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PREFACE
The work that I have taken to complete this book has been done on a
highly compressed time schedule. During the late summer of 2008, I was
approached by my friend James Franczek, senior partner at the Chicago labor law
firm of Franczek, Radelet & Rose, about the possibility of doing some work on the
proposed Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), which passed the House of
Representatives in 2008, only to die in the Senate after a procedural vote to
consider the bill failed to garner the necessary 60 votes. Franczek, and others
whom I met with that summer, were confident that the reintroduction of EFCA was
highly likely in 2009, especially if the Democratic majority increased in the Senate
and (as has turned out to be the case) Barack Obama was elected President of the
United States.
President Obama has been a persistent and outspoken supporter of
this proposed legislation, and he takes office with solid labor‐backed Democratic
majorities in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. As a result, the
pressure has escalated on legislators to consider EFCA, which, as will be come
evident, has three major components. The first of these is an increase in the
penalties for unfair labor practices by employers during the course of union
organization campaigns. The second is the use of a card‐check system to authorize a
union for a particular bargaining unit. The third is a system of mandatory interest
arbitration which allows a panel of federal arbitrators to set the terms of a first two‐
year contract of an overtly truncated timeline of 130 days is not met. The statute
would in effect bypass the protections of the secret ballot in the formation of a union
and deny any employer or employee the option to refuse to deal on the terms
demanded by a union. These are no small changes.
I have worked in the area of labor law on and off since I was a third‐year
student at the Yale Law School. I have also written and taught in the area in the
years that followed. Given my previous familiarity with the field, it took me little
time to realize that this proposed legislation would have the worst possible
consequences for the workplace—and through it for the overall economy. The
brevity of the statute conceals a host of serious difficulties about its integration with
the labor laws that would remain on the books, even as it gives evidence to the
massive shift of power from private ordering to state control. I wish to make it clear
at the outset that I do not regard the current labor law as ideal relative to more
market‐oriented approaches. But it has been relatively stable on matters of
collective bargaining over the past 60 years, during which it has provided a
framework to which both management and labor has been able to adapt.
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Shortly after I spoke with Franczek, I agreed to write a detailed study of the
Act. The task, however, was too large to do entirely by my own resources. I have
had for several years a working affiliation with LECG consulting group, and I was
able to enlist the support of one of its managing directors, Anne Layne‐Farrar, with
whom I have worked on many other occasions, to help me on the project. She in
turn recruited one of LECG’s crack research analysts, Mr. Sokol Vako, to assist me
both in the collection of data and in a detailed review of the manuscript at every
stage. Toward the end of the process, he was ably assisted by two other research
analysts, Dhiren Patki and Alina Marinova.
In addition to their help, I have received helpful comments along the way by
a large number of individuals who have long experience and intimate involvement
in labor law. In addition, to James Franczek, David Radelet and Jennifer Niemiec of
Franczek, Radelet & Rose provided me with useful background information in EFCA
and card check recognition and interest arbitration under Illinois law. Mr. Philip
Miscimarra, a Senior Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School and
partner at Morgan, Lewis and Bockius, provided detailed comments on an earlier
draft of this paper. Additional comments have been provided by Mr. Andrew
Kramer and G. Roger King of Jones Day.
I am also grateful to my long time friend John Raisian, the Director of the
Hoover Institution, for speedily arranging the publication of this volume, and to
Stephen Langlois, Associate Director of the Hoover Institution for speeding this
volume toward publication.
Finally, I have received financial support for this work from the Alliance to
Save Main Street Jobs, which is comprised of the HR Policy Association (the leader of
the Alliance), the Retail Industry Leaders Association, the Real Estate Roundtable,
the American Hotel and Lodging Association, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the
International Council of Shopping Centers, and the Associated Builders and
Contractors. I am grateful for their support, and for their willingness to allow me
complete freedom to write the book in the manner that I chose. I know that all
members of these organizations understand that the passage of EFCA is fraught with
perils not only to them as employers, but to everyone in this country, be they
employer or employee. The stakes on this issue are too great to remain silent. I am
honored to have this opportunity to write “The Case Against the Employee Free
Choice Act.”
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INTRODUCTION
The EFCA Initiative

Historical Background
The Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) is the most transformative piece of
labor legislation to come before Congress since the enactment of the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA). To assess the potential impact of EFCA, this blunt
statement needs to be put in historical perspective. The NLRA marked the
culmination of a systematic effort of the Progressive movement that dominated so
much of American intellectual life during the first third of the twentieth century. Its
basic purpose was to displace the earlier judge‐made regime that had previously
governed labor relationships. That system did not carve out any special privileges,
or impose any special burdens, on labor unions and their members. Instead it
applied the same general legal principles applicable to other forms of business and
economic associations organized to advance the interests of their members. The
first major departure from that model in American labor law was the passage in
1914 of Section 6 of the Clayton Act, which insulated labor unions from the
application of all antitrust laws insofar as their members were members of
organizations “instituted for purposes of mutual help.” 1 In effect all efforts of
workers to join together in unions were exempted from the standard antitrust law
that otherwise makes horizontal arrangements between individuals a per se offense
under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 2 Next in 1926, the Railway Labor Act conferred
special privileges of collective bargaining on railroad workers, 3 which was later
extended to airlines. 4 Seven years later, the Norris‐LaGuardia Act of 1933 placed
sharp limitations on the traditional ability of employers to obtain injunctions during
the course of labor disputes. 5 Shortly thereafter, the Congress passed the original
version of the NLRA (the Wagner Act), which was upheld against constitutional
challenges in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co. 6 Since that time, the subsequent
changes all took place within the framework of the collective bargaining regime set
out under the Wagner Act. The most important subsequent change was the Taft‐
Hartley Act of 1947, which cut back on some of the main advantages that the
Wagner Act had conferred upon unions. Its chief innovation was to make it clear
that the NLRA respected employees’ collective choice on unionization, but did not
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put its thumb on the scale in favor of unionization if the workers voted otherwise.
Thus the original language of section 7 in the 1935 Act showed a strong preference
for labor organization when it provided:
§7. Employees shall have the right to self‐organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
The Taft‐Hartley Act of 1947 made explicit the converse of this proposition
when it added to the above provision the following clause:
And shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities
except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requirement membership in a labor organization as a condition of
employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3). 7
In addition the Taft‐Hartley Act created a set of unfair labor practices with
respect to union conduct, which parallel those for management, including important
substantive limitations on secondary boycotts—that is—union action directed
against firms that did business with any employer that was the target of a union
organization drive. And finally, the Taft‐Hartley Act gave its explicit blessing to state
right‐to‐work laws that allowed individuals to remain outside the union, and not
pay it dues, even after it won a union election. These changes, however, did nothing
to undo the basic principle of union elections followed by good faith bargaining
between the two sides once the union was selected. Finally, the Landrum‐Griffin Act
of 1959 8 was directed toward issues of internal union management, with an eye to
the control of union corruption—a topic which is outside the scope of this analysis
of the EFCA.
As was widely acknowledged at the time, the NLRA was revolutionary in its
implications for American Labor Law. 9 The two central pillars of the original NLRA
have survived to this day. The first was to introduce a system of union democracy
whereby unions could only obtain the rights of exclusive representation for firms if
they could prevail in an election held by secret ballot. If a union was selected, both
parties were under obligations to negotiate in good faith to work towards a
collective bargaining agreement. In addition, the legislative history of the NLRA
went to great pains to establish a second pillar of free negotiation. In its own words,
[t]he committee wishes to dispel any possible false impression that this bill is
designed to compel the making of agreements or to permit governmental
supervision of their terms. It must be stressed that the duty to bargain
collectively does not carry with it the duty to reach an agreement because the
essence of collective bargaining is that either party shall be free to decide
whether proposals made to it are satisfactory. 10
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EFCA’s Three Prongs
THE CARD CHECK
EFCA rejects both these fundamental commitments of the NLRA. Its liberal
defenders have attacked the current structure under the NRLA as inhospitable to
unions. 11 Thus the EFCA contains three provisions, which if enacted into law, would
transform the institution of collective bargaining. The first proposal would allow
either party the option to substitute a card‐check system for the current electoral
system. To be sure, the EFCA leaves in place the present NLRA provisions that allow
unions to proceed by filing a representation petition supported by 30 percent or
more of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit and then holding elections. 12
Nonetheless, it seems clear that in virtually all cases the card check will displace the
secret ballot. As a matter of current practice, virtually all major unions choose to file
representation petitions only after they have accumulated signed authorization
cards from well over 50 percent of unit members. They need that cushion because
they know from experience that worker defections will take place during the course
of any election campaign in which management can present its own case of the
tradeoffs, costs and disadvantages of representation. It follows therefore that no
rational union would risk the election if they have in their possession authorization
cards from just over 50 percent of the members of the unit they seek to represent.
As a practical matter however, the EFCA would wholly displace union elections with
the new “card check” procedure. No union is likely to file for an election with over
30 but under 50 percent of signed authorization cards in the hopes of improving its
position during a campaign. The conversion to the card check system is likely to
prove well‐nigh complete.
COMPULSORY INTEREST ARBITRATION
EFCA’s second major provision would introduce a system of compulsory
interest arbitration that leads to a first “contract” of two years duration. The term
contract is put in quotation marks because an actual agreement that obtains the
assent of both parties is not required during the initial period in question. This
mandatory first contract, moreover, is not limited to wage matters, but must cover
all the issues that are typically hammered out by agreement under the current
system.
INCREASED PENALTIES FOR EMPLOYER UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The third major change of the EFCA, which ties in closely with the adoption
of the card check system, substantially increases the penalties imposed on
employers with respect to violations of section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, which prohibits
discrimination against employees for their union activities. 13 This section also
requires the NLRB to give priority to charges of ULPs that arise in the course of
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organizing campaign, in order to backstop the advantage that unions expect to
receive from the addition of the card check alternative.

EFCA’s Economic Consequences
The legislative adoption of these provisions taken together, would radically
alter the balance of power between management and labor. Its impact would
extend to virtually all businesses, except from some small business that fall below
the “interstate commerce” thresholds that the NLRB applies in exercise of its own
jurisdiction. 14 But even those exemptions have little relevance to any new firm that
hopes to grow over time. The bottom line therefore is that the passage of the EFCA
will create huge dislocations in established ways of doing business that will in turn
lead to large losses in productivity. Small businesses, which as a group are the
largest source of new jobs in the country, will find themselves besieged with
insistent demands for unionization, for which they are ill‐equipped to cope. These
businesses often operate on small budgets, without the assistance of full time
lawyers. Under EFCA, their first exposure to unions could come at the conclusion of
a secret campaign, which requires them to both hire and acquire expertise on
contentious matters for which they are ill‐equipped to deal, at a cost which they can
ill afford to bear. These calls for unionization will divert management from the
essential tasks of product development, marketing and sales, on which their
business models necessarily depend. The likely consequence of EFCA will be to
retard the formation of small businesses, as fledgling entrepreneurs will reassess
their prospects of success to take into account the danger of derailment at an early
stage in the process. In the long‐term the EFCA will reduce the rate of firm
formation, and thus deprive the economy of a central driver of new job creation and
technology growth.
Large firms face a different set of difficulties. Like their smaller compatriots,
they will face the heavy costs of meeting simultaneous multiple threats of
unionization. Since they operate through far‐flung, geographically dispersed
divisions, they face the risk of inconsistent arbitral decrees that will impede the
development of firm wide practices. Given the uncertain scope of these decrees, it is
quite possible that restrictions designed to preserve job security within a unit will
limit the ability of the firm to reorganize nonunit employees who are closely
connected with them. In addition, the prospect of multiple union arbitrations
covering different locations could result in inconsistent first contracts under a
system that offers no clear avenues for appeal or clarification. Faced with these
constraints, a firm’s ability to shift and meet the rising competition from new firms
could easily result in the loss of jobs from the failure of certain business lines, or the
conscious redeployment by management of assets and new investment to locations
that have lower costs and greater flexibility –traits most often associated with
nonunion operations. The decision to send more activities offshore is also a distinct
likelihood. Any efforts to stem that flow could easily lead to a collapse of the entire
firm in the face of effective foreign competition. Nonunionized firms are able to
make these decisions in anticipation of a union threat. Firms that are currently
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bound by collective bargaining agreements of course remain subject to the core
obligations under the NLRA, which include the duty to bargain in good faith, without
any antiunion animus. 15 Unions may try to challenge some of these decisions before
the NLRB, but the powerful and economic rationales for taking these measures will
reduce the chances of union success. Yet if the EFCA were in place, the level of labor
tension and strife is likely to increase the frequency and intensity of public protests,
political campaigns, and work slowdowns or stoppages in response to decisions to
relocate or outsource. The key union leaders who link these key business decisions
to “[t]he Senseless Slaughter of the Good American Job,” which are tantamount to
“wanton acts of physical violence,” 16 will not to take kindly to wholly lawful
decisions to set up shop elsewhere. The same can be said of officials like Andy Stern
who is intent on the restoration of the American dream and is not likely to pull in his
horns if EFCA does not meet his expectations. The next round direct action and new
legislative fixes offer them the path of least resistance. The economic dislocation
under EFCA will lead to further strife, not industrial peace.
Of course, the exact pattern of union threats, maneuvers, and responses is
difficult to predict owing in part to the huge gaps in EFCA. But regardless of how
these play out, it is certain that these devastating effects would arise chiefly from the
synergistic effects of the first two provisions mentioned above. Taken together, they
allow a union that acquires a sufficient number of signatures through a largely
unregulated card authorization process to force management to accept a first
“contract”—in reality an arbitral decree—that lasts for a two year period. Step one
under the EFCA would routinely displace the long‐established system of union
elections by routinely allowing any union that presents a majority (e.g., 50% + 1) of
the cards signed by workers in an appropriate bargaining unit to become the
bargaining agent for all the workers, including those who had no knowledge of the
campaign from either coworkers or the employer. For some workers at least, the
misnamed EFCA would leave them no choice at all if they are not approached during
the campaign.
The EFCA’s second provision introduces a system of “interest arbitration”—
in reality compulsory arbitration—under which the failure of the two sides to reach
an agreement within as little as 130 days after union recognition—a short time for
any first‐time collective bargaining agreement that starts with a blank sheet of
paper—results in the appointment of a panel of arbitrators to impose by decree the
first two‐year contract. Under the proposed timetable, negotiations are supposed to
begin within 10 days after union recognition. On the other hand, the union knows in
advance the targets of its card check drives and can have its negotiation team in
place before the results of the card check are computed. The element of surprise
thus gives them a huge strategic advantage over small business firms, which may
not be even able to find a lawyer to represent them during this short period. Large
firms suffer from the same tactical disadvantage. Yet even if they take the costly
step of having some negotiation teams in place, they could still be besieged by
multiple claims at the same time, which could leave them short on vital resources.
These difficulties are aggravated by the remainder of the statutory cycle. In
the second stage the parties would have 90 days—a short time for addressing the
multiplicity of issues in play—to reach a voluntary settlement. If an agreement is not
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reached by this time, then a mediator from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service (FMCS) would work with the parties for 30 days before the matter goes
before a panel of arbitrators. Once again, it is quite possible that just scheduling
meetings for the relevant negotiators—all of whom are likely to have multiple
commitments—could be difficult within the statutory period.
The entire time for negotiation could easily be consumed by collateral
matters that drive the case quickly to arbitration, at which point it is anyone’s guess
what will happen. The EFCA provides no limitation on how long the arbitration
panel may take to make its decision, and does not indicate what happens to the
various open issues for the bargaining unit that were left unresolved during the
interim period. Its basic procedures and powers are all to be determined by
regulation under the statute, none of which will be drafted when the EFCA takes
effect. Any effort to participate in the process whereby these regulations are drafted
imposes additional costs, which are likely to prove especially large for small
businesses that have no direct experience with the administrative process.

Why Unions Decline
Unions and their backers seek to justify this profound reversal of 70
unbroken years under the NLRA by claiming that radical surgery offers the only
effective way to reverse the rapid decline in union membership in the private sector.
It is of course undisputed that level of private sector unionization has fallen from its
high of about 35 percent of eligible workers in 1954 to about 8 percent of eligible
workers today. Union supporters argue that this decline in unionization rates has
had adverse consequences on the overall social fabric including the fragile status of
the middle class. For example, in her highly influential study on union elections,
Kate Bronfenbrenner, who herself has extensive experience as an SEIU organizer, 17
sounds the general theme by insisting that the overall increase in social prosperity
in the 1990s did not translate into higher wages for workers. Indeed she claims that
her “study conclusively demonstrates that capital mobility and the threat of capital
mobility have had a profound impact on the ability of American workers to exercise
their rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining.” 18 Her point
illustrates a misunderstanding of the basic picture. What she should have said was
that it is impossible for unions (and their domestic employers) to claim monopoly
rents in the face of global competition, which is more powerful for businesses that
can be moved offshore to those service industries that remain at home. But it is not
that the rights of association that are stripped. It is that their value cannot be
preserved against new entrants. What Bronfenbrenner does not acknowledge is
that only the willingness of unions to back off their demands is what saves their
jobs—when it is not too little and too late. Union intransigence would not stave off
the demise of firm and union alike in the absence of tariff walls.
Nor is she correct in her claim that the market has left workers behind. The
basic picture can be fleshed out by looking at a data that examines the relationship
in the broad economy between individual wages and individual productivity. The
standard neoclassical economic theory on this point is confident in its prediction.
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Workers as a group in the general economy face a competitive labor market, in large
measure because of the low levels of union penetration in the private sector.
Accordingly, we should expect wages to be bid up to reflect any increase in
productivity, for the possibility of switching jobs will force wages up. Just that result
is found by looking at government statistics that seek to correlate these two key
variables. The basic chart, as prepared by the conservative Heritage Foundation
shows an exceedingly close statistical correlation.
FIGURE 1
PRODUCTIVITY AND COMPENSATION GROWS, 1947‐2007
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It is also a mistake to think that the decline in labor union membership is
unique to the United States. In fact that decline is matched by the decline in
unionization in other nations that operate under different legal regimes. 19 The
extent of the decline can be judged by looking at Table I, which shows a uniform
pattern of steep declines. In this regard, the New Zealand experience, although
small in number, is of some interest because the dramatic drop after 1990—from 51
percent in 1990 to 24.9 percent in 1996—was precipitated in part by the passage of
the Employee Contract Act of 1990 initiated by the National, or conservative party. 20
Yet when the Labour Party undid the earlier reforms by passing the Employee
Contract Act upon taking power in 2000, the percentage of union participation
barely budged. The key point that should be gathered from these figures is that any
effort to attribute the decline in the American market to distinctive factors of our
own system of labor law sorely misses the point. Larger, global trends are very
much in evidence, which undercut the key union claim that distinctive American
bargaining procedures drives the current decline in union membership. 21
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TABLE 1
UNION DENSITY IN 11 COUNTRIES AND E. U., ADJUSTED DATA, 1970–2003, IN % 22
United
States
23.5
19.5
15.5
15.5
15.1
15.1
14.9
14.3
14.0
13.6
13.4
13.4
12.8
12.8
12.6
12.4

Canada
31.6
34.7
32.9
—
33.1
32.8
—
—
—
28.8
28.5
27.9
28.1
28.2
28.2
28.4

Absolute
Change
1970‐1980
1980‐1990
1990‐2003
1970‐2003

‐2.5
‐4.0
‐3.1
‐11.1

Relative
Change
1970‐1980
1980‐1990
1990‐2003
1970‐2003

‐10.6
‐20.5
‐20.0
‐47.2

Year
1970
1980
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

Japan
35.1
31.1
25.4
24.8
24.5
24.3
24.3
24.0
23.4
22.8
22.5
22.2
21.5
20.9
20.3
19.7

Rep.
of
Korea
12.6
14.7
17.6
16.1
15.1
14.5
13.4
12.9
12.2
11.9
12.1
11.1
11.1
11.2
11.1
11.2

Euro.
Union
37.8
39.7
33.1
34.1
33.4
32.7
31.7
30.4
29.5
28.8
28.2
27.8
27.3
26.6
26.3
—

Germany
32.0
34.9
31.2
36.0
33.9
31.8
30.4
29.2
27.8
27.0
25.9
25.6
25.0
23.5
23.2
22.6

France
21.7
18.3
10.1
9.9
9.9
9.6
9.2
9.0
8.3
8.2
8.0
8.1
8.2
8.1
8.3
8.3

Italy
37.0
49.6
38.8
38.7
38.9
39.2
38.7
38.1
37.4
36.2
35.7
36.1
34.9
34.8
34.0
33.7

U. K.
44.8
50.7
39.3
38.5
37.2
36.1
34.2
32.6
31.7
30.6
30.1
29.8
29.7
29.3
29.2
29.3

Ireland
53.2
57.1
51.1
50.2
49.8
47.7
46.2
45.8
45.5
43.5
41.5
—
—
36.6
36.3
35.3

13.9
‐18.1
‐28.9
‐33.1

‐4.0
‐5.8
‐5.6
‐15.4

2.0
3.0
‐6.5
‐1.5

1.9
‐6.7
‐6.7
‐11.5

2.9
‐3.7
‐8.6
‐9.5

‐3.4
‐8.1
‐1.9
‐13.4

12.6
‐10.8
‐5.1
‐3.3

5.9
‐11.4
‐10.0
‐15.5

3.9
‐6.1
‐15.8
‐17.9

25.2
‐26.2
‐56.7
‐60.0

‐11.4
‐18.6
‐22.0
‐43.9

15.9
20.4
‐36.9
‐11.9

5.0
‐16.9
‐20.2
‐30.4

9.1
‐10.6
‐27.6
‐29.7

‐15.7
‐44.3
‐18.8
‐61.8

34.1
‐21.8
‐13.1
‐8.9

13.2
‐22.5
‐25.4
‐34.6

7.3
‐10.7
‐30.9
‐33.6

Australia
50.2
49.5
40.5
—
39.6
37.6
35.0
32.7
31.1
30.3
28.1
25.7
24.7
24.5
23.1
22.9

New
Zealand
55.2
69.1
51.0
44.4
37.1
34.5
30.2
27.6
24.9
23.6
22.3
21.9
22.7
22.6
22.1
—

3.3
‐1.8
‐4.7
‐6.5

‐0.7
‐9.0
‐17.6
‐27.3

10.4
‐5.2
‐14.3
‐20.6

‐1.4
‐18.2
‐43.5
‐54.4

FIGURE 2
U.S UNION DENSITY, 1977‐2007
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FIGURE 3
U.S. UNION MEMBERSHIP 1977‐2007

Union Membership (Millions)

25

20

15

10

5

0
1977

1982

1987

1992

1997

2002

2007

Year
Private Sector

Public Sector

Total Members

FIGURE 4
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The key dispute is over the reasons for this admitted decline. The defenders of
EFCA typically claim that unions suffer a serious disadvantage in an organizing
campaign because the unjustified intransigence of employers both large and small,
including the use of unfair labor practices (ULPs), prevents workers from exercising
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the full and free choice to join a union—the equal right to refrain from joining a
union receives less attention—contained in the essential guarantee for collective
bargaining after the 1947 Taft‐Hartley Amendments to the NLRA.
In making this claim, the critics of the current law studiously ignore not only
the global trends noted above, but all other factors that could account for the decline
in unionization. Some likely candidates for the observed decline include the
expansion of free trade across national borders, more intensive global competition
for employees, the reduced appeal of unions to younger workers, 23 the entry of
smaller decentralized firms, the rapid turnover of workers in a relatively open
economy, the better wages and working conditions that nonunion employees can
command in an open economy, the rise in government regulation that confers
certain protections (i.e. against discrimination) that no longer are subjects of
bargaining, ineffective union organizing, and the rigidity of the internal governance
structure of unions themselves. Most important perhaps is the fundamental switch
in the political economy of the United States. The 1930s marked a corporatist
period, in which monopoly unions shared power with regulated monopoly
industries, shielded from competition by a powerful state. 24 More recently, the
economic environment has switched by allowing the free entry of smaller firms
whose vitality and growth has gone a long way in undermining the old monopoly
models, posing more challenges to established firms and their long‐standing labor
unions. No account of the decline in unionization is complete without taking these
changes in account, which the defenders of EFCA blindly refuse to do.
The case in support of EFCA is also deficient for its failure to establish any
tight relationship between the supposed wrong and the curative legislation. Of
EFCA’s three provisions, the only one that deals directly with the incidence of ULPs
is the third, which imposes increased penalties on employers, without, however,
imposing a similar increase on unions for any ULPs they might commit in handling
of authorization cards or in taking positions initial agreement disputes. In other
words, the EFCA does not contain any parallel provision that imposes increased
penalties for unions with respect to their violation of the analogous ULPs contained
in NLRA section 8(b)(1)(A), which prohibits union restraint or coercion of
employees; section 8(b)(3), which imposes on union the obligation to bargain in
good faith during negotiations; and section 8(b)(4), which prohibits unlawful union
pressure directed against secondary parties in order to improperly place pressure
on the employer engaged in union bargaining. EFCA only increases the penalties for
employers.
The proposal for the standard substitution of a card‐check system for the
secret ballot is manifestly overbroad because it imposes this new method of union
recognition in all cases based on the occurrence of ULPs in some small fraction of
cases, which is systematically overstated by union defenders. Most anomalously,
the insistence on interest arbitration—a fancy phrase for compulsory labor
arbitration—is described misleadingly in the bill as a means of “facilitating initial
collective bargaining agreements,” when in fact unions are frustrated by their
inability to obtain first contracts that advance their interests under the traditional
bargaining system. Federal and state law has never allowed any panel of arbitrators
to impose a full array of detailed obligations on a reluctant party. In fact, the NLRA’s
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definition of collective bargaining explicitly states that the law does not require
either party to accept a particular proposal or to make a particular concession
(NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)). Without question, this dramatic switch in the
current law enjoys no precedent in the private sector, and, as will become evident,
only highly imperfect analogies in the public sector.
All the public defenses of the EFCA, including the testimony before Congress
on March 27, 2007, skirt the interest arbitration question entirely. Professor
Cynthia Estlund of NYU Law School, for example, ducked the arbitration issue with
the simple observation that she was concerned only with “enhanced enforcement
and majority sign‐up process,” without ever explaining why it was appropriate to
ignore the evident synergies between the two. 25 None of the other parties who
testified addressed it either. It is as though a conspiracy of silence among the
supporters of the Act envelops the one provision that most dramatically transforms
the American system of collective bargaining for the worst.
In this extended essay I hope to fill the large gaps that the previous advocacy
and research leaves open in understanding EFCA. My approach proceeds in two
stages. The first parses the card‐check and arbitration provisions of the EFCA. The
second offers a detailed critique of its institutional structure and probable economic
consequences, both allocative and distributive. 26
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CHAPTER 1
CARD CHECKS VERSUS SECRET BALLOT ELECTIONS

Streamlining Union Certification?
Section 2 of the EFCA is described as “Streamlining Union Certification.” That
heading connotes an effort to fine‐tune the current system in order to make it work
more cheaply, quickly and effectively. But this title belies the major changes that the
section imposes, which would gut the entire system of union elections. The power of
the union is, of course, inversely proportional to the ability of the employer to
influence the outcome of the election. By increasing penalties for employer, but not
union ULPs, section 4 of the EFCA, entitled “Strengthening Enforcement,” tilts the
scale in unions’ favor, without any effective mechanism for remedying abuses
associated with union authorization cards or petition. These two provisions
significantly alter all aspects of any union organization drive. In this chapter I offer
a systematic comparison of the current law position under the NLRA and the
proposed change. This inquiry requires an examination of all phases of the process
that leads up to the certification or rejection of a union. I start therefore with
preliminary efforts that unions make to secure an advantageous outcome either
through an election or card‐check under the current law. In particular I speak first
about neutrality agreements and the issues of salted employees. Thereafter I turn to
issues that surround the conduct of an election campaign and therefore turn to a
comparison of the secret ballot and the card check as means to determine whether a
union will represent a bargaining unit. The charges and countercharges of coercion
and intimidation are thrown about with great abandon, and must be examined at
every stage throughout the process.

A Fatal Imbalance?
In order to understand the particulars that follow, it is necessary to start
with this bedrock issue: do the current rules contain some implicit bias against
union organization? In order to assess this charge, it is necessary to look at all three
phases of these elections: preliminary maneuvers, the actual election campaign and
the conduct of the election itself. In making this assessment, a note of diffidence is
needed. It should be quite evident that the peculiar circumstances of union
elections cannot be governed by rules that carry over from the political context
without some adaption to the distinctive context of worker elections under the
NLRA. But it hardly follows from this proposition that NLRA union representation
elections are tainted when measured against some benchmark of political elections.
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Quite simply both types of election are, and must remain flawed under any test that
requires election outcomes to be a perfect reflection of voter preferences. The only
workable questions ask what fixes could be made to improve the situation with
respect to either the campaign or the election itself.
The source of this cautious assessment lies in large measure in one constant
feature of all electoral contexts—the built‐in asymmetry among the contending
parties in a variety of different settings. In a political election, one asymmetry arises
whenever one party is able to reap the advantages of incumbency, which allow its
candidates to reach voters through legitimate government expenditures that lie
outside campaign finance limitations. 1
The constant efforts of government regulators to create fundraising or
spending limits that cancel out these advantages necessarily falls short of its
laudable objective. Yet the Supreme Court has properly taken pains to indicate that
the level of scrutiny given to these reforms cannot be so high as to preclude all
forms of government regulation, even if incumbents keep their insider advantage
against challengers.
The challenge to devise appropriate electoral safeguards is not confined to
cases where one party is the incumbent. Various strategic imbalances also arise
when two or more candidates vie for an office that neither holds. Thus in the 2004
presidential election, the contribution of the so‐called 527 organizations, including
the Swift‐Boat Vets and POWs For Truth had a powerful negative impact on the
fortunes of John Kerry. 2 And the decision of Barack Obama to forgo public money in
the 2008 campaign generated a huge media advantage that manifested itself most
clearly in the closing days of the election. More generally, massive contributions
from political action committees that are organized by activist groups, including
labor unions, can exert a profound effect on electoral outcomes throughout the
entire system. In the recent election cycle unions contributed $450 million to elect
democratic candidates, $85 million of which was contributed by SEIU. 3 The most
candid appraisal about the purpose of these contributions comes from Andy Stern,
who was worried not only about who gets elected. Quite consciously, SEIU put aside
“an additional $10 million to get people unelected if need be. ‘We would like to
make sure people appreciate that we take them at their word and when they don’t
live up to their word there should be consequences,” 4 which doubtless there are.
The point of these observations is to stress that it is impossible to devise any
set of election rules that do not create advantages for one side or the other. In the
course of any complex campaign, advantages run in both directions, from which it
does not follow that any two sets of advantages necessarily cancel out. The same
basic insight carries over to union elections, where the asymmetries are guaranteed
by the fundamental difference in the position of the two major parties, and the
closed and limited environment in which these election campaigns take place. It is
important to review the evidence to see the extent to which any charge of
systematic unfairness accounts for the decline in union participation. The overall
answer is that it is difficult to postulate any large employer advantage. Indeed with
the increase of collateral attacks that unions make on employers outside and prior
to the election process, the organizing advantage writ‐large has tilted in their favor.
There is no evidence of any systematic shift in the rules governing either these
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campaigns or elections proper. Nor is there any evidence of administrative bias in
the conduct of elections at the NLRB in either direction. In order to trace out this
theme, I shall begin with the election campaigns. Thereafter I shall discuss both
certification and decertification elections.

The Organization Campaign
NEUTRALITY AGREEMENTS
The current union antipathy toward union elections has also led union
leaders to make a systematic and concerted push to obtain so‐called neutrality
agreements to negate what they regard as the inherently coercive nature of union
elections. 5 They defend these agreements as a way to counter the various tactics
that employers reportedly use to resist unionization, including captive meetings,
email blasts and supervisor persuasion which, according to EFCA proponents,
operate to pummel workers into voting against the union. 6
The terms of actual neutrality agreements will vary case to case, but the basic
pattern in about two‐thirds of the cases is that the employer agrees to waive the
right to a representation election, and to accept the outcome of a card‐check
campaign organized by the union. 7 In the remainder of the agreements, some
limitations on employer speech, from modest to severe, are accepted, but the card‐
check provision is rejected. Not all of these agreements require the union to agree to
any similar restraints, but some do. These agreements have an uneasy status
because they do not necessarily reflect the interests and concerns of the employees
who might care about the election on the one hand, or about the opportunity to hear
speech from the other side. Many of these agreements are made in secret between
unions and large employers, including secret engagements between Sodexho, Inc,
and the Compass Group USA and Service Employees International Union (SEIU) and
Unite Here. 8 The parties claimed that they needed secrecy for competitive reasons,
and may well have worked for the advantages of both sides, given the full range of
pressures that unions can bring against employers.
This claim should be greeted with suspicion. As a matter of general contract
law, agreements that bind third persons without their consent are highly suspect,
and these neutrality agreements as a class are not exempt from that criticism.
Section 7 of the NLRA protects neither the rights of unions nor of employers, but of
employees—all employees. It is not to protect unionization as such. Thus the
current law accepts the ability of employees to set up unions through card checks,
but at the same time it prefers union elections. 9
It is easy enough to see why labor unions would support card check
procedures. They improve the union’s chances of gaining recognition, even if they
limit the voice and remove the votes of dissenting workers. It is, of course, harder to
see why employers who are opposed to unions would be willing to accept these
provisions. In a large number of cases, neutrality agreements result from persistent
“corporate campaigns” waged by unions against employers, either in the complete
absence of any bargaining relationship or where the union represents employees at
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some but not all company facilities. In these cases, paradoxically, it is often in the
interest of unions to postpone the election in order to continue their pressure on the
firm, and the current interpretation of the NLRA does not give the employer the
option to force an election unless the union has clearly announced its willingness to
go ahead with the election. 10 In other cases, the employer’s decision may be simply
bowing to the inevitable, a rational calculation to avoid greater loss. If a union is
known to be in a strong position, the neutrality agreement spares the firm the costs
of contesting an election while holding out some small hope that the union will not
be able to gain sufficient number of cards to force recognition or to win an election if
one is still allowed. So the outcome could be chalked up to simple economic
rationality.
Bear in mind that these neutrality agreements do not always have the
benevolent origins that their supporters attribute to them. Professor James
Brudney, for example, points to other collateral advantages that unions can dangle
before management in order to get it to sign neutrality agreements, including
steering access to union conventions to hotels that accept these agreements. 11
Unfortunately, when the carrot does not work, the stick is still available. There is an
enormous variation in the regulatory environment of firms that are covered by the
NLRA. But the employers, in some industries at least, are commonly vulnerable to
union pressure on other fronts. That point has not escaped the most dynamic leader
in the labor movement, Andy Stern President of the Service Employees International
Union, who put the point forward with frightening bluntness. “We like to say: We
use the power of persuasion first. If it doesn’t work, we try the persuasion of
power.” 12 Stern may have no formal training in game theory, but he has an
instinctive grasp of its central principles. The person who hears the initial
persuasive pitch what to expect if he does not agree: a switch into second gear. The
maxim therefore only shows that SEIU will not need to expend unnecessary labor so
long as its second stage threat is credible.
And it is. For example, SEIU has taken an active role as a vehement critic of
all private equity firms. Just recently it urged the California Public
Employees’ Retirement System (Calpers) not to invest in certain companies that
failed to meet labor standards acceptable to SEIU. 13 Stern has also mounted an
extensive political campaign that targets private equity firms, most notably
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts and the Carlyle Group, which have resisted unionization
efforts by SEIU, by portraying them as “buyout monsters” whose greed threatens the
health and stability of the middle class. 14 Clearly, these pressure tactics represent
efforts to circumvent unit elections by engaging in conduct that verges on, or
crosses the line of, defamation, knowing that law suits on this matter are either
doomed to fail as a legal matter or only give the targeted firm another dose of
unwanted publicity. Such tough organizing tactics outside the NLRA framework only
speak to union power, and have the great virtue that retaliation in kind is not
possible. There is nothing that Kohlberg Kravis Roberts or the Carlyle Group could
say about SEIU’s Andy Stern that has one‐thousandth of the pop of the bitter
denunciations that he can make against them.
Nor does the extracurricular use of coercion—taken here in a narrow
sense—stop with publicity campaigns. Litigation on collateral matters offers
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avenues through which to attack employers. One common strategy, for example, is
for unions to file all sorts of lawsuits against employers for alleged violations of
various labor statutes, the Fair Labor Standards Act, OSHA, the antidiscrimination
laws, the antitrust laws, and so forth in order to gain recognition as the bargaining
agent or exact a neutrality agreement. 15 Here again the complaints are costly to
respond to even if their charges are unmerited. These lawsuits at least are
expensive to file and they require the identification of real plaintiffs, which
anonymous complaints do not.
A still more potent technique takes advantage of the cumbrous machinery of
the administrative state. The employers regulated by the NLRA are a diverse lot.
Some of them work in highly unregulated industries, where regulatory retaliation
and threats are difficult to launch. Yet other businesses are far more vulnerable.
Hospitals for obvious reasons are among the most heavily regulated industries of all.
Many of these regulatory groups will conduct on‐the‐spot inspections in response to
anonymous tips and complaints. It is not difficult for unions—especially SEIU—to
lodge multiple regulatory complaints in order to impose on an employer heavy costs
of dealing with the disruption caused by these inspections, which can even result in
the disruption of patient care and public confidence. 16 The costs of bad publicity
and compliance efforts are high even if, as is commonly the case, the complaints are
eventually dismissed as groundless. On the other hand the risk of liability or bad
publicity to SEIU is negligible.
The increased reliance on these tactics is revealing in a more ominous sense.
They give a clear indication that SEIU and other unions do not think that they can
persuade firms that they are better off with the unions than they are without them.
Hence the use of these tactics is designed to alter the terms of trade. Now the SEIU
strategy is to demonstrate to employers that they are better off with the union than
they are suffering under the various tactics SEIU can impose unilaterally to
undermine their ordinary operations. The social welfare implications of this
alternative approach are profound. The voluntary acceptance of a union (especially
in the absence of any duty to bargain) should in theory be treated as welfare
enhancing. When parties enter into ordinary business contracts it is strong
evidence that they regard themselves as better off than before: why else go through
the trouble. The acquiescence of a union in the face of these constant threats,
however, only shows that the firm is better off with the union than with the threats
that induced it to cave in. It does not show that the union can improve the level of
production of the firm so as to make the firm (or society) better off with the union
than without it. Nor is there any reason to think that efforts to placate an aggressive
union do anything to improve the welfare of the firm’s worker.
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TABLE 2
NUMBER OF NLRB ELECTIONS HELD 2000‐2007 17
Number of
Year
Elections
2000
2705
2001
2334
2002
2167
2003
2133
2004
1917
2005
2007
2006
1546
2007
1407
As will become clear, the use of these tactics by unions is a conscious effort to
avoid the pitfalls of secret ballot elections, whose use has declined in recent years,
by close to 50 percent, from 2,705 in 2000 to 1407 in 2007. Set against this
background, an employer’s decision to enter into a neutrality agreement in order to
stave off a barrage of regulatory complaints hardly counts as voluntary. Instead it is
a rational calculation to avoid a greater peril that has nothing to do with the welfare
of bargaining unit members. Section 8(b)(2) is not applicable because there is no
“company” union. Pigeon‐holing this conduct under section 8(b)(1)––which deals
with the ULPs of labor organization––is, however, not as easy as it seems, for the
section only applies to conduct “(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the
exercise of their rights guaranteed in section 7.” Clearly the direct target of these
initiatives is the employer not the workers, so that the section could only apply if the
indirect effect on workers’ rights were sufficient to trigger the application of the
section, which presents a tricky point of statutory construction. But the abuse of
false publicity and legal process, especially the latter, is apparent given that charges
and complaints are often made wholly without regard to the truth. One important
labor reform would be to expand the scope of ULPs to cover these behaviors. When
the question of reforms comes up, the legislative control of collateral attacks on
employers and other employees should be part of the agenda, not something that is
swept under the rug.
SALTED EMPLOYEES
The efforts to combine economic leverage with administrative challenges and
collateral litigation is matched with yet another tactic: the conscious exploitation of
the NLRB’s administrative processes to achieve the desired ends. One such issue
involves the use of “salted” employees to test for unfair labor practices. Union
members apply for jobs solely to set up potential violations of section 8(a)(3) 18 The
Supreme Court has construed that section to protect ordinary job applicants, even
though they do not fall precisely within the statutory definition, which covers
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workers who have been let go, but not those who were never hired. 19 But salted
“employees” do not deserve NLRB protection under this extended definition, for
they frequently have no intention to accept any job offer. When they do take jobs,
they have no commitment to the firm. Instead they frequently follow scripted union
protocols that could drive nonunion firms from the market by overwhelming them
with litigation costs, attorneys’ fees, and alleged backpay liability. 20 Unless, of
course, they accept union representation as the lesser evil.
For example, in Toering Electrical 21 the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers (IBEW) applied its own manual by instructing a “salted”
unionized electrical worker to provoke the confrontation that led to his dismissal.
The worker promptly filed a claim that the employer had discriminated against
union members under section 8(a)(3). A highly polarized board, by a 3 (Republican)
to 2 (Democrat) majority, denied the claim, insisting that the “Board does not serve
its intended statutory role as a neutral arbiter of disputes if it must litigate hiring
discrimination charges filed on behalf of disingenuous applicants who intend no
service and loyalty to a common enterprise with a targeted employer.” 22
The NLRB majority was right to clamp down on the practice. There is no
shortage of bona fide job applicants who are in a position to test for an employer’s
antiunion animus. The absence of any independent claims offers good evidence that
the employer has not violated its statutory obligation. Union testers are not neutral,
so the risk of finding false positive ULPs is great. That problem is acute in dual
motive cases where, as in Toering Electrical, the employer claims that outdated
resumes and its ability to tap other available workers were the independent
grounds that drove its decision. In these joint motivation cases, the employer must
prove that the particular workers would not have been hired even if there had been
no antiunion animus. 23 Union members therefore can rely on this favorable
presumption to set up their ULP claims, by consciously acting in a blustery fashion
while asserting pro union sentiments, thereby forcing the employer to show that the
bluster alone would have led to the discharge. Using testers is always dangerous
business when the investigator has a vested in interest in the outcome. 24 Given the
total lack of any institutional safeguards against abuse, salting itself should be
treated as a union ULP under section 8(b)(2) “to cause or attempt to cause an
employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection [8](a)(3). .
.”
FREE VERSUS COERCIVE SPEECH
We now turn to one of the most contentious claims by the supporters of
EFCA: the current process is heavily biased against them because of the use of
coercive tactics throughout the union organization campaign. In order to place this
in context, it is best to begin the analysis with a sensitive question that union
supporters usually prefer to avoid. Why do many employers, both large and small,
exhibit outward hostility or stony indifference toward a union during an organizing
campaign? The simplest explanation is that they perceive that they have much to
lose through unionization in the form of forgone wage increases, reduced pension
and health plans, restrictive work rules, work stoppages, and a general loss of
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management prerogatives. On these issues, they should be regarded as better
judges of their own self‐interest than the unions seeking recognition under the
NLRA.
Yet in the face of this brutal economic reality, the implicit union premise is
that an employer behaves improperly during an election by making known its
preferences, even when there is nothing illegal about the presentation of their
views. That extreme claim is unsupportable, especially in light of the explicit
statutory framework used to regulate employer speech under section 8(c), which
provides:
(c) Expression of views without threat of reprisal or force or
promise of benefit The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or
the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual
form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any
of the provisions of this Act [subchapter], if such expression contains no
threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
The reason for this complex provision derives from the NLRA’s complex
structure that creates a bilateral monopoly under which any particular employer
must negotiate with a particular union. Good faith bargaining is so difficult because
the monopolistic structures of collective bargain insure that there is never a unique
wage or set of conditions that govern management labor relations. Unlike the
position that parties find themselves in competitive markets, there is always a wide
range acceptable after a fashion to both sides. Within that range each seeks to gain
the best deal possible for itself. The exact distribution of gains and losses is
impossible to predict in advance. Accordingly, the rules fashioned under the NLRA
have had to take immense care to make sure that neither side obtains too dominant
a bargaining position.
Section 8(c) represents an effort to work out a delicate compromise about
employer speech that is most vital when it matters the most—in the context of
union elections. Employer speech provides valuable information to workers.
Workers need to be able to form an educated view on the long‐term implications of
union representation, which includes some estimate as to how well employees think
the union and employer will work together on points of common concern.
Employees can form that judgment only by collecting information from all sides.
The relevant information includes some sense of the employer’s reaction to the
initial contract negotiations, ongoing informal adjustments, and future contracts.
None of that information is available if employers lack an appropriate forum in
which to voice their own views. In all other walks of life individuals are allowed to
make clear their response, positive or negative, to participating with others in
proposed business deals. In most business contexts, however, it is rarely necessary
to voice public opposition to a proposed deal, because the option of just walking
away from the transaction is routinely available. But the current structure of the
NLRA makes any flat‐out refusal to bargain illegal, which in turn makes it entirely
appropriate for employers to express their views in the most forceful and authentic
terms possible. Why is it improper for employers to point out the fate of so many
union workers at the formerly Big Three automakers, or in the steel plants, or
anywhere else where union ranks have shrunk with the downturn in business of
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unionized firms? Why is it inappropriate for small businesses to point to their rivals
that have faltered in growth once unionized? The acid test should be whether the
statements are true or false. It should not be whether, when true, they are effective
or ineffective in influencing worker behavior. The union request for employer
detachment is simply a union demand for unilateral employer disarmament in times
of conflict. It is a somber but necessary truth that once a duty to bargain, found
nowhere else, is imposed, employers and unions alike have stron g incentives to
voice their views with passion and power.
Nor should there be any principled objection to employer speech before a
“captive” employee audience, which has long been permitted under the NLRA,
except for the 24‐hour period immediately preceding an NLRB‐conducted secret
ballot election. The term “captive” should be put in quotation marks because it does
not involve situations where workers are physically restrained. It covers any and all
gatherings of employees on company time while at work. Employer speech in these
settings runs the risk of backfiring, and in any event assembling any required
meeting is expensive for an employer, as each and everyone one of these sessions is
on company time. Valuable resources have to be diverted to get that message
across. Workers have to be paid to attend these sessions. Indeed, the use of such
sessions could easily become more common under a card‐check system that leads to
compulsory arbitration, for employers know that a card check drive could be
organized at any time. At that point, employers may be well‐advised to undertake a
permanent campaign to oppose unionization. The stakes of recognition are now
higher on both sides. There are no free goods in labor relations. The firm that
spends its own resources in opposing a union gives out a strong, unambiguous,
costly, and above all reliable, signal as to its views of the likely consequences of
unionization.
The critics of employer speech sidestep these arguments. Their chief
objection to employer speech is not that it is illegal but that it is effective. Professor
Cynthia Estlund of NYU Law School, for example, has protested that one defect of the
current electoral campaign, which lasts on average just under six weeks, is that
“employers chop away, by legal and illegal means, at the employees’ support for the
union.” 25 Legal and illegal means should never be equated. Holding elections is
designed to give employers the chance by legal means to do just that, to “chop away”
at union support, just as it gives unions a chance to “chop away” at employer
support. The standard approaches to deliberative democracy rest on the
proposition that the vigorous interchange of ideas allows individuals to reform their
choices of means in order to maximize their desired ends. Persuasion is the
antithesis of coercion, not its sinister doppelganger. To repeat, so long as illegal
routes are not taken, no speech becomes coercive solely because it is effective. The
central tenet of the First Amendment is that “the best test of truth is the power of
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.” 26 When workers
change their mind, either way until the last moment, it is not a sign of system
pathology. It is a sign of system strength.
In addition, the critics of the current campaign process rarely acknowledge
the prominent limitations that section 8(c) of the NLRA places on employer speech.
Its final phrase, which permits the speech only “if such expression contains no
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threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit” has no analogy anywhere else in
First Amendment law. The detailed analysis of what employers or unions may or
may not say or do in this area raise a fair number of borderline cases. The rough‐
and‐ready compromise that emerges from this provision is that employers may
make any statement that accurately reflects the intensity of their opposition to the
union. In addition, they may make statements that predict, objectively and
accurately, the consequences of unionization. More surprisingly, employers cannot
provide benefits or promise to grant them as an inducement for employees to
remain unrepresented. It is, for example, unlawful under section 8(c) for
management to promise certain overtime or vacation benefits just before a union
election. 27 Employers, however, may make their case more vivid by showing the
business reversals and bankruptcy of formerly successful businesses that have gone
the union route. However, one potent tool is taken from them because they are not
allowed to make threats to either impose costs or remove benefits from workers. To
be sure, the firm CEO can say that “a union contract is likely to make it hard for the
firm to compete against a named rival,” but he cannot say pointedly that “if you join
a union, I will close the division.”
That simple statement conceals the underlying complexities, because the
employer may in some situations close the plant after a union election, even if it
cannot threaten to do so. The leading case on the point remains Textile Workers
Union v. Darlington Manufacturing Co. 28 which held that section 8(a)(3) governed.
In so doing, it repudiated (as it had to) the common law position that an employer
had the absolute right to decide whether to close up shop or remain in business. But
at the same time, Justice Harlan refused to move to the opposite extreme whereby
any decision to close the business down necessarily constituted a ULP under section
8(a)(3). Accordingly he refused to find that any decision to close down a plant,
which had the effect of reducing union interests was an act of coercion governed
under section 8(a)(1) of the Act. “A proposition that a single businessman cannot
choose to go out of business if he wants to would represent such a startling
innovation that it should not be entertained without the clearest manifestation of
legislative intent or unequivocal judicial precedent so construing the Labor
Relations Act.” 29 Accordingly, Darlington adopted a middle position whereby all
employer decisions to relocate or subcontract driven by antiunion motivations
remain violations of section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. The language in Section 8(c) is
therefore consistent with the dual motivation framework that underlies the Act.
Nonetheless, distinction between a prediction and a threat, implicit in section
8(c), is often difficult to draw in light of verbal slips that arise in the heat of a
recognition election. The complexity of this area should caution anyone from
reading too much into findings of ULPs in the context of organization drives,
discussed in detail later on. The findings reflect only violations of the law, but they
do not distinguish between the import of statements that say “if you join a union I
will close the plant,” from “if you join the union, I will beat your brains out in a back
alley.” Both utterances are illegal under current law, but carry with them different
levels of moral turpitude. Nor do these findings indicate whether unlawful
statements, especially of the first variety had any adverse effect on the election in
light of all the other campaign activity. But no matter how the findings are
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interpreted, one point remains: the amount of speech allowed to the employer
under current law is far less than that allowed to candidates in political elections
where all parties are allowed, if not affirmatively encouraged, to make predictions,
threats, and promises with equal abandon, as part of the free, open and uninhibited
debate that is protected under the first amendment. 30 In other contexts, the only
firm limitations on the types of speech relate to immediate threats of the use of
force. Even fraudulent statements receive some degree of constitutional protection,
given the difficulty of disentangling them from true speech in the course of any
political campaign. 31 And the NLRA has notably flip‐flopped on whether allegations
of fraudulent statements should be sufficient to set aside union elections, precisely
because of the difficulty of deciding whether they actually altered the outcome of the
election. 32
The failure to understand how these rules works often leads union
supporters to postulate improper employer conduct when there is none. For
example, Professor Bronfenbrenner insists that one key determinants of employer
success in their antiunion campaigns rests in the threats they make to workers,
often covertly, to take their operations overseas if the union is in fact elected. 33
Bronfenbrenner’s reports of covert activities are exclusively from union
representatives, who need not be scrupulous about whether the employers have
crossed the wavy line between lawful predictions and illegal threats. 34 Indeed in
most cases her own descriptions show that these actions are not illegal under the
NLRA. Union officials understand that they cannot win these cases because the
current law does not treat, as Bronfenbrenner purports to do, as unlawful “specific
unambiguous written threats ranging from newspaper articles, posters, and videos
of union plans that had closed, to letters and leaflets which specifically mentioned
that the plant would close if the union came in.” 35 Given this description, it is
therefore not surprising that unions have become “increasingly reluctant to file
unfair labor practice charges in response to plant closing threats.” 36
Bronfenbrenner uses the word “threat” innumerable times, but the word
“prediction” only twice in her paper, both in quotations from another source—
Human Rights Watch. 37 Her misstatement of the law taints all her empirical
conclusions. The material she refers to is all permissible subject matter in a union
election.
Nor is there anything in her broader social claim that these closings have
manifested in only one percent of the cases in her sample, even if such alleged
threats (broadly construed) are made in about half the cases. Her implicit subtext is
that these predictions should be regarded as threats because the closing occurs only
in a small percentage of cases. But the general context belies the force of her claim.
No firm wants to go out of business after unionization. Predictably, unionized firms
will try to hold on as long as they can, so long as they have some prospect of a long‐
term profit. It is therefore no surprise that the low closing rate is found in a study
that covered only a two year period, as there was little time for the plant closings to
take place. No long‐term effects could be observed. The high number of shuttered
plants makes it highly unlikely that the employers have uttered idle words. Indeed,
in a prior study Bronfenbrenner notes that for a longer time span “fifteen percent of
employers actually followed through on the threat and shut down all or part of their
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operations after the union was voted in.” 38 Once again, she misuses the word
“threat.” But that point aside, her data understates the potential dislocation from
unionization. More concretely, we have no idea from this data how many of them
contracted operations or refused to expand them.
UNION CAMPAIGN ADVANTAGES
There is, moreover, a second side of the coin that needs to be stressed. Labor
unions also enjoy significant strategic advantages in election campaigns that have
no analog in a political setting. A concise list of these advantages was offered in the
testimony of Charles Cohen, a former member of the NLRB, before the
Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor and Pensions. 39 The first of these is
that the union has the advantage of timing. It can decide whether to advance or
slow down the process, and often does the latter in order to allow its collateral
attacks to increase the odds that it will be able to secure a card check agreement.
The second advantage is that it has large control over the definition of the
bargaining unit for the election. Union support is not uniform in workplaces, and
this power of unit designation allows the union to shrink or expand the unit in order
to maximize its chances of overall success. Third, on both these critical measures
the union has in its exclusive possession the signed authorization cards, which supply
it with a solid information base on which to make predictions of the success of
various strategies, after which it can force the election within a few weeks. Fourth,
once the petition is filed, the union is entitled to receive a list of the names and home
addresses of all union members. Multiple home visits are permitted to unions but
not management. Nothing limits the number of union representatives in any
particular case to one. And fifth, unions are not bound by the same restrictions that
govern employer speech and thus are free to make promises, and often make
threats against recalcitrant workers that are difficult to prove or counteract. How
this set of advantages squares off against those which employers enjoy is hard to say
for sure. But it is clear that the decline in unionization cannot be attributed to any of
the rules governing campaigns, which have been stable in form for well over forty
years.

Secret Ballot versus Card Check
FREE CHOICE OR NO CHOICE
The card‐check system is even more objectionable because it gives the union
the unfettered option to routinely bypass the secret ballot under NLRB. 40 On this
critical issue, the EFCA wraps itself in the mantle of employee free choice. There is,
however, no requirement in the EFCA that a union publicly announce that it is
undertaking a card‐check drive before it begins its efforts to sign up workers, even
though one could be easily added. Ironically, it looks therefore as if the EFCA would
give the unions an option to become the bargaining agent of all workers within
some unit as the result of a secret card‐check drive whose purpose is to avoid
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alerting a substantial fraction of fellow workers who are known to be opposed to
the union, in support of another union, or the employer, who may well have the
same attitude. This pattern might not hold in all cases, as tactical considerations
vary. But there is nothing in either the current version of the NLRA or the EFCA that
dictates public notification prior to the presentation of the signed authorization
cards to the Board for its investigation. To be sure, on its face Section 2 of the EFCA
does nothing explicitly to limit the ability of employers to speak to employees about
their views of the consequences of unionization. And it may be possible for
employers to engage, at some clear cost in efficiency and good will, in nonstop
campaigns to oppose unions if they perceive that a union campaign is about to
begin.
Unions would be in a position, moreover, to make credible charges of
employer ULPs if they make inquiries of their employees whether such a secret
campaign has begun, and, if so, by what union. At present it is probably a ULP for the
employer to demand of a worker that he disclose whether a union has started a
secret check card campaign. But on the other side, it is surely legal for a worker to
inform the employer that the campaign is taking place or even for the employer to
engage in discussions concerning potential organizing campaigns that workers are
free to affirm. But this area could easily prove contentious especially if there is no
election in the offing. Yet no matter how these countless variations play out, the
bottom line is EFCA offers a systematic advantage to unions as any secret card check
drive necessarily compromises the employer’s ability to target any campaign against
the union or unions seeking recognition.
The defenders of the ECFA say little or nothing to justify the possibility of a
union preventing dissenting workers from having a voice in the democratic process
that the representation elections afford to the union. It is a profound irony that a
statute that purports to empower workers to exercise their “free choice”
necessarily, and by its own terms, disenfranchises a potentially large fraction of
them. The supporters of EFCA have, however, no similar reluctance to denounce the
adverse impact that employer speech has on the unionization process. In so doing,
their view is that employer speech must be misguided because it inhibits the rights
of employees to form unions. This, of course, misstates the central objective of the
NLRA by ignoring the key language in Section 7 of the Act that states in addition to
“the right of self‐organization,” workers “shall also have the right to refrain from any
or all such activities” if they choose not to join a union. 41
In addition, the truncated card‐check policy does more than degrade the
deliberative process that leads up to any election. It also exposes workers to
multiple forms of intimidation and direct coercion. Today’s supporters of the card‐
check system typically give a polite nod to the virtues of secret elections as a
prelude to their all‐out attack on all other features of the current electoral system,
given the urgency and intensity of the management response. 42 The arguments in
support of a card‐check program for public employees in Illinois took just that
line. 43 Supporters of the card check policy complain that elections with secret
ballots are “lengthy and cumbersome,” over which the employer “has control” of the
process meaning that they can “routinely” use the campaign period “to scare
workers into voting against a union even if the workers want a union.” 44 But in
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their zeal to condemn the employer they never explain why it is necessary to leap to
the card‐check outcome without figuring out how to expedite or improve union
elections within the current framework—which is not easy given the current speed
with which they are processed. In so doing, they put on blinders by acting as if all
abuses come from the management side. At no point do they discuss, let alone
admit, that inherent challenges are associated with an effort to convince employees
– who in many cases are already well‐compensated – that they should pay money
for union representation. Nor do EFCA supporters address the allegation that union
organizers, or overzealous pro‐union employees, are also capable of coercive
behavior during a union election. 45
Profound doubts over a card check have thus been voiced by labor’s natural
allies. Recently, former Democratic senator and presidential nominee George
McGovern condemned EFCA because of its failure to take into account the obvious:
“There are many documented cases where workers have been pressured, harassed,
tricked and intimated into signing cards that have led to mandatory payment of
dues.” 46 And he pointedly asked why it is that a protection that Americans think
desirable outside the United States should be dispensed with here. “Some of the
most respected Democratic members of congress— including Reps. Marcy Kaptur of
Ohio, George Miller and Pete Stark of California, and Barney Frank of
Massachusetts—have advised workers in developing countries such as Mexico to
insist on the secret ballot when voting as to whether or not their workplaces should
have a union. We should have no less for employees in our country.” 47 The same
position was taken by a former Democratic head of the NLRB, who recently said that
“[s]ecret ballots to resolve union representation rights are the way to go, and
Obama should meet the Republicans halfway by saying so.” 48 And there is little
doubt that all democratic political systems have secret ballots for their voting
decisions. Why then not for union democracy, which is a self‐conscious progressive
effort to introduce similar democratic features into the workplace? 49
Pressures on the card‐check will in fact be more acute under EFCA than in
any public union context because of the enormity of the stakes. Under EFCA a
successful card‐check campaign does not lead merely to an election, or even to a
collective bargaining negotiation. It leads to “interest” arbitration, whereby union
recognition necessarily leads to a guaranteed first‐contract instead of a union
election. Given the stakes, the card check system may further polarize the union
electorate. Prounion workers will be more committed to the union because they
perceive higher rates of return from unionization. But opposing workers may fight
harder because they no longer can sign a union authorization card to satisfy an
insistent organizer, only to vote against the union in a subsequent election.
Workers that are approached in parks and bars and grocery stores, not even
knowing that a campaign is underway, are literally unorganized. They do not know
how many other cards have been signed, or whether or how these cards will be
validated. But they do know that organizers can have long memories of who is with
or against them. These workers could now prefer to capitulate to a union they
oppose if the alternative is to be on record against that union when it wins anyhow.
If the preference order of these workers is (1) no union, (2) support a union that is
likely to be elected, or (3) face retaliation if the unwanted union is selected, they
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could easily choose (2) to avoid (3), even if their first choice is (1). Strategic
surrender of this sort would never be made within the confines of a secret ballot.
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES IN UNION ELECTIONS
Another key union claim with respect to NLRA secret ballot elections is that
they are undermined by a rash of ULPs. That claim is wrong in two related ways.
First, it tends systematically to overstate the number of ULPs that arise out of and in
the course of organizing drives. Second, it overlooks the data on election results
both for recognition campaigns and for decertification campaigns. Many of the
claims for ULPs during union elections are found in the Bronfenbrenner study. I
shall examine her study in some detail because it is the centerpiece of the union case
that ULPs are the prime culprit in the decline of unionization levels. At the outset, it
is important to set her work in context. The study was prepared for the United
States Trade Deficit Review Commission, whose major purpose was to deliver a
strong and explicit protectionist message. In Bronfenbrenner’s view, globalization
is the major threat that any successful national labor policy should resist. 50 Her
major conclusion is that employer threats to take business overseas is a chief source
of labor insecurity, which triggers “race to the bottom” in “working conditions, and
living standards” that only strong union action can counteract. 51 At no point does
the study show the slightest recognition that competition is generally a source of
higher productivity and lower prices, which have precisely the opposite effect. Nor
does she recognize the risk of collapse which is an inherent risk of this aggressive
strategy. Writing in 2000, she singled out the automobile industry as one of the few
sectors that had held its ground on wage issues. 52 Her study reveals no inkling of
the chaos among the “Big Three” manufacturers in that industry that was to follow,
with the loss of some 500,000 jobs in the industry since that date. Nor could she
have anticipated the jockeying for a massive bailout program, which at this writing
called for an infusion of perhaps up to $125 billion for General Motors, Chrysler and
Ford, all done with the active cooperation between management and UAW officials,
including its President Ronald Gettelfinger. 53 Nor, of course, does she mention that
the foreign automobile manufacturers in the United States have remained profitable
throughout with worker wages around $26/hour 54 , whose citizens will have to
subsidize any Detroit bailout.
Armed with her flawed world view, she then examines a random sample of
600 certification elections conducted by the NLRB, creating a data set that rests
exclusively on the evaluations of the “lead organizers” of these campaigns, 55 without
any cross check to either official or employer records to see whether the reported
violations were correctly characterized. Her collection method of the survey data is
in itself sufficient reason to discredit her results in their entirety.
But even if we put that obvious methodological objection to the side, a
closer look at her data reveals how the bias in data collection works its way through
the argument. One of her claims is that “one in four employers in our sample
discharged workers for union activity.” 56 In and of itself, the glass could be
regarded as at least three‐quarters empty, especially since “[u]nions won 44 percent
of all the elections in the sample and 38 percent of elections with threats.” 57 The
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differential rate is sufficiently small that it could hardly explain more than a tiny
fraction of major decline in union representation over the past 50 years. Let each
election account for about 100 workers—high in fact—then the six percent
differential over 600 cases translates into 36 additional union victories, or 3,600
workers who should have been unionized in this sample. But even that differential
is overstated because it does give any offset for the NLRB‐ordered reinstatements to
workers who were determined to be subject to those practices—a figure that cannot
be accurately determined from Bronfenbrenner’s reports. 58
Nor are there major changes in the overall landscape if these figures are
projected over the entire set of union elections. Assuming that this figure is
accurate—which it is not—it translates into an increase over the eight year period
of 2000‐2008 into about 75,000 additional union members, which is 6 percent of the
roughly 1,250,000 individuals who participated in these elections. 59 That figure has
to be reduced further to take into account those cases in which the union is unable
to bargain to a first contract, and those in which the union certification led to
attrition in the total size of he workforce. The numbers are too small with any
reasonable adjustments to account for the decline in union membership.
The more important errors in her study relate, however, to the computation
of the data set in the first place, for it is always difficult to figure out which ULPs
filed in the midst of a certification election were filed with respect to practices
undertaken during that election. As noted below, NLRA data reveals that over 90
percent of NLRB elections are held within 60 days after the union representation
petition is filed. The NLRA section 10(b), however, allows permits the filing of
unfair labor practices up to six months following the conduct that is alleged to be
unlawful. 60
On this score, the overtly pro‐management analysis provided by J. Justin
Wilson of the Center for Union Facts differs from Bronfenbrenner’s in that it does
not rely on survey data collected from union organizers—or for that matter,
interested employers. Instead its sole data source is the information systematically
gathered from official NLRB records—its Case Activity Tracking System (CATS)
database—on both the conduct of union organization campaigns and the
distribution of ULPs. 61 The interpretation of the data requires a detailed
examination of individual cases to match any ULP to a particular campaign, for the
CATS reports do not divide their reinstatement cases between those tied to union
organization drives and those connected with other sorts of activity. So Wilson
performed detailed matches on name similarity to sort the ULPs by category. 62
Even that adjustment tends to bias upwards the number of ULPs committed during
the organizational drives, because it cannot distinguish in firms that have multiple
bargaining units the particular cases that were attributable to its organizational and
its other activities. Nonetheless, Wilson concluded that over the three year period
from 2003‐2005—data that is more recent and more comprehensive than
Bronfenbrenner’s—11,342 organizing petitions were filed. During that period,
workers were offered reinstatement through remedial action in 3,675 cases. Some
remedial action was taken in 1,538 of the 3,546 CA cases filed in conjunction with
the 11,342 CA petitions. At the same time some 608 cases were dismissed, and
some 1,400 cases were withdrawn. Of the 1,538 CA cases in which remedial actions
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were taken, only 303 arose in the course of an organization campaign. Accordingly,
there were 303 improper firings for the 11,342 organizing campaigns, which implies
that the likelihood of an improper firing by an employer during the course of a
union campaign is only 2.7%. 63 . The large number of withdrawn cases—40 percent
of the total—may have been filed for strategic reasons only. It is a far cry from
Bronfenbrenner’s 25 percent figure. To be sure, Wilson’s numbers could be low if
some workers who choose not to file valid grievances with the NLRB. But by the
same token, these data are consistent with another message. It is bad strategy for
reputational reasons to fire workers during a campaign, and management lawyers
constantly warn employers of the business risks that they take wholly apart from
any legal sanctions that might be imposed.
The Bronfenbrenner study is not the only one that overestimates the level of
illegal employer behavior in organizational campaigns. An earlier study by Harvard
Law Professor (and AFL‐CIO board member in both the US and Canada) Paul Weiler
reported that employers had fired 5 percent of the pro‐union employees during an
organization campaign, which would amount thousands of workers per year. 64 That
ratio was forcefully challenged in a paper by Robert LaLonde and my late University
of Chicago Law School colleague Professor Bernard D. Meltzer, who reduced that
figure to 1 in 63 pro‐union workers, or about 1.59 percent, on the assumption that
only 50 percent of all cases in which reinstatement was sought were for
organizational activities. 65 Wilson, however, disputes their claim that half of the
NLRB reinstatement orders come from organizing campaigns, which he found (with
some adjustments for card checks) was roughly 10 percent for the 2003‐2005 data.
He thus recalculates the number of dismissals on the assumption that only ten
percent of the reinstatements were for organizational assumptions, at which point
the number drops to about 1 in 340 pro‐union workers, or 0.295 percent, a number
so small that hardly suggests a major problem that operates as a systematic
deterrence to union organization.
We can analyze the role of ULP’s in other ways. Bronfenbrenner notes that
the longer the period of election campaigns the less likely the union is to prevail in
the outcome. Thus she reports the union’s rate of success is 50% for elections held
within 60 days of the filing of the petition, but only 31% for elections held from 61
to 180 days of the filing of the petition. 66 Ironically, however, when put into context,
this evidence cuts in favor of the probity of the current system of union elections.
NLRB General Counsel Ronald Meisburg has two instructive findings in his 2007
report of NLRB activity: “Initial elections in union representation elections were
conducted in a median of 39 days from the filing of the petition.” 67 “93.9% of all
initial representation elections were conducted within 56 days of the filing of the
petition in FY 2007, compared to 94.1% in FY 2006, and above our target of 90%.” 68
It is clear that the second figure of 31% success covers something under 6% of the
elections, so that all the institutional weight attaches to the first figure. Even so,
there is a lingering misconception of the delays in setting these elections. William B.
Gould IV, a former head of the NLRB in the Clinton years believes that these
elections should be staged “within one or two weeks of the filing of a union's
petition seeking recognition,” 69 which seems short given the number of elections
and the inevitable difficulties in their administration. But he makes this

35
recommendation on the incorrect assumption that “the resolution of union drives
currently takes months and sometimes years.” 70 The promptness of the elections
makes it difficult to subject them to any real attack.

Election Results
The conclusion that ULPs have little impact on the rate of unionization is
confirmed by looking at the tabulations that the NLRA supplies with respect to
organizing campaigns between April 2000 and March 2008. The data indicates that
of the 17,870 collective bargaining elections, unions won 10,148, or about 56.8
percent. These elections involved a total of about 1.253 million workers for an
average of about 70 workers per unit. The union victories yielded a net of 585,150
workers, for about 58 workers per unit. The union defeats covered 668,235
workers in 7,722 units for an average of about 87 workers per unit. The most
striking feature about the data is the reduction in union elections in during the
period from April 2000‐March 2008, coupled with their increased success rate.
FIGURE 5
CERTIFICATION ELECTIONS AND UNION SUCCESS RATE, APRIL 2000‐MARCH 2008
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This data reflects two major trends. The first is that the number of elections
has declined over the past eight years. It appears, the union judgment that their
alternative tactics for securing representation are more effective, so that they resort
to elections only in settings where their prospects are more favorable. Second, the
small size of the relevant units suggest that most of the targeted employers are
themselves small businesses, even if some of them exceed in size the customary
definition of a small business as one with fewer than 100 employees. The figures
vary from year to year, but the basic pattern is summarized in the following two
graphs which indicate by unit size the number of workers in which the union and
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the employer prevailed in elections, RC, where labor sought representation, and
elections held to see whether a union would be decertified.
TABLE 3
CERTIFICATION ELECTIONS 2003‐2006 BY SIZE OF UNIT (RC & RM) 71
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FIGURE 6
CERTIFICATION ELECTIONS – REPRESENTATION CHOSEN, 2003‐2006
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FIGURE 7
CERTIFICATION ELECTIONS – NO REPRESENTATION CHOSEN, 2003‐2006
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The volume of elections is sufficiently high to suggest that unions did not
perceive any insuperable obstacles in conducting their organizing campaigns. The
divided outcomes suggest that employers were also able to make their case in some
instances but by no means in all. There is no evidence of which I am aware that
indicates that employer resistance has aborted a substantial number of
organizational campaigns that might have succeeded in the absence of any ULPs.
The more likely explanation for the recent decline in union representation is the rise
of neutrality agreements and card check campaigns.
TABLE 4
UNION CERTIFICATION ELECTIONS
UNION

Elections Participated in

CERTIFICATION
ELECTIONS
Period
Oct 07‐Mar 08
Apr 07‐Sept 07
Oct 06‐Mar 07
Apr 06‐Sept 06
Oct 05‐Mar 06
Apr 05‐Sept 05
Oct 04‐Mar 05
Apr 04‐Sept 04
Oct 03‐Mar 04
Apr 03‐Sept 03
Oct 02‐Mar 03
Apr 02‐Sept 02
Oct 01‐Mar 02
Apr 01‐Sept 01
Oct 00‐Mar 01
Apr 00‐Sept 00

Total
752
788
725
862
893
1,150
1,076
1,240
1,045
1,293
1,212
1,434
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1,345
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1,536

Resulting in
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472
421
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699
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No
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49,411
29,018
20,393
48,240
26,717
21,523
51,905
30,018
21,887
61,040
30,849
30,191
62,103
36,253
25,850
72,495
34,708
37,787
77,104
34,062
43,042
83,094
40,440
42,654
79,341
38,232
41,109
78,945
41,372
37,573
88,478
34,301
54,177
89,181
45,020
44,161
85,664
34,094
51,570
105,351
38,008
67,343
101,788
41,269
60,519
119,245
50,789
68,456
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Decertification elections reinforce the story, as illustrated in the table below.
Here no card check is allowed to decertify a union. The primary route is through
elections called for by unit employees; in some instances an employer can withdraw
recognition of a majority union if it can show, not just a good faith doubt as to the
position of the union, but “the union’s actual loss of majority status” 72 . As might be
expected these elections are far less frequent than certification elections. In
addition, the units in question are not selected at random, but for their history of
poor or corrupt union relations. But again the results show no sign of process
breakdown. The results are closely contested both in terms of units and in terms of
votes. The results thus confirm the general view that the electoral process works
more or less as it should.
TABLE 5
DECERTIFICATION ELECTIONS
Elections Participated In
Period
Oct 07‐Mar 08
Apr 07‐Sept 07
Oct 06‐Mar 07
Apr 06‐Sept 06
Oct 05‐Mar 06
Apr 05‐Sept 05
Oct 04‐Mar 05
Apr 04‐Sept 04
Oct 03‐Mar 04
Apr 03‐Sept 03
Oct 02‐Mar 03
Apr 02‐Sept 02
Oct 01‐Mar 02
Apr 01‐Sept 01
Oct 00‐Mar 01
Apr 00‐Sept 00

Total
149
190
165
181
176
158
220
208
212
194
226
228
188
195
167
207

Resulting in
Certification
63
65
58
58
58
55
74
68
78
72
78
63
67
71
50
69

Resulting in
Decertification
86
125
107
123
118
103
146
140
134
122
148
165
121
124
117
138

Valid Votes Cast
Cast for
Cast
the
Against
Total
Union
the Union
9,505
5,456
4,049
13,257
6,646
6,611
8,245
4,726
3,519
10,364
5,230
5,134
13,365
7,810
5,555
10,775
6,264
4,511
10,923
5,324
5,599
9,562
4,717
4,845
15,395
7,225
8,170
10,150
5,059
5,091
13,845
6,297
7,548
9,870
4,487
5,383
7,365
3,649
3,716
12,082
6,706
5,376
9,702
4,950
4,752
11,276
5,731
5,545

In any event, the influence of these elections on the overall level of
unionization in the workforce is by any measure small, for even if the unions had
won all of the contested elections, the additional 668,235 workers is less than the
overall decline in union membership during the same period. The results hardly
change if it were deemed proper for the union to overcome all the successful
decertification elections. If all these workers were over an eight year period put
back into the mix, the total of union workers would have increased only to 8.89
million, which is equal to the sum of the number of union members in private
industry in 2007 (8,114,000) and the 668,235 workers in units where the union lost
a recognition election and the 105,637 employees who were in decertified units.
This still leads to only an 8.2% unionization rate in the private sector workforce.
These figures provide the maximum because they assume that all the union defeats
were improper and, further, that all these additional workers would have retained

39
their jobs, in the face of the strong competitive pressures that had led to national
declines.
As things now stand, in recent years the decline in union membership
outstrips the gains from new elections. Thus the second column of the table below
shows the gain or loss in the existing ranks. The third column shows the number of
new union members. The reduction in the existing ranks over this period equals
2,559,000 members which again dwarfs the 668,000 individuals who voted not to
join a union during that period. Stated otherwise, union membership losses through
attrition would have equaled about 1,786,000 members even if the unions had won
every single recognition and decertification election. Given that the more expansion
of the overall workforce, the percentage declines in union membership are best
understood as a lack of demand for union representation, and not a defect in the
election process.
TABLE 6
UNION MEMBERSHIP 2000‐2007: SOME PRIVATE SECTOR STATISTICS
Year

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

Number
of Union
Members
(000's)
9,148
9,113
8,800
8,452
8,205
8,255
7,981
8,114

Loss of Current
Membership
from Prior Year
(000's)
‐492
‐226
‐491
‐506
‐407
‐85
‐387
35

New Members
through
Elections
(000's)*
221
191
178
158
160
135
113
98

Net Change in
Membership
From Prior
Year (000’s)
‐271
‐35
‐313
‐348
‐247
50
‐274
133

Size of
Workforce
(000’s)
101,810
101,605
102,153
102,648
103,584
105,508
107,846
108,714

% of
Workforce
Unionized
9.0%
9.0%
8.6%
8.2%
7.9%
7.8%
7.4%
7.5%

*Year is considered form Apr to March of following year.
Overall, the evidence is overwhelming that the decline of the labor movement
is not attributable to any defect, real or imagined, in the present election process.
Among the many potential explanations, two features emerge. The first is the
erosion in membership of the once‐dominant workers such as the United Auto
Workers, the Steelworkers and the Rubberworkers. As the figure below shows,
these 3 unions today have about 1.5 million fewer members than they did during
the mid 1970’s—and even that number will decline no matter what happens to the
proposed federal bailout of the former Big Three. The uptick in USW membership
that we see in the recent years is primarily due to mergers of other unions including
URW and PACE with USW, artificially raising USW membership by over 340,000
members. 73
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FIGURE 8
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Second, it is a function of the inability of union firms to grow relative to their
nonunion competitors in such key sectors as retailing, which in principle should
present attractive targets for unionization. This point is of especial importance in
general because it suggests that the consequences of unionization for small firms
should not be evaluated solely in terms of the number of workers who are unionized
in each year. Rather the key question is the extent to which unionization of small
firms inhibits the potential for growth so that these firms do not realize their full
economic potential. On this score, it is instructive to note that the explosive growth
that takes place, for example, in the retail sector is concentrated in such
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nonunionized retail firms as Publix and Target, where the former has see its
workforce expand from 82,000 to 144,000 between 1993 and 2007, and Target
from 174,000 to 366,000 during that same period. I am not aware of any unionized
firm that can show that kind of sustained growth over a parallel stretch of time.
The reason for those differential growth rates is not, I believe, hard to
explain. The standard union mantra on this point is that gains if this sort are
possible within the union framework if only the management team would work in
“partnership” with its union. But this mellow approach misconceives the nature of
partnerships, which in business matters can only arise from voluntary
arrangements, and only last so long as the atmosphere of trust survives between the
party. Partners do not rely on litigation and arbitration during the course of their
business. They only use it when the business has come apart. No employer/union
relationship can meet that standard of voluntary cooperation under a statutory
scheme that imposes duties to bargain. The entire system of collective bargaining
results in the following paradox, whereby traditional conceptions of good faith—the
touchstone in partnership law— can only exists within a voluntary framework that
is inconsistent with the very different brand of “good faith” negotiations
contemplated under the labor statutes. The simple truth is that no system of
divided control under the present mandatory regime can generate the level of trust
needed for the kind of voluntary cooperation that is the hallmark of genuine
business partnerships. Rather, the length and complexity of collective bargaining
agreements, and the long periods for their negotiations offer powerful testament as
to why the growth of unionized firms will lag behind that of their well‐run
nonunionized rivals. And in the present age of austerity to sacrifice potential jobs
for the flawed ideal of greater union penetration into employment markets is to kill
jobs on Main Street in support of an ideal that is preserved only because of the
misguided ingenuity of strong union supporters. EFCA will only magnify the
disadvantages of the current system of labor relations.

The Infirmities of Card Check Campaigns
CARD CHECKS UNDER THE CURRENT LAW
The use of the card check will surely change these calculations, by shutting
off input from both dissenting workers and the employer, especially if the campaign
can begin in secret. Some reports suggest that organizing campaigns enjoy a 78
percent success rate when the neutrality agreement institutes card checks and
imposes limits on employer speech. 76 If these numbers are to be taken at face value,
the choice of rules makes a difference in outcomes. Start with the position of unit
members. As previously noted, so long as an election is required, the effort of
unions to turn to their supporters for card‐checks has only limited effects. The
unions understand this as well. The collection of card signatures can take place at
any time and any place. It is wholly unsupervised by the Board or anyone else.
Under the current law, once a union obtains 30 percent of signatures, the formal
NLRB recognition process can begin. 77 As the gains to a union from satisfying the
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card check are limited, the willingness of a union to use tactics that involve
intimidation or misrepresentation is lower as well. Those who disagree with the
union need not mark themselves for criticism, for they can sign the card and then
vote against the union in the election by secret ballot. That election takes place after
a campaign. All workers are in a position to make their views known to their fellow
workers at any time during the election campaign, including those coworkers who
have previously signed the cards. The fact that such speech could sway workers
against a union is the reason why it should be allowed and not stifled. The essence
of a free and robust debate is the risk that the arguments of your opponents will
prove more persuasive to the electorate than your own.
Nor, finally, is there any theoretical reason to doubt the empirical results that
show at most mixed union success in NLRB elections. We should expect employer
speech – and potential opposition expressed by some employees themselves – to be
persuasive at least some of the time. After all, they can often make out their case in
ways that make their opposition resonate with the legitimate concerns of their
employees. Like all complex choices, the decision to join a union has some potential
advantages and some disadvantages. I shall turn to these issues in greater detail
later, but the short version of the story is that prospective union membership does
not come cheap. Unions impose dues and service obligations; unions impose hidden
barriers that hamper the advancement of able members of the rank and file into
management; union rules create implicit conflicts between workers in different
groups, whether measured by age, length of service, or occupation; union work rules
render firms less nimble to meet competition and to adopt new technologies; union
firms are subject to disruptions by strikes, lockouts and slowdowns in which
aggressive union tactics can in fact kill the employer goose that lays the golden egg.
Rational and informed workers could therefore conclude that the full costs of union
membership exceed its benefits to them, wholly without regard to any larger social
consequences. These workers have no incentive to support a union that does not
advance their interest solely because that union also disadvantages the employer.
The mixed results in union elections are an accurate reflection of those competing
forces.
The entire calculus of costs and rewards changes under the proposed card‐
check system of EFCA. Now the union gains to card collection are far greater: the
union becomes the designated bargaining agent when it obtains a majority of the
cards for members of the unit. An astute union will no longer find it necessary to
announce an organization campaign with great fanfare. Rather in most if not all
cases unions will proceed surreptitiously to circumvent opposing employees and
round up as many cards as possible in a silent phase of its campaign. At this point
the risks of employee intimidation and misrepresentation from unsupervised union
conduct are far greater. Quite simply, these tactics yield the union a greater gain
once the backstop of the supervised election is eliminated. It is all too easy for union
organizers to trap with impunity workers in dark hallways or on isolated streets
after dark. There are countless contexts in which the threat of coercion can be
implicit, powerful, and unreported. The fear of revenge from a successful union is
not something that may workers can look on with indifference. The change in the
payoff from a victorious card check will lead to a change for the worse in how
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unions conduct their organizing campaigns. The large gains from getting signed
cards, and the easy means to obtain them could well raise union abuse to levels
above those that are under observed in the current system.
The situation is aggravated still further once these cards are turned over to
the union. Existing law treats union authorization cards as irrevocable. Nor does it
supply any effective mechanism that allows employees to revoke or withdraw their
authorization cards, once signed. The NLRB has written: “A showing of interest is
not subject to attack on the ground that the cards on which it is based have been
revoked or withdrawn. ‘Such an attack . . . has no bearing on the validity of the
original showing but merely raises the question as to whether particular employees
have changed their minds about union representation. That question can best be
resolved on the basis of an election by secret ballot.” 78 The curative power of the
secret ballot is not available under the EFCA. Also under existing law, authorization
cards may be regarded as current for up to one year or more after being signed. 79
And authorization card signatures, under existing law, “are presumed to be genuine
unless there is some indication to the contrary.” 80 Moreover, employers under
existing law in representation proceedings cannot even litigate questions about the
production of false, fabricated or fraudulent authorization cards. 81 At most they may
submit to the NLRB Regional Director any evidence of fraudulent or fabricated
authorization cards. Even that information is difficult to assemble because the
NLRB does not release to the employer its information about which employees
reportedly signed the authorization cards submitted to the NLRB. 82 The
administrative remedy dominates. 83
Use of these truncated procedures has more dire consequences under EFCA,
for now they are not backstopped by a secret ballot election. To be sure, EFCA
charges the NLRB with developing procedures for establishing “the validity of
signed authorizations designating bargaining representatives” (EFCA § 2). And it is
worth noting that all efforts by the Republican Minority to bulk up the EFCA
procedural with additional procedural protections for the card check, all of which
were opposed by all Democrats on the Committee. 84
One such proposal would require union officials to return the card within
five days after request by an employer. That approach would permit workers to
update their preferences before the card may be submitted. Otherwise the process
results in a systematic tilt toward the union. If a worker at any time signs the card,
then he is bound for the duration of the period. There could be a successful card
authorization program, therefore, even though the requisite number of workers do
not support the program at the time it is submitted. Take a simple example: if 60
percent workers sign cards over the course of a campaign, and 20 percent wish
them back at the end, the union prevails with 40 percent support when it chooses,
on its own initiative, to submit the cards to the NLRA.
A second proposal limited the card check to workers who had been
employed for 180 days, in order to eliminate salted workers from voting, and to
establish some permanent connection with the work force. That proposal would
have the advantage of blocking the use of card checks for newly formed firms that
were not in existence for 180 days, in order to prevent a simple majority of the
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incumbent workers from binding new workers who had no opportunity to
participate in the deliberations at all.
A third proposal was to limit card check authorizations to persons who are
legally in the United States, and thus prevent illegal aliens from influence, or
perhaps controlling the outcome of the card‐check. There are of course serious
questions of how illegal aliens should be treated under the labor law, on which I
venture no opinion here. But it does seem odd that so long as these workers are at
risk for deportation they should be given a say—perhaps the decisive say—in
whether a firm at which they may not work, should be unionized.
A fourth proposal provided that reinstatement could not be ordered for
union workers who engaged in violence or other dangerous behavior. A
complementary proposal called for the decertification of any union that encouraged
or used violence, in line with the NLRA’s policy to promote industrial peace. The
refusal to adopt this provision shows the implicit double standard in a statute that
beefs up sanctions against employer for any form of conduct that is found to be a
ULP, including that which falls far short of the serious abuses here.
Even if all these proposals were adopted, it would not, in my view, make the
card‐check system preferable to the secret ballot election, with its long history of
institutional safeguards. The established law on secret ballot election goes to great
pains to prevent either side from disrupting the process. The basic NLRB standard
strives to achieve “laboratory” conditions to rule out the possibility of abuse. 85
Standard rules require that employers post three days before elections posters that
inform workers of their rights. Electioneering is prohibited near the election site.
The elections are conducted by neutral NLRA officials, under the scrutiny of
observers from both employers and employees. The eligibility of voters is
established by list prior to the election. The NLRB agents maintain physical custody
over the ballot box at all times, and remove it from the premises when the election is
completed.
Nor does the experience in states where there are public employee “card
check” recognition regimes provide much hope that the regulations under EFCA
would sensibly address these numerous deficiencies. Under the Illinois public sector
collective bargaining statute, for example, union authorization cards are not
revocable for a six month period, even at the request of the worker. 86 Hence any
reduction in pro‐union sentiment will have a smaller effect in the card‐check context
than in an electoral one. The campaign in its public phase also works with a one‐
way ratchet so that formerly antiunion workers can change their mind at any time
within the six month window, while formerly pro‐union workers cannot. It is quite
easy to see today why a union that wins a card check campaign could, as often
happens, lose the follow‐on election. It is hard to imagine any process that is less
democratic in either intention or execution than the card‐check rule under EFCA.
The only clear winners of this skewed and expedited process are the union
leadership, who gain in dues and power through the successful certification
campaign.
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SELECTIVE USE OF CARD‐CHECKS
There is a second telltale sign of the dubious legitimacy of the card‐check
system. Under section 2 of EFCA, its use is reserved to one and only one situation:
the selection of a union for a workforce that is not organized. Supporters of EFCA
would regard it as ludicrous to allow employers to collect signed cards from
workers that indicate their preference not to have a union. And defenders of EFCA
would bristle at any suggestion that a later employer card could displace a signature
on a prior union card. But they do not explain why the risks of coercion by
employers are greater in the one case than in the other.
In addition, the drafters of EFCA did not propose a system of card‐check
decertification take effect if 30 percent of the workers within an appropriate
bargaining unit signed cards asking for the decertification of an incumbent union.
That result can, however, be grafted on to the card check system. Indeed the NLRB
took just this position in its 2007 decision in Dana Corp. which involved two cases of
businesses whose workers expressed strong sentiments against the union card
check. 87 At issue in that case were two successful union card check campaigns on
which the respective unions sought immediate orders to negotiate. Yet in both
cases, dissident workers in each unit filed petitions to hold an immediate
decertification election. In one instance the petition was signed by a majority of
workers in the unit. In the other case by 35 percent, which is greater than the 30
percent requirement of cards to trigger an election. The usual rule where a union is
certified through an election is to create a recognition bar that lasts for three years,
during which period the union can negotiate a contract, without fear of facing a
dissident election for decertification. 88 The need for this rule follows from the
fluctuating membership of any bargaining unit over the protracted period of
bargaining between employer and union. By analogy to political elections, the
results stand even though shifts in electoral composition or sentiment follow the
election day. No one questions the need for this recognition bar in electoral
contexts.
Card check certification, however, does not have the same probative weight
as a union election, so the much mooted question is whether the same recognition
bar should attach. The question is whether the recognition bar should be left
unmodified in the new context. Once again a sharply divided Board held that the
infirmities of the card check, with its attendant risks of mistake, fraud, confusion,
and coercion did not justify the automatic progression from majority signatures to
Board recognition. Instead, it created by administrative rule (which any new Board
could easily undo) a new procedure that allows for an election so long as 30 percent
of the workers within the unit call for it, which is the same percentage needed to
trigger an election today. The fact that the antiunion forces could gather that
number of votes within a short period of time offers some evidence of the weak
probative value of card checks. Once, moreover, the union survives the recognition
election, then the automatic three‐year recognition bar applies as in other cases.
Yet it is doubtful whether this administrative correction survives under
EFCA, which simply provides that the Board “shall” order the parties to bargain. But
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it makes no provision for employee to present their rival cards within 45 days of the
original filing to trigger an election. Instead it appears that EFCA would leave
untouched the current process under which unit employees must wait to request a
decertification election under various complex rules that kick in either on the
expiration of a short‐term union contract or after three years under a union contract
that runs three or more years. Given the prounion bias of EFCA, it is not likely that
many courts would think that the NRLB could preserve its rule in Dana Corporation,
even if it were inclined to do so.
Indeed the situation looks even more one‐sided, for there is nothing in EFCA
that indicates that once one card‐check drive has failed it blocks a second campaign
either by the original or a second union, for a fixed statutory period of time. The
current version of the NLRA only provides that a new election cannot be ordered “in
any bargaining unit within which in the preceding twelve‐month period, a valid
election shall have been held.” 89 There is no conforming amendment that would
raise this bar against new check‐card drives after either a previous election within
that twelve‐month period or a failed card‐check drive within that time (assuming
that it goes far enough to become public knowledge). Employers and dissenting
workers can be subject to multiple attacks along this front.
The most telling provision of the EFCA is the last: the card check system may
never be used to displace an incumbent union, for EFCA explicitly applies only so
long as “no other individual or labor organization is currently certified or
recognized as the exclusive representative of any of the employees in the unit.” 90
The implicit judgment in this statutory command is that card‐checks are too
unreliable to displace a union, even though they are reliable enough to entrench
one. The defenders of the statute give no explanation as to why this one‐sided legal
regime for recognition elections does not work in other contexts, given the ever‐
present risk of coercion in all contexts. But the political explanation for this skewed
result is easy to identify. The EFCA only allows the card check that improve the
odds of union representation. It rejects that approach where the card check would
either reduce or transfer union representation.
ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTIES
The situation is even graver in light of the administrative difficulties in
running a card check system. The exact particulars of the new regime will
doubtlessly have to be fleshed out by regulation or administrative process, which
adds yet another layer of transitional uncertainty to the process. But in all
likelihood the rules will make it difficult to resist a union petition for certification.
In particular, either a card check or petition is likely to suffice as a serious statement
of interest in union representation. Otherwise formal requirements for validity are
nonexistent. Under EFCA, the union need not even have the employee’s signature
witnessed, for example, by a notary public to establish its validity. Because
employees would have no way of knowing that false or fraudulent authorization
cards were submitted on their behalf, there is no way that a “card check” could
replicate the reliability and freedom of expression provided by a secret ballot
election, preceded by notice, in which all employees can participate.
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More generally, any card‐check pattern is likely to follow the current hands‐
off practices under the NLRA, which give the firm little or no voice in the
determination of card validity. Nor do existing state public bargaining statutes
instill confidence that authorization card “validity” procedures would be effective.
The Illinois Labor Relation Board (ILRB) routinely accepts any card that lists the
name of the union along with some statement that acknowledges that the
employee’s signature should be regarded as evidence that the worker is willing to
accept union representation in an appropriate bargaining unit. It does not appear
that the particular contours of the unit need be stated on the signed card, even
though their specification might influence the worker choice. Rather, so long as the
unit ultimately identified after the cards are collected meets the requirements of a
suitable bargaining unit under the act, the signature is binding. The union therefore
can wait to designate its bargaining unit until it sees the distribution of cards, at
which point it will pick that unit that will maximize its gain. It is of course possible
for workers to limit that union discretion by indicating clearly on the card that he is
only signing on for an election. Union organizers are not likely to present those
cards after EFCA.
Once the cards are presented to the NLRB for certification, two activities will
take place on parallel tracks. On the legal side, the parties will have to argue over
the definition of the appropriate bargaining unit, which will be a challenging task for
firms that are not unionized. There are no natural boundaries by location or
occupation that leap out as decisive characteristics, and the parties will always
jockey for position depending on the perceived distribution of the cards. Unions,
who have a leg up in the dispute, will seek to define the largest unit over which they
could command a majority, but will insist on a smaller unit if it cannot. Management
will seek to steer the unit in the opposite direction. The validation process will
become ever more complex if two or more unions are seeking certification, with
some overlap in their expected membership, which could well require either clever
line drawing or perhaps a Board‐supervised election to resolve the matter. In the
interim, the manifest uncertainty is likely to have a negative impact on overall firm
performance. Costs become difficult to estimate, and some workers may either look
elsewhere for job or quit over their uneasiness in working in a union establishment.
At the same time a parallel issue arises over the question of whether the
signature cards or name are “valid” for the purposes of this act, where again the
NLRB procedures give short shrift to independent employer objections. Nor is that
likely to change if the Illinois experience with public unions offers a reliable
precedent. Within seven (7) days after the ILRA receives the majority interest (or
MI) petition, the employer is obligated to provide both a list of the employees in the
proposed bargaining unit and signature exemplars for those employees, including
signatures on W‐2 forms or other official documents. That list provided by the
employer includes only those employees in the proposed bargaining unit as of the
date the petition was filed. Quite possibly, the cards of former employees would
count, even though they could not vote in an election after they departed. The only
test of genuineness is a comparison of the two signatures by a Board agent who
normally has no expertise in handwriting analysis. It could be difficult to detect
some forgeries with this device. The system is surely less reliable than requiring the
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worker to appear before a neutral party to sign a card that could then become the
specimen for comparison, where only those signatures that match count.
The limited nature of the employer’s challenge to the card validity also
matters. The inquiry into validity is focused only on the narrow question of whether
the card was signed by the worker, within six months—or one year in NLRB
proceedings—before the petition was signed. The system does not offer the
employer any effective ways to challenge the cards on the ground that the signature
date has been altered, for the workers are not required to file a duplicate in any lock
box which can be dated as of the time of their arrival, for use if the union files the
petition. Nor is there any requirement of notarization. As noted above, a worker is
not allowed to withdraw the card before the appointed date. The decision not to
count a card depends on the proof in the individual case, by “clear and convincing
evidence of fraud.” This tough standard is not met under current law by referring to
the background risk that unions will engage in coercive tactics to win an election.
Yet neither employer nor dissenting workers are allowed to take depositions of the
card signatories to gather information about any violation. Nor does it appear that
individual workers may come forward on their own to testify that they had been
tricked or deceived into joining a union.
Faced with these limitations, it is highly unlikely that an employer could
carry the burden of proving coercion by the “clear and convincing evidence” needed
to reject the card check result. It is not surprising that there is no reported instance
of setting aside any card check under the fraud and coercion provisions of the
Illinois Act. The entire system is out of whack. In a close dispute one or two votes
could make all the difference. Coercion or mistake could make a difference in the
outcome of any close election. But under EFCA all errors in administration skew the
outcome in favor of the union. Under EFCA as the risk of fraud goes up with the card
check, the level of administrative and judicial oversight goes down. The situation
will only get worse if the level of card check activity increases after EFCA. Yet the
entire statute contains no provisions to deal with the huge volume of dispute and
litigation that the provision will raise. The bottom line thus seems clear. The
introduction of the card‐check system is precipitous and wise. The object of any
proceeding that determines whether a particular union shall represent a particular
group of workers should not be used to stack the deck in favor of either side. The
current law on this point is not, and cannot be, perfect. But it is vastly superior to
the card‐check system that EFCA proposes to substitute in its place.

CHAPTER 2
MANDATORY ARBITRATION OF TERMS AND RESTRICTIONS

No modest proposal
To date the card check provisions have grabbed most of the headlines in the
debate over EFCA. Its most dramatic departure from sound practice lies, in my
view, in its categorical insistence on “interest” arbitration. “Interest arbitration” is a
term of art that is used in opposition to the “grievance arbitration” provisions that
are found in labor contracts along with other types of agreements. The key to
grievance arbitration is faithful adherence to the underlying contractual provisions.
As the Supreme Court has stated nearly 50 years ago in the Steelworkers Trilogy, it
affords an enormous scope to arbitrators to resolve grievances in accordance with
the terms and surrounding circumstances of a given contract. 1 It is not the role of
grievance arbitrators to impose their own views on management or labor, but to
seek to gather information not only from the express terms of the contract, but also
“from the common law of the shop.” 2 Written text and common practice under the
agreement are the hallmarks of grievance arbitration. The Supreme Court has thus
held that courts should give enormous deference to arbitrators on all matters of law
and fact arising out of grievance arbitration.
Interest arbitration is a very different process. As the term suggests, the
purpose of an arbitrator is to determine the “interests” of both parties to the
agreement. In effect the new arbitral role is to set the terms of the agreement, not to
interpret or apply a preexisting arrangement. In some instances, interest
arbitration is done through mutual agreement. Under EFCA it is done pursuant to
statutory mandate over the objection of the employer. Either way of course, the
level of discretion afforded to the arbitrator is far greater and subject to no obvious
extrinsic limits. I shall discuss later the legal implications of the two forms of
arbitration. For the moment, however, it suffices to note the sweeping changes
wrought by EFCA. Its arbitral process leads to a first “contract”—the word must be
put in quotation marks—under which a panel of arbitrators, chosen by an as yet
unknown process, imposes whatever terms and restrictions for that it deems fit a
two‐year period, without possibility of judicial review. This new innovation marks a
complete departure from the current law which provides that once a union has been
certified, both the union and the employer fall under an obligation to bargain in
good faith. In those cases in which neither side commits an ULP, a bargaining
impasse imposes no obligation on either side to cooperate with the other. A union
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could order a strike and an employer could conduct a lock‐out of union workers and
hire replacement workers who keep their positions as long as the strike endures,
and perhaps gain some protection once the strike is concluded. 3 These prospects
are not all that attractive to any business large or small, and the willingness of an
employer to take a tough stance in negotiation is best understood as a measure of
how much it thinks it will lose in operating flexibility, wages and competitive
position under a collective bargaining contract.
The relative calculus is changed even if compulsory arbitration is grafted
onto system of labor law that retains union elections. Once the union is so selected,
the EFCA’s three‐step process, lasting 130 days, would still kick in, except when the
parties accept extensions by mutual agreement. The union can at the expiration of
this 130 day period force the employer’s hand, for at that time, “the [Federal
Mediation and Conciliation] Service shall refer the dispute to an arbitration board
established in accordance with such regulations as may be prescribed by the
Service. The arbitration panel shall render a decision settling the dispute and such
decision shall be binding upon the parties for a period of 2 years, unless amended
during such period by written consent of the parties.” 4 Thus, the most radical
transformation in American labor law is brought about in two sentences. But on the
particulars of this novel program there is only silence. The only point the EFCA
resolves is the arbitration is before either a “board” or a “panel,” which presumably
contains three members, perhaps more. But it is no easy matter to deploy
compulsory arbitration to fill in the blanks on an empty piece of paper, and the gaps
in EFCA left to regulation are legion and the consequences momentous.
The initial question raises a fundamental issue that EFCA does not address at
all. How should the statutory obligation to negotiate in good faith cash out in a legal
environment where neither party has the option to walk away from the negotiation.
Put otherwise, the current framework states that the statute “does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.” 5 Quite
simply, the billion dollar question is whether this provision remains operative
within a compulsory arbitration regime. Here, in principle, the most sensible
approach under EFCA’s unsound institutional framework is to dispense with good
faith bargaining requirements altogether. Intransigence no longer has any real
benefits given that the arbitral panel can structure its decree to sanction an
obstructionist party. If one side refuses to cooperate, the other party just runs out
the clock and the matter goes straight to arbitration after 130 days where time
limits can be enforced. As part of that process the panel can decide how to
apportion blame as it fashions its decree. The rest of the bad faith apparatus can be
ignored because EFCA’s more draconian methods have effectively made it futile to
refuse to bargain. The overall change in the NLRA should lead to a complete
recalibration of the entire statute. EFCA of course does not take this approach.
Instead it leaves open the question of how its compulsory arbitration scheme
meshes with the current set of duties to bargain in good faith. Here are some of the
difficulties.
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Transitional provisions
The initial shortcoming in this approach to compulsory arbitration is that no
steps made taken to insure the orderly transition, or to issue regulations that could
answer the question just posed on the proper integration of EFCA with existing
institutions. Rather the Act calls for the law to take effect immediately on passage,
without doing anything to secure the feasibility of its rapid implementation. EFCA
contains no provision that delays the effective date of the statute to allow the
various government agencies to finalize the regulations that are supposed to govern
its operation. That shortcoming may not be too acute with respect to the card check
provision because the existing systems already in place answer, however
unsatisfactorily, the key questions on implementation. But the same optimistic
estimation cannot be made of the interest arbitration provisions that promise a
radical alteration in the form of labor negotiations. As will become clear, the gaps
take place at each stage of the process, yet the total absence of guidance leaves
everyone ill‐equipped to deal with the multiple contingencies that are sure to crop
up in negotiations that will be fraught with tension from the outset. Major statutes
such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 contained provisions that delayed their
implementation for a year in order to allow parties to follow the basic procedures of
the Administrative Procedure Act with respect to the promulgation of key
regulations. 6

Initiation of Bargaining
The problems of integrating EFCA’s compulsory arbitration system with the
NLRA’s obligation to bargain in good faith begins with the first procedural step. It is,
to say the least, extraordinarily difficult in the best of circumstances to get any
negotiations off the ground within 10 days after the recognition of a union if both
parties are to comply with the basic mechanics of bargaining under the NLRA. And
the result of union certification via a card check will set the stage for precipitous
negotiations. But notwithstanding the likely distrust on both sides, the work must
continue. This is no easy task. Over the past six decades, an extensive body of NLRB
law provides that the obligation to bargain not only includes meeting at “reasonable
times,” but also the disclosure of information reasonably necessary for the parties to
discharge their respective obligations to bargain in good faith. 7 In practice, the
standard union requests for troves of information typically precipitate disputes over
the form and manner by which relevant data is turned over to the union, the
appropriate treatment of confidential information, the financial capabilities of the
employer to meet pay demands, and the allocation of the costs incurred in turning
over, subject to safeguards, certain types of sensitive information.
Unfortunately, a 10‐day period does not permit an adequate resolution of
issues surrounding the assembly, preservation, and transfer of information in the
heated context of negotiations. Yet EFCA contains no provisions that indicate what
adjustments, if any, should be made in the bargaining schedule when these
negotiations are unable to begin on time. Nor does it contain any indication of
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whether either side, or both, will be viewed as having committed a ULP when and if
the negotiations break down. Is the NLRB going to have to make determinations of
which side failed to cooperate, when both may have dragged their feet? And what
schedule will the negotiations take while any such determination is made? It may
be sufficient for popular consumption to state that the statutory timetable should be
faithfully followed. But it is critical for any successful system to put in place a
detailed decision‐tree that sets out the procedures to be applied, and the
consequences to be attached when and if the parties prove unable to adhere to the
original schedule. These gaps in the time table are sure to provoke further
dislocations in the subsequent stages of the process, which in turn will be the source
of further disputes.

Negotiation and Mediation
The initial difficulties on integration are likely to be compounded during the
ongoing process of negotiation and mediation. There are countless reasons, both
good and bad, why parties may be unable to keep to the tight schedules set out
under EFCA. It is common for high‐profile negotiation teams to face crises in other
areas of their business, to deal with other EFCA negotiations, to get sick, or to take
leave for family emergencies. Multiple commitments and logistical difficulties, like
storms and floods, could easily throw negotiations off schedule. The possibilities for
confusion become greater during the mediation stage of negotiations, for EFCA
contains no provisions that indicate what should be done if the mediator fails to
show up on appointed day. To be sure, these difficulties could be addressed by
informal adjustments of the schedule by mutual consent. But so long as either side
has some strategic advantage from insisting on expediting the process, there are no
guarantees that these ongoing modifications will be implemented, and no indication
of what dispute mechanisms are appropriate in the event of breakdown. Even if the
obvious question of how arbitration should proceed when one side claims that
mediation has not run its course, is left unanswered by the statute.
EFCA also fails to integrate its own rapid timetables with the traditional
enforcement machinery under the NLRA that works under a different clock. For
over 60 years, the NLRA has required both the union and the employer to engage in
“good faith” bargaining. 8 It is, however, unclear how these obligations would be
recast under the EFCA. On one track, EFCA drives any unresolved agreement into
mandatory arbitration after 120 days. On a second track, disputes over whether
either side has engaged in bad faith bargaining can easily linger on, because both
sides may petition the NLRB for up to six months after the occurrence of the alleged
misconduct. 9 The upshot is that a barrage of ULP claims could intersect with a
prolonged arbitration process, lending uncertainty to both regimes.
Nor will the difficulties quickly disappear. Filing of a ULP charge represents
only the first step of a complex process. Historically, most bad faith bargaining
cases take time to work their way through different appellate labors. Some
important cases might not reach the five‐member NLRB for years. But what
happens to the Board’s efforts to impose remedies on either an employer or union
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whom it finds has bargained in bad faith during the 120‐day bargaining period
preceding mandatory arbitration, how can the NLRB devise a meaningful remedy
when, in the interim, a panel of arbitrators has forced an arrangement upon the
parties for the two‐year period prescribed under EFCA? Ironically, if a useful
remedy is no longer possible, it is as though EFCA effectively undercuts, if not
repeals, the NLRA’s requirement of good faith bargaining in relation to initial
agreements.
Yet this result is far from certain. Alternatively, EFCA may result in an
enormous number of NLRB‐adjudicated bad faith bargaining disputes. But again,
think of the complications just on the wage issues. If the employer’s conduct is
thought to be improper, does that lead to retroactive wage increases, including ones
that apply after the conclusion of the initial two‐year period. Alternatively, if unions
are found to have violated their good faith bargaining obligations, after an EFCA‐
empowered arbitration panel has awarded it a favorable wage rate, should anything
be done to unravel the gains that the arbitrator has improperly bestowed in union
membership? Does that form of intervention apply only to wage terms or to other
aspects of the initial arbitral decree, some of which could have hurt the firm
financially or, for that matter, driven it into bankruptcy. It is most unfortunate if any
of these scenarios makes a mockery of the “certainty beforehand” to which the
United States Supreme Court gives pride of place when applying the NLRA to
fundamental business changes. 10

Compulsory Interest Arbitration
A STANDARDLESS PROCESS
The greatest difficulties under EFCA arise, of course, with its most daring
innovation, the use of mandatory arbitration to resolve all contract disputes. At this
coercive stage of the proceeding, it becomes critical to set out the rules by which
both parties will be bound. Yet once again EFCA opts for one broad mandate with
no details. Nothing in the statute settles questions of how arbitration panels are to
be set up, the scope of their powers, or the reviewability of their decrees on matters
of fact and law. Nor does EFCA make any effort to indicate the set of relevant
considerations for the arbitral decrees, and in this regard is in sharp contrast with
the detailed specifications of procedures and standards found in many state laws
that require interest arbitration in the public sector. 11
The catalog of unresolved questions prior to arbitration is very large,
especially for firms with no history of union relationships. There is, moreover,
nothing in EFCA that questions the validity of check cards collected prior to the
passage of the Act, so that the NLRB could easily be inundated with cases right after
its passage. A hundred and thirty days is an exceedingly tight time frame, not only
for negotiations but also for the entire notice and comment proceeding that the
NLRA and the FMCS will have to complete in order to put the bill into action. The
failure to establish any standards before the organization drives begin could easily
overwhelm the agency and lead to inconsistent patterns in individual cases. It
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seems that some delay before implementation is needed no matter what view is
taken on the desirability of the so‐called “reforms”.
STRUCTURE OF THE ARBITRATION PANELS
Turning next to matters of procedure, the first question involves the
selection of the arbitration panel. Many arbitration panels consist of three persons,
one of whom is selected by each party, after which the two arbitrators select in
some fashion the third, or neutral, arbitrator. This selection process may be made
more complex. For example, each side may first present a slate of potential
arbitrators. Thereafter the other side may be able to veto some number of those
choices, or, less likely, select the arbitrator from the opposing list that it finds most
desirable. But there is no necessity for the FMCS to follow these patterns when it
issues its regulations.
In principle, the FMCS could appoint all three members of the arbitration
panel by itself. Indeed for all the statute provides, it could pick all three (or more
arbitrators) exclusively from the ranks of labor or management, which raises
evident questions of bias of constitutional magnitude—one that should prompt a
strong procedural due process claim under the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. More likely, the Service will promulgate regulations that will
give each side some control over the selection of at least one arbitrator. But that
approach does nothing to resolve the impasse that will arise over the appointment
of the critical third arbitrator with his tie‐breaking role. Here it seems almost self‐
evident that the Service itself will have to take an active hand. But so long as that
Service is subject to any political influence—which seems inevitable—it is likely to
pick a decisive arbitrator who is temperamentally in favor of one side or another.
Whether the regulations will allow any administrative or judicial challenge to the
arbitral selection, it is not possible to say. Nor is it clear that the decision of the
Board with such adversarial consequences will be entitled to administrative
deference under the Chevron doctrine. 12 The claims for expertise are thin in this
context; and the risk of obvious bias in the selection of any “neutral” arbitrator is
clear.
POWERS OF THE ARBITRATION PANELS
Once the panel is selected, what is the scope of the arbitration, and how will
the panel gain the information to flesh out the first nonconsensual decree? The
current law tends to afford unions broad, but not unlimited discretion in framing the
requests for information that it serves on employers. I have already commented on
how it is unlikely that these matters could be resolved within a ten day period. But it
should not be assumed that these common problems exclude another set of issues
that is more likely to crop up in a first round negotiation between two parties with
no common history of negotiations. The discretion to request information is broad
but it is not unlimited. There are some matters that an employer may shield from a
union, and claims of this type of privilege could be exceptionally difficult to resolve
in some arbitration proceedings.
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Information is always a valuable commodity and one serious issue is whether
its release carries with it improper use or transmission to third parties. To guard
against these risks the obligation to disclose in a union context is typically limited
for two reasons. First, the union typically has no information of value that it could
release to the employer, so all these disclosures must run in one direction only, as
they have done historically. Second, the courts have a real uneasiness about
allowing for open‐ended requests for information. In NLRB v. Truitt
Manufacturing, 13 the Supreme Court affirmed the long‐standing Board position that
good faith negotiations required the employer to back up its claims to be unable to
grant workers the 10 cent per hour increase by disclosing sufficient financial
information to the union. The Court limited that obligation, however, to inquiries
that were not “unduly burdensome or injurious to its business.” 14 More critically, in
Detroit Edison v. NLRB, 15 the court refused to order the defendant utility to disclose
the particulars of psychological tests to determine its promotions were in
conformity with a collective bargaining which allowed seniority to be displaced only
“the reasonable qualifications and abilities of the employees being considered are
not significantly different.” 16
The range of relevant information is, of course, broader under interest
arbitration than under grievance arbitration, so these trade secret versus disclosure
conflicts will be more frequent and more acute. Within this new context, it is unclear
what information should count as burdensome under Truitt or confidential under
Detroit Edison. It takes no imagination, however, to conclude that an arbitration
panel could routinely require the employer to disclose to the union extensive
information about many aspects of the employer’s activities as part of the
comprehensive arbitration process. That information will in all likelihood cover job
classifications and wages, pension and benefit information for all workers within
the unit, all mandatory subjects of negotiation. 17 This information contains valuable
clues as to the employer’s business plan which normally counts as a trade secret. 18
Nor is it likely under EFCA that the employer could resist demands made under
subpoena about salary information for nonunion workers in the firm in order to
establish ostensible standards of comparability.
Given the scope of this mandatory arbitration, moreover, financial and salary
information might be only the start. Work rules, promotion and discipline policy,
sick leave and disability are all mandatory matters that must be addressed in
current collective bargaining negotiations. They are, therefore, proper matters
before the EFCA’s arbitral panel. Some portion of that information may be already
available in employee handbooks, but those publications would not contain internal
management estimates of cost or protocols for implementation that could be subject
to discovery. Many small businesses are in the process of rapid growth which
makes the release of any information about their expansion plans of great value to
competitors in any dynamic industry. The release of their information could reduce
their prospects for going public or for being bought out by some larger firm.
At the other end of the spectrum, most complex businesses have elaborate
procedures and arrangements for work done within the firm and work contracted
out to other parties, including the details of all outsourcing contracts on work that
the union would likely want to reclaim for the bargaining unit, perhaps to determine
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potential liabilities for contractual breach. Large firms constantly acquire new
businesses and shed old ones, so all the thorny questions of successor liability also
will be brought into the arbitration process. Right now the standard private sector
collective bargaining agreement for small units can run to hundreds of pages on
dozens of different topics. The sparse words of EFCA gives no hint as how the
arbitrators will collect and interpret the information needed to make the system of
interest arbitration go. Failing agreement, disputed matters may yet wind up in
further litigation. But EFCA is silent on internal appeals within the FMCS or by
interlocutory appeals to the court.
SCOPE OF COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
EFCA is also silent on the topics covered by its proposed arbitration scheme.
Under section 8(d) of the NLRA, the obligation for good faith negotiation extends to
“wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.” 19 The first two
terms are relatively clear, but the phrase “other terms and conditions of
employment” is highly elastic. The House version of section 8(d) contained a long
list of topics to which the duty to bargain would attach:
(i) wage rates, hours of employment, and work requirements; (ii)
procedures and practices relating to discharge, suspension, lay‐off, recall,
seniority, and discipline, or to promotion, demotion, transfer and assignment
within the bargaining unit; (iii) conditions, procedures, and practices,
governing safety, sanitation, and protection of health at the place of
employment; (iv) vacations and leaves of absence; and (v) administrative
and procedural provisions relating to the foregoing subjects. 20
Which of these topics is covered by the more general phrase “other terms
and conditions of employment,” is matter of some dispute over such key questions
as furloughs and reduction in force arrangements. Those disagreements are surely
important under the current system, but they are not life‐and‐death matters given
that either side can simply refuse to budge on those issues that it regards as critical
to its survival or prosperity. But the classification of any of these issues as
mandatory under EFCA is truly transformative, because once the subject is raised
the arbitral panel is not bound to follow any common practice whereby firms refuse
to yield control over these matters to the union under the collective bargaining
agreement. The absence of any guidance as to the limits of the arbitral power is yet
another of the major structural weaknesses in EFCA.
To make matters more difficult, the existing case law draws an elusive but
critical distinction between mandatory and permissive terms of bargaining. As to
the former, both sides are required to seek some honest agreement. Nonetheless,
each side is allowed to propose that an agreement on mandatory terms be achieved
by adding other “permissive” terms into the agreement. These permissive terms are
those that either party can put forward, but on which neither side cannot insist if
the other side refuses to include them in the negotiations. Matters of product design,
advertising, new stock issues, and credit arrangements fall clearly outside the scope
of mandatory bargaining. But as matters get closer to the workplace environment,
the line‐drawing becomes more difficult. One example of a permissive term, for
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example, is an employer’s demand to a union that an employer’s last offer be put to
a vote of unit members before the union may call a strike. 21
Speaking generally, EFCA does not state in so many words whether any
permissive terms could be made subject to a mandatory system of “first contract”
arbitration. On one view, mandatory arbitration should mimic any agreement that
the parties themselves would reach. Since voluntary agreements include permissive
topics of negotiation, these then become subject to arbitral consideration like any
other—at which point either side could expand the list of topics relevant to
arbitration. In principle, however, the better view limits the coercive arbitral
arrangement to mandatory terms only. The presumption should be set against the
expansion of government power, a matter that could not be forced into traditional
negotiations should not be made part of the final coercive decree unless both parties
consent. Unfortunately, like so many issues under EFCA, the point is left hanging.
What is clear, however, is that under Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v.
NLRB, the list of mandatory collective bargaining issues includes a wide range of
issues relating to the size of the workforce. 22 One such provision is the so‐called
management rights clause, which in general terms preserves to management the
right to retain its “normal prerogatives” in the operation of the firm’s business,
which the Supreme Court has held management may insist on in good faith. 23 Often
these clauses specify in great detail the types of decisions that fall exclusively to
management during the course of the contract. In principle, therefore, an arbitrator
could conclude that no decision relating to the introduction of new products or the
modes of production, or even the price of goods could be done without union
approval. These examples are not fancy extensions of Fibreboard, which treated as a
mandatory bargaining issue any “contracting out” of work for the business that
could be performed by unit members to third persons. More specifically, Fibreboard
held that a decision by an employer to contract out its maintenance operations to
third persons was a subject of mandatory bargaining because it took work away for
current unit members.
This subject is exceedingly important for arbitral decisions to prevent
contracting out of any work by a single unit in the firm could easily make it difficult
to retain flexibility in work assignments for nonunion workers elsewhere in the
firm. Let the firm have an integrated process in which it only makes sense to
contract out an entire job; then an arbitral decree with respect to a single union will
dictate policy for the treatment of nonunion work. But Fibreboard’s reach remains,
even today, somewhat unclear because the Court also noted that ‘[o]ur decision
need not and does not encompass other forms of ‘contracting out’ or
‘subcontracting’ which arise daily in our complex economy.”
That disclaimer, however, does not indicate just how far this duty to bargain
runs. In First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 24 the Court held that the
employer had no duty to bargain over the decision to shut down a part of its
business by canceling particular contracts. But First National does not undermine
Fiberboard’s central proposition that mandatory bargaining can cover many
decisions about subcontracting out unit work. Nor does it resolve all the questions
about whether there is a duty to bargain over such key questions of whether a firm
may relocate all or part of its operations from one facility to another. That issue is
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not one which is amenable to clear delineation. The NLRB formulation of the
question in Dubuque Packing Co. 25 makes the question turn on the differences in the
operations and the two locations and the motivations for moving from one place to
another. Under Dubuque it is open for an employer to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence “(1) that labor costs (direct or indirect) were not a factor in the
decision, or (2) that even if labor costs were a factor in the decision, the union could
not have offered labor cost concession that could have changed the employer’s
decision to relocate." 26 I quote this language from the NLRB because it shows just
how difficult it is to decide matters of mandatory bargaining even after a full record
of the transaction becomes available. It seems manifestly the case that none of this
information will be easily assembled in the interest arbitration proceedings under
EFCA. (It is also sobering that both plants closed when the NLRB thwarted the
management proposal.) It is therefore quite possible that an arbitration panel may
believe it is empowered to prevent the outsourcing of further work, the relocation of
business facilities, or even to bring back in‐house work that had been outsourced. It
is unclear whether these extraordinary restrictions, never agreed to by the
employer, would properly fall within the scope of the arbitral decree. Nor is it clear
whether the final arbitration could require the employer to terminate or abrogate
existing contracts with third parties as inconsistent with the collective bargaining
agreement, and if so, whether the decree would shield the employer from an action
for contract damages or perhaps even specific performance. All that is known is
that it has long been held that a collective bargaining agreement abrogates prior
individual contracts that employer made with unit members prior to the selection of
the union as the bargaining agent. 27 How this plays out with other agreements
remains a mystery. For large and complex businesses, literally hundreds of these
third party agreements could be exposed to arbitral review, when their invalidation
or modification could pose serious issues of third party liability.
This same risk could occur with the pension rights of workers within the
unit. It is well established that pension plans for existing (but not future) employees
are a mandatory topic of negotiation. 28 It therefore seems likely that the arbitrator
could impose on the company a variety of provisions that modify pension benefits
for current unit members, which raises thorny questions of which benefits under
the pension plan are vested in the employees. Among the intriguing possibilities are
orders that the employer make contributions to some multiemployer plan, even one
which is underfunded, so that the firm suffers in expectation a net loss from joining
in that venture. Any such decision could generate enormous liabilities for the
employer if, for example, it subsequently experiences changes that constitute a
“withdrawal” from the multiemployer pension plan). 29 There is an obvious question
of whether the dictation of these rights constitutes a confiscation of the property
interests of either employers or unions, which will require extensive and time‐
consuming litigation to settle. For the moment it is simply enough to note the
enormous reach of arbitral power. These examples can be easily multiplied,
because nothing limits the scope of that arbitration.
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INTEREST ARBITRATION EXTENSIONS?
Another critical question concerns the simple issue of whether the initial
arbitral decree could stipulate that the next contract negotiation—and the next after
that—could be subject to the EFCA’s mandatory arbitration provisions. Ideally,
EFCA should have stated in so many terms that it does not permit extensions but
only applies to first contract arbitrations. But in the absence of any real guidance on
this question, it seems that this is the proper result in any event. The key question
under current law is whether one labor contract could stipulate that both sides
accept interest arbitration for the negotiation of the extension of the original
contract. That result would be proper if interest arbitration were a mandatory
bargaining subject under current law. Yet the case law on this point seems to cut
the opposite way. In NLRB v. Columbus Printing Pressmen Union No. 252, 30 the court
found that it was a ULP under section 8(b)(3) for the union to insist that this clause
be included in the next agreement. Its basic conclusion was that this clause
fundamentally altered the nature of bargaining by removing the right to refuse to
make concessions during the next period, especially since the union could insist on
interest arbitration during the next period. The fear of a “self‐perpetuating” interest
arbitration scheme was key to this decision. That fear also drove the decision in
American Metal Products v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 104, where the court refused
to enforce an award obtained to second round of interest‐arbitration pursuant to an
initial interest arbitration award. 31 That result should apply a fortiori in any case
for any initial interest‐arbitration award that EFCA imposes.
The situation under EFCA is still more complex because it is unclear what
status should attach to an arbitral award under EFCA that erroneously covers
matters that are properly classified as permissive. On this question, current law has
little to say about compulsory interest‐arbitration, because it is so rare in the private
sector. But in those instances when arbitration takes place pursuant to the
agreement of the parties, the Supreme Court has taken a deferential approach that
leaves the arbitration decisions undisturbed on appeal—of which none is allowed
under EFCA—even when the arbitrators have committed “grievous error” made
“improvident, even silly factfinding.” 32 That approach may make sense in light of
the long tradition that affords that affords extraordinary deference to grievance
arbitration chosen by the parties. 33 But it hardly makes sense with respect to
coercive arbitration done without judicial review, except perhaps in bankruptcy,
where all too many of these cases are likely to land. The fact, moreover, that on
many topics—e.g. subcontracting and relocation—the line between mandatory and
permissive bargaining may depend on subjective factors and negotiation behavior
puts incredible burdens on a system. Once again, the constitutional specter of due
process violations appears to loom large against EFCA which contains no safeguards
at all against arbitral misbehavior. Even the strongest supports of interest‐
arbitration must acknowledge that the gaps in EFCA render the scheme wholly
unworkable, especially if introduced on a mass basis at breakneck speed.
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RIGHT TO WORK LAWS
Whatever the ambiguities elsewhere, EFCA’s interest arbitration provision
does not appear to preempt state right to work laws. Section 14(b) of the NLRA
provides: “nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the execution or
application of agreements requiring membership in any State or Territory in which
such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law.” This section
allows individual states to outlaw so‐called union security clauses, which usually
take one of two forms. First, a “union shop” clause requires a worker to join a union,
and thereby assume all the obligations of union membership, within a fixed period
after the union has been recognized. The weaker “agency shop” provision only
requires that the worker who chooses not to join a union be required to make some
contribution to the union in lieu of dues. It does not appear however, that interest
arbitration could go any further in the future than voluntary negotiations could on
this matter today. If conventional negotiations could not bind dissenting workers in
right to work states, the same result should hold for interest arbitration under EFCA,
just as it does for efforts to build an extension of EFCA in the original interest
arbitration decree. Nonetheless one area of ambiguity remains, for nothing in the
EFCA precludes the arbitrator from setting stiff fees in agency shop jurisdiction, as
an obvious deterrent to workers opting out of the unions.

Economic Consequences of Interest Arbitration
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
As should be evident, the implementation of any scheme of compulsory
arbitration in labor disputes will increase costs and uncertainty in labor
negotiations. The precise incidence of these costs is difficult to determine. As an
initial guess, both sides will be required to bear half the direct costs of the
arbitration process, as well as their own private costs of pressing the arbitration
forward. It seems quite likely that these costs would impose special burdens on
small firms, which have no experience on these matters and would have to staff up
at breakneck speed to meet their obligations under EFCA. In addition, the proposal
will generate social costs in the form of more extensive government infrastructure
to support the new regulatory apparatus. The exact amount of these costs cannot be
estimated in advance without knowledge as to the frequency and extent of
individual litigation. But as applied over the entire economy, the number cannot be
small either on an initial or ongoing basis. It appears therefore imperative to offer
some social gain to justify these public and private expenditures. It turns out that
these are hard to identify. Defenders of compulsory interest arbitration point to two
justifications for that system. The first is it generates a higher level of industrial
peace by removing the lock‐out and the strike from any first contract negotiation.
The second is that the program has worked well in both the public and private
sector. Both of these claims are seriously flawed.
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INDUSTRIAL PEACE
On the first point, it is surely correct that interest arbitration removes both
the risk of strikes and lockouts during the negotiation of the initial contract. But the
issue of industrial peace cannot be measured at a single point in time; it must be
measured over the entire cycle under EFCA, from original card check through
contract renewals after the expiration of the initial period. Two other stages are
involved.
First, the initial negotiations. I have already indicated why there is good
reason to think that the card check system will lead to squabbles between unions
and management over both the definition of the bargaining unit and the validity of
individual signature cards. Likewise, EFCA makes no provision for unions or
companies – in connection with bargaining – to formulate, exchange and respond to
requests for information and documentation. These requests are regular fixtures in
conventional negotiations, but never under an expedited timetable. They assume a
still greater role in a new and untested bargaining relationship, where the stakes are
higher and the anticipated levels of cooperation lower.
Yet in the face of these evident obstacles EFCA makes no allowance for letting
the employer and the union resolve questions pertaining to such requests. Nor does
the NLRB have authorization to make an investigation of the likely charges that
unions or employers may make about the failure of the other side to satisfy its
obligations to bargain in good faith, which may will survive for employers under
Sections 8(a)(5) and for unions under section 8(b)(3). It is also unclear under the
act whether the 120 day period for negotiation is on hold until these ULP claims are
resolved. With the stakes this high and the law this unclear, neither side will be
disposed to back down once a dispute arises. In addition, the parties always bargain
in the shadow of the law. Accordingly, the prospect of arbitration could easily lead
one side to hold out for the best outcome it expects to achieve from any arbitral
ruling. There is no reason for it to take anything less. Thus the likelihood of a
voluntary agreement could easily go down under this system, which puts greater
pressure on the still unknown arbitration process, as unions may have a strong
incentive to hold out for a strike it rich settlement, especially if they think the
decisive arbitrator is on their side.
Second, arbitral uncertainties. During the initial period, the arbitrated
contract could easily turn out to create many undesirable consequences, which were
not foreseen or understood during the initial arbitration. And of course there is no
guarantee that the arbitral decree will be clear enough to cover all disputes. It too
could be subject of disagreement and controversy. The EFCA, however, offers no
mechanism to address the question of midcourse correction, which could be most
difficult in light of the basic labor law proposition that the employer is not allowed
to impose unilateral changes of the original bargaining agreement. Nor does it
contain any mechanism to resolve promptly honest disputes over the interpretation
of its decrees. Yet both these issues will be of great importance in this context given
that the original arbitral decree is likely to miss the mark on so many issues. At this
point, the union could easily be in a strong hold‐up position with respect to issues
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that could spell life or death to the firm. But there appears no way for the
arbitrators who made the initial mistake to correct the mistake on application of the
employer. Similar issues could also arise in the opposite direction with respect to
certain union activities. The likelihood and extent of those mistakes however
appear far smaller as most of the arbitral provisions are likely to place sharp
restriction on management, and not union, prerogatives.
Third, the effective contract period. The issuance of an arbitration award
does not end the cycle of disagreement. At the end of the two year period, new
ruptures will arise. For starters, EFCA states that the arbitration panel “decision
shall be binding upon the parties for a period of 2 years. . .” 34 This does not make it
clear whether the arbitral award is effective only from the date it is handed down, so
that the previous business arrangements applies to the period between recognition
and arbitration, or whether the two‐year period will be retroactive, thereby making
changes in wages or benefits binding from the date of union recognition. If the latter
is indeed the case, a prolonged arbitration could result in a decree whose effect
could lapse just as it is announced, plunging the parties into a new round of
bargaining under traditional rules. Normally, the renegotiation of a collective
bargaining agreement is a painful affair, especially if matters have not worked out
well during the initial contract period. Unions can press for objectives that they did
not achieve at the original stage, just as management can demand give‐backs if
market conditions have become more competitive. Conversely, if the two‐year
period runs from when the initial agreement dispute is resolved, it necessarily
follows that the initial decree would last for a far longer period, during which it is
unknown whether employers and employees will be bound by preexisting
employment terms and conditions or by those are imposed by the arbitration panel.
The duration of the arbitration proceedings would therefore increase the hardship
from the new terms dictated by the arbitral process. It would also increase the
possibility that both sides would be more likely to resort to the conventional
economic weapons, including strikes and lockouts, during or after the arbitration
period, assuming that is known in advance.
These familiar difficulties are certain to be magnified because the basic
arrangement is now the product of an imposed settlement and not a voluntary
agreement. At this point one side—probably both management and disgruntled
workers had no say in the initial arbitration—will think that the entire previous
arrangement has no legitimacy because it was dictated by third party arbitrators.
The upshot is that both critical stages in the life of a labor agreement take place with
no input from the employees who are forced to live with the arrangement. They
must first live with the denial of the secret ballot that selects the union . Thereafter
they have to live under a contract whose terms they do not know, and whose
provisions they do not have the opportunity to accept or reject. Freed from the
shackles of the original agreement, the management team will bargain hard with the
union in order to take back what it regards as unacceptable arbitral fiats. It is
therefore likely that the pent‐up antagonisms of a dictated regime will boil over.
The ostensible peace when the first contract is imposed will be offset by the
increased tensions at other points in the general cycle.
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WHAT COUNTS AS SUCCESSFUL ARBITRATIONS?
In order for any relationship to remain stable over time, it must leave each
party better off than it would have been in the absence of the agreement. That
condition can be satisfied, albeit it with difficulty, in voluntary agreements between
the two sides, for neither management nor labor will agree to any contract that
leaves them worse off than they would have been with a lock out or a strike. But
there is no guarantee that any complex arbitrator‐imposed terms and restrictions
under EFCA will meet this condition. Remember the dispute here is not limited to
salaries and benefits, but necessarily spills over to all terms that are part and parcel
of standard collective bargaining agreement. Many of these are not easy to
monetize, such as work rules, promotions, demotions, reassignments, layoffs,
grievances and the like. Each of these provisions is hard to value, and it is easy for
an arbitrator to underestimate the level of dislocation that a particular restriction
will have on the competitive mettle of the firm.
The problem is even more difficult than it first appears for two reasons. The
first relates to a single arbitral award: the many close interconnections between the
various aspects of the employment relationship could impose unexpected burdens
on the management of the firm. Again the problem is equally acute for small
businesses and large ones. Two years is an eternity for any firm shackled with a
labor agreement that makes it impossible to respond quickly to new dangers or
opportunities. The implicit static model behind EFCA is at least a generation behind
the times. The second relates to the prospect of multiple arbitral awards on behalf
of different bargaining units in the same firm: there may be inconsistencies
between the awards, or the cumulative burdens could easily escape the detection of
the separate arbitration panels as they move along parallel tracks.
It will be said of course that these points are overestimated because of the
common use of these arrangements in the public sector, where neither strikes nor
lockouts are allowed. But there are significant differences between the public and
private settings. Most public unions—teachers, police, firemen, sanitation and so
on—work for a given public employer with a fixed internal structure that faces no
direct competition from any other firm. There is, therefore, a certain forgiveness in
the setting of terms because the government unit has the opportunity to make up
any losses from contract through increased levels of tax support. In addition,
contract renewals and extensions are typically negotiated off past agreements,
which have already proved viable.
Viable, however, is far from optimal. With public employment, many of the
terms are dictated by statute or regulation, which could easily be ill‐suited for many
of the bargaining units subject to its provisions. Unfortunately, however, the parties
have no opportunity to revise the basic agreement to counter any inefficiency that
these or other provisions cause in supplying government services. The basic
contract structure lives on long after the efficient modes of production have shifted.
The continuation in service may prevent disruptions, but it conceals the rapid
deterioration that interest arbitration fosters by entrenching older modes of doing
business in the face of new technology. The rubber hits the road whenever the
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public institutions are faced with new competition. All too often the methods of
education and financing in public schools change only slowly with time. Yet once a
charter school is allowed to bid for students, the inefficiencies of the public system
become apparent. It can adopt, for example, efficient backroom systems that will
free up more resources for teaching. It can make new innovations without having to
clear a top‐heavy bureaucracy. Hence we see the fierce opposition of teachers
unions to vouchers, charter and home schooling, for what they reveal about their
own rigid organizational structure. 35 Efficient institutions do not have to fear new
entrants whose cost structure is higher than their own. Inefficient institutions must
drive out these new entrants by legal compulsion for otherwise parents will vote
with their feet by educating their students elsewhere. Interest arbitration by legal
compulsion works only in sheltered environments.
Private firms, of course, rarely enjoy the luxury of a state monopoly. They
cannot keep out rivals that are more efficient than themselves. Interest arbitration
can thus deal a fatal blow to any firm caught in its clutches. In the simplest situation,
one firm is subject to a compulsory arbitration decree before its key rivals are
unionized. Its labor bill goes up, its managerial flexibility goes down. The necessary
consequence is that the firm will face immediate losses that can be chalked up
exclusively to the interest arbitration. There are countless variations on this theme,
for even if two rival businesses are both subject to interest arbitration, their
competitive balance could be profoundly shifted if the one arbitral decree imposes
more onerous obligations on employer A than a second arbitral decree imposes on
employee B.
Disparities will be everyday occurrences in these novel settings, especially
for firms, both small and large, that have never been unionized at all. Quite simply
the arbitration panel has no template agreement on which to base its final decree. It
operates largely in the dark, being able to rely at most on filtered information
without any real appreciation for how a complex business operates. The leaps of
faith are much greater, which means that the relative disparities between any two
competitive firms will be far greater. But unlike the public sector there is no
monopoly protection to shield the blow.
Nor does the limited presence of voluntary interest arbitration in the private
sphere indicate the contrary. These arbitration arrangements have been agreed to
in advance by parties who have negotiated under the current rules governing
collective bargaining. For example, based on unique circumstances then existing in
the steel industry, the United Steelworkers and major steel industry producers in
the early 1970s agreed to an Experimental Negotiating Agreement (ENA) providing
for the arbitration of unresolved labor contract disputes. But the system did not
work, and it was ultimately abandoned, only to be followed by the near‐demise of
the entire U.S. steel industry. 36
In other cases, the scope of the arbitration by design has been limited to
certain particular areas, once an actual agreement has been worked out on all other
issues. To give but one example, the parties in professional baseball have agreed,
but only through the usual collective bargaining arrangements, that individual
player compensation can be resolved based on final offer arbitration. They have
refused to move to interest arbitration for their master agreement in negotiating
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their successive labor contracts, even though repeated breakdowns in collective
bargaining has resulted in five strikes and three lockouts since 1972. 37 It is also
instructive to note that these breakdowns were in the early years of collective
bargaining, when neither side had experience in dealing with the other. Five of the
dislocations took place in the decade between 1972 and 1982; two in the decade
between 1982 and 1992; one in the decade between 1992‐ and 2002, and none
thereafter. That pattern suggests that we should expect high levels of disruption in
the early periods under EFCA because we are in the early stages of the learning
curve, where neither side has realistic expectations of how the process will work or
what they can be expected to derive from it.
The targeted system of final offer arbitration now in place works, moreover,
because by design the standard player agreements reduce the disagreement to a
single number—the salary—in a contract that lasts only for a single‐year. 38 Under
the standard system each party submits a single number and the arbitrator chooses
that number that is closest to his own estimate as to the worth of the player in
question. Thus if the player demands $2 million and the club offers only $1 million,
the arbitrator will side with the player if his estimate of the player’s one year worth
is over $1.5 million, and with the team if that estimate is under $1.5 million. Under
this system, each party knows that it faces an inescapable dilemma. The expected
value of its contract will increase as its bid becomes more aggressive (high for the
player and low for the team), but that expected value will simultaneously be
reduced as aggressive bids always carry with them a lower probability of its success.
Those two numbers—chances of success and desirability of outcome—are inversely
related, so ideally each party would like to pick that figure which is a dollar closer to
the anticipated arbitral award than its rival. That process leads to a compression in
the bids, so that the gap is usually reduced. In this context, the residual
uncertainties tend to drive both sides to a settlement, often for long‐term negotiated
contracts that contain far more complex compensation packages.
There is no possible transference of this system to the world of interest
arbitration under EFCA, where the parameters can never be limited to a single
variable. At this point, the question is what provisions should be included in an
agreement, and how should they be integrated with each other. The traditional
form of labor arbitration involved seasoned professionals with close knowledge of
the relevant industry and its practices, to which courts have given a great deal of
deference. 39 Yet such deference is wholly inappropriate in this context, especially
for businesses that were nonunion, where there is no accumulated wisdom to which
any arbitrator could turn. A huge demand for arbitrators would test a system that is
not geared up to meet it, and the likely source of arbitrators will be drawn from the
public sector, where the slow pace of innovation and the rigid styles of doing
business give rise to precisely the wrong mindset.
Where, moreover, should conscientious arbitrators turn for guidance? There
are no obvious comparables to look to for other nonunion firms, because their
business approaches will differ greatly. So the tendency will be to look to the same
unionized firms that have lost market share to their nonunionized rivals, largely
because union firms use static paradigms that have long been discarded in nonunion
settings. One obvious issue is job classifications. Union contracts normally do not
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allow workers in one job category to be pressed into service at a moment’s notice to
do work that falls outside their job description. But even the casual shopper can
observe the length of check out lines, which are likely to be shorter at nonunion
stores, which train all their personnel to operate cash registers to keep the customer
traffic flowing.
Any decision to impose the union work rules on the nonunion firm, therefore,
has profound anticompetitive effects by lowering the best so that the worst can
continue to compete. It is as though the labor law is being used to cartelize an
industry—and in an inefficient form at that—in ways that would be improper under
the antitrust laws with their focus on the preservation of consumer welfare through
the protection of vigorous competition.
Nor would it make sense to compare the nonunion operations at one firm in
the industry with those of another. One key advantage of competition is to allow
different businesses to experiment with different business models to satisfy their
customers. Labor arbitration will degenerate into a branch of industrial policy if it is
construed to require uniformity on these matters. Quite simply, interest arbitration
will make it difficult for each firm to keep its preferred method of business
operations in place no matter what its competitors do. The crippling effects of this
system seem evident, which is why so few firms ever agreed to it voluntarily. And
the situation would be still worse if arbitrators thought that they should confer
among themselves before settling on decrees in particular cases. That approach is
certainly not required under EFCA, but nothing under the statute prohibits a single
panel charged with many cases from taking just this approach.
In sum, the difficulties with compulsory interest arbitration are so manifest
that Congress should reject it forthwith.
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CHAPTER 3
THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF UNIONIZATION

An Interest Group Analysis
The first portion of this monograph has been directed to a close analysis of
the provisions of the EFCA. It is also appropriate to examine the social
consequences of this legislation for all relevant groups. This issue has real salience
today because there is much evidence that the full array of employment laws is
perceived as the number one regulatory threat facing the American firms today—
even without EFCA. 1 The adoption of EFCA will only compound the problem with
its twin threats of card check and compulsory arbitration. As a theoretical matter,
legal reforms can never produce social gains by shrinking the size of the pie, which
is what always happens when administrative costs go up and productive output
goes down. Rather than dwell solely on this general proposition, it is instructive to
see how this assessment of EFCA plays out for four groups: unions, employees,
employers and all third parties.
The analysis of the first point does not require any subtlety. Union dues fuel
union activities. Each provision of EFCA adds fuel to the fire by increasing the
ability of unions to organize and to undertake political activities that protect or
enhance their economic clout inside the workplace. Unions have to be chalked up as
unambiguous winners from EFCA. The other three groups require some more
consideration. The bottom line is that workers find themselves, at best, in an
ambiguous position, which explains their divided loyalties. From the outset they
must be able to secure from unionization advantages that offset the loss of the
secret ballot and the opportunity to ratify or reject any final settlement—both now
exclusive union prerogatives. Employers are unambiguous losers, which explains
their opposition. The public at large also loses, but the consequences of the
legislation are sufficiently indirect that its views on the question may not track the
probable economic consequences of the legislation.

The Ambiguous Union Member Interest: A Large Share of a Smaller Pie
The easiest way to understand the ambiguities of the employee position is to
ask what they can gain or lose from engaging in union activity. The traditional
account of this point, acknowledged even by union supporters, is that the NLRA in
its present form allows unions to exercise on behalf of their members some degree
of monopoly power, which in turn allows them to raise wages, reduce hours, and
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otherwise improve working conditions. In writing about this topic some 25 years
ago, Richard Freeman and James Medoff noted simply:
Most, if not all, unions have monopoly power, which they can use to
raise wages above competitive levels. Assuming that the competitive system
works perfectly, these wages increases have harmful economic effects,
reducing the national output and distorting the distribution of income. The
analysis of unions as monopolies focuses on the magnitude of the union
markup of wages and traces the ways in which this markup causes firms to
lower employment and output, thereby harming economic efficiency and
altering the distribution of income. 2
In one sense their candid admission attributes to unions more influence over
wages than they presently exert. The overall structure of the economy today is
more competitive generally than it was 25 years ago when Freeman and Medoff
were writing. The increased pace of global trade, the improved systems of
transportation and communication expand the market, which in turn makes it more
difficult for niche unions to acquire and maintain monopoly power—which is one
reason why unions oppose free trade agreements. Union monopoly power is a
constant threat but not a uniform presence. That monopoly power, however, can be
increased through legislation. Even so, some historical data does point to a
substantial increment in wages that union members have over nonunion members.
Thus Harley Shaiken notes that “Bureau of Labor Statistics data that indicate a union
wage advantage of 28.1 percent for wages and 43.7 percent of total compensation—
wages and benefits.” 3 To be sure, these differentials look to be large. It is therefore
necessary to correct the numbers by controlling for other features of the two
cohorts of workers. Shaiken thus concludes—and I cannot vouch for his numbers—
that the wage premium for union workers is 14.7 percent 4 across all groups.
As Freeman and Medoff recognize, the overall situation is far more complex
than might be supposed because unions do not operate like business entities. In
general business entities are able to suppress conflicts of interest among
shareholders, by structuring their holdings so that they share pro rata by size of
stakes in the firm’s gains and losses. 5 Indeed it is precisely to preserve these
parallel interests that publicly traded corporations usually have only a single class
of common stock. The individual interests of union members, however, often
diverge from one another. Seniority matters among the rank and file, and its
rigorous protection in union contracts is no testimony to its efficiency, as Freeman
and Medoff suggest, 6 for there is little evidence that it is adopted in nonunion firms.
Rather the strict adherence to seniority systems reflects the additional political
clout that senior workers have, given that the governance structure favors senior
employees when it comes to layoffs. 7 In addition, unions have to speak for retired
members of the union, especially on pension and health care issues, and make
provision for the hiring of new members over time. Political power within the union
is positively correlated with longevity of union membership, which increases the
potential of intergenerational conflicts.
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Faced with this background, it becomes necessary to discuss matters that
affect all workers equally and those that trigger conflicts of interest. Laying bare
these common conflicts helps explain why workers are of two minds over union
membership. On the one side there are many union enthusiasts for whom solidarity
is an appropriate watchword. But this group is not a random sample of the overall
population. Workers whose views differ will tend to gravitate away from strong
union firms and from industries with strong union presence. There is therefore no
reason to think that the level of union support in existing units translates to equal
levels of support in the general population. Quite the contrary, there are many costs
associated with union membership that can easily explain the reluctance of
nonunionized workers to cast their lot with unions.
First, union membership does not come cheap. In 2000, it was reported that
union dues eat up on average some 1.25% of the paycheck, 8 a figure that seems
stable. 9 Union activities can eat up a fraction more. Some portions of the increase
in gross pay are thus offset by the increase in union‐related expenses. These costs
are compounded by the need for workers to spend time on union affairs, be it to run
committees or vote in elections, or cooperate with or oppose the union on particular
questions. Union democracy does not come free, and operates fitfully at best. In all
cases, the refusal of workers to participate in their collective affairs is costly.
Standing aside in union elections, for example, could result in the selection of union
officers who are antagonistic to some of the absentee’s interests. Not participating
in union governance could lead to a weakening of union institutions or isolation
from fellow union members. In all cases, it is harder for workers to navigate a
system with dual union and management governance than it is for them to deal with
a single employer.
Second, unionization dulls long term worker prospects for advancement—a
consequence that will effect younger workers more than older ones, and able
workers more than mediocre ones. Any union necessarily works large changes
internal to the workplace to take into account the complex dual governance
structure in which both management and labor play a part.
Here is one example, with major implications. Low‐level workers find it
easier to gain access to management positions in nonunion settings. The Supreme
Court has long upheld the NLRB regulations that exclude from statutory coverage
any employees with access to or control over confidential files and information
related to management functions. 10 The theory is that dual loyalties are not
acceptable for sensitive positions. But this narrow interpretive rule could not reach
all cases of dual loyalty unless it completed gutted the NLRA’s basic collective
bargaining mandate. All union members, no matter what their station, have dual
loyalties, which may make some management representatives reluctant to share
with union members that type of information that could be used against them
thereafter. Hence the lines between union and nonunion workers can harden so
that it is risky for managers to mentor union workers with an eye to promotion. 11
A nonunionized firm is much less worried about dual loyalties, and thus is able to
give rank‐and‐file workers more information and support, but of course not all,
sensitive information that can help them learn about the business as a spur to
personal advancement. In a similar vein, no unionized employer may offer

72
additional benefits to workers of exceptional diligence or skill unless authorized by
the collective bargaining agreement. These constraints limit the upward mobility of
workers within the firm, by creating a wall of separation between union workers
and management.
The wall can get quite high. In many settings it is an ULP for an employer to
alter working arrangements or resolve grievances with individual workers without
going through the union. As the grievance process becomes more formal, the
Supreme Court has held that no individual worker has the right to control his own
case, even though section 9(a) of the NLRA appears to authorize that result. 12 Today
the grievance can only go forward if the union decides to press it, except in the few
cases where the union is found to have acted in bad faith. 13 This interposed layer of
control makes it difficult for workers to calculate their net advantage from union
membership. Accordingly, many workers, especially stronger workers, may
sensibly conclude that the short‐term wage increases from unionization are
substantially offset by the reduction in their long‐term prospects of advancement.
Third, many union defenders take pride in the increased equalization of
wages that unions introduce into the workplace. But this parity is a double edged
sword given its adverse impact on firm efficiency. As a matter of economic theory,
an efficient firm will set pay to reflect the (marginal) contribution that each worker
makes to the firm. Cost justified wage differentials will be common as firms have
little desire to engage in cross‐subsidies among members of its workforce. Pay
some workers too little relative to their contribution and they will leave; pay them
too much and you will lose out financially to the competition. But unions cannot
work by this simple metric because of their need to share the wealth among all
union members in order to maintain their majority coalition. In response to these
governance pressures, therefore, the union will tend to narrow wages differences
among workers in different classifications in order to hold the bargaining unit
together. Skilled workers, if outnumbered in the bargaining unit, could easily
oppose unionization on just this ground.
The concern is long‐standing. As early as the 1960s, the UAW had to enter
into special agreements to resolve the long standing grievances of its skilled
workers. 14 The problem occurs today. Here is one example in hospitals. Let all
nurses be put into the same unit, wages will level off, which will tend to create
shortages on hard beats like oncology and intensive care, and relatively larger
numbers in pediatrics and obstetrics, where happy occasions outnumber sad ones.
Similar conflicts arise when unions have to reconcile seniority lists when two units
merge. 15 The firm’s inability to maintain wage differentials could compromise the
firm’s competitive standing, leading to across‐the board reductions in wages and
work force.
These problems are compounded because technical innovation and global
competition require quick adoption of new business models. These shifts are hard to
negotiate in advance, even when both sides are committed to the collective
bargaining process. Rigid union job categories impede renegotiation of the collective
bargaining agreement. Risk averse workers will tend to favor the status quo. And
that bias will be strengthened by the heavy transaction costs of renegotiating a deal
that leaves each union group happy. Ordinary firms in private markets typically
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respond to adverse economic circumstances by firing some workers. 16 More
recently, there has been a move toward unpaid furloughs and extended closings as
part of a general effort to keep the workforce in tact for an eventual economic
turnaround. 17 Their clear judgment is that it is too costly to maintain a large work
force of part‐time employees who are likely to be both resentful and
underemployed. Morale and output will both suffer. Severance, often with some
economic package, is the preferred alternative in most firms. That strategy will not
be as attractive to unions for whom the dismissal of any worker means a loss of
union membership and a corresponding loss of dues income. So there are efforts to
provide various forms of compensation to individual workers, such as the
automobile workers who continue to draw paychecks as union members so long as
they are “available” for work in some facility. 18 The upshot is that the unionized
firm could easily lag behind its more nimble rivals.
In response, it has been said that unions understand this risk and encourage
various kinds of training programs to earn worker support. Harley Shaiken in his
Congressional testimony quotes James Kaster, President of UAW 1715, representing
the famed General Motor’s plant in Lordstown, Ohio. “’If we don’t make a profit, we
don’t have a plant.’” 19 All too true, but not quite in the sense he intended. General
Motors is on the ropes; total union membership at the company is down sharply. 20
Lordstown does relatively well because it makes small cars. But there is an ongoing
union battle over “flow rights” to Lordstown from the shuttered GM plant in
Moraine. 21 The blunt truth is that plant closings have been routine at GM, even
before its implosion at the end of 2008. Clearly someone has miscalculated the
amount of “free cash” available in collective bargaining negotiations at Moraine and
elsewhere. It is no accident that the former Big Three automobile companies —GM,
Ford, and Chrysler—now need a major government bailout to survive at all. 22 And it
is of course no surprise that one of the central issues in the ongoing bailout saga are
the union contracts—wages, pensions, benefits and workrules) that put the Detroit
companies at a marked disadvantage to the foreign companies that do not have to
shake these multiple burdens. It is, to say the least, a dangerous to try to capture the
golden eggs without killing the goose.
As the bailout negotiations indicate, one of the knottiest problems in union
negotiations involves the implicit conflicts between the senior workers, who need
for the business to last only long enough to secure their high wages and retirement
benefits, pushing the risk off onto the junior workers who necessarily have a longer
time horizon. That conflict is “only” one of degree, not in kind. But the difference in
preferences can be large enough such that the dominant senior faction will push
hard enough to reap its short‐term benefits while leaving retirees and younger
members in the lurch. In addition, these pension arrangements could be
destabilized under EFCA. Pension and other retirement benefits are manifestly
mandatory terms, so that an arbitration agreement could reduce the pensions of
some workers and increase those of others, given that no prior contractual
understandings are protected against revision under the J.I. Case rule that allows
collective bargaining agreement to abrogate otherwise valid labor contracts. 23 Even
conflict of interest is not as stark as that explicitly acknowledged whenever unions
negotiate two‐tier wage packages, whereby future employees receive far less in

74
their compensation package than the current workers. It should therefore be of no
surprise that the UAW negotiated just this type of deal in order to gain $1 billion in
new work. Here is the indictment of that deal on the World Socialist Web site:
The UAW also jettisoned the principle of “equal pay for equal work”
by agreeing to lower wages for new hires at Delphi and Visteon (the parts
company spun off from Ford), which currently employ 30,000 UAW workers.
The companies are seeking to establish a permanent two‐tier wage system,
in which new hires work for vastly lower starting wages and benefits—in
line with other suppliers—and can never catch up to workers who were
hired before the current contract.
The UAW and the two parts suppliers will meet within 90 days of the
contract ratification to work out the extent of the wage and benefit cuts.
Delphi and Visteon workers will have no vote on the matter.
As one worker noted, the two‐tier wages will further break up the
solidarity of auto workers. In future contracts, the companies are sure to tell
newer workers the only way they can pay for wage improvements is to vote
for pension reductions for the company’s tens of thousands of retirees. 24
Why be surprised? The union has preserved the monopoly profits for its
dominant faction while acceding to a competitive wage for the new arrivals who had
no voice in the bargaining unit when the agreement was negotiated. No wonder one
worker said: “The UAW is no longer a union. They are all sellouts. They are just
looking out for their own interests.” 25 Too harsh perhaps because desperate
situations require extreme actions.
The debacle in the automobile industry has not spread to all industries.
Some unions do better than others, within and across industries. The history of
these relationships are filled with twists and turns in the road, so much so that it is
impossible for anyone to summarize accurately and uncontroversially the path of
any particular negotiations. It is critical to understand why this wide variation in
management‐union relations is virtually inevitable given the uncertain operation of
union democracy under current law. The outcome of union elections and card
checks are often determined by a few votes one way or the other. It takes very little
to displace a cooperative union president with a firebrand who wants to take high
risks to secure high returns for its workers—or the reverse. The contrast between
the relative labor peace at Southwest Airlines and the constant tumult at Northwest
Airlines show how much one union can diverge from another. 26
Union membership creates yet another form of instability that workers could
rationally wish to avoid: the statutory framework for collective bargaining
negotiations, which impose on both sides the obligation to bargain in good faith. By
conscious design this results in a bilateral monopoly situation in which there is no
unique wage level for any given output as there is in a competitive market. 27 The
union, as exclusive representative of the workers, must bargain with management.
Management must bargain with this union. Neither side has alternatives. There is
no way that the management can just refuse to deal or seek out new trading
partners as in competitive markets.
This structure matters. As a matter of economic theory, there is a huge level
of indeterminacy about the terms and conditions of these contracts, and much
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dispute over wages. Quite simply, in many negotiations, there is large bargaining
range such that the minimum that the union will accept is, as the automobile
examples show, less than the maximum that the firm will offer. (On salary, for
example, if the union might accept $20 per hour, and the management may be
prepared to offer up to $30, the bargaining range is $10. In this simplest of
examples, there is no unique range, as much depends on the bargaining strategies of
the two sides.) Markets with bilateral monopolies are always more difficult to
operate than competitive ones where the gap between the offering and asking price
quickly disappears. Accordingly, the good faith negotiations are far more artificial,
scripted and complex than those that exist in a nonunion environment where take‐
it‐or‐leave it offers can be made on either side at far lower costs. Negotiations in
competitive markets rarely have catastrophic consequences when they break down,
because both sides can go elsewhere. Not so when collective bargaining
negotiations break down under the NLRA. Strikes and lockouts can arise, with
disruptions in production or service. In the long run, few firms, new or established,
will choose to invest capital in environments where such investments can be held
hostage to union demands. Some firms will contract or go out of business. Other
firms will invest their capital in the nonunion portions of the business in order to
realize a more stable set of returns.
These consequences are neither obscure nor improbable. Workers who
sense the downward spiral of union relationships could easily prefer the long‐term
stability of nonunion relationships to the high risk/high return strategy from
unionization. Not in all cases, and not in all settings, but surely in many. Nor could
it be easy to gainsay their caution. The autoworkers unions, the steel unions, the
rubber workers unions are all vivid illustrations of how risky union membership
can turn out to be. The lesson will not be lost on some workers who will shy away
from new businesses that are saddled with union representation. The defenders of
EFCA studiously ignore these issues, even though a clear awareness of these
industrial casualties is critical for any worker to make an intelligent choice.
Employer speech and the frank expression of opinion – both protected under
federal law 28 – can often be of great service to the firm’s workers as they debate
among themselves the pros and cons of union representation.

The Employer’s Interest under Collective Bargaining: A Smaller Share of a
Smaller Pie
The ambiguity in worker attitudes and preferences stems from the fact that
possible monopoly wages could offset the overall productivity losses of the firm.
Different workers will make different assessments on this fundamental trade‐off, so
that views can run the gamut from deep devotion to fierce opposition to labor
unions. The employer interest does not suffer from any such ambiguity. The firm
gets the smaller share of the smaller pie, and thus loses both ways from
unionization. It is therefore no wonder that many successful firms are so openly
adamant about resisting unions. 29 They do not have to calculate the precise
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magnitude of the losses to know that unions create the double whammy. Their only
question is how best to respond to the risk.
The defenders of unionization, in general, and of EFCA in particular, write as
if employer resistance to unionization is an inexplicable and lamentable feature of
the business landscape, just as if these powerful economic forces do not exist. They
do not seem to believe, deeply down, that the opposition to unions is either rational
or defensible. In order to make that case respectable, they put forward a “second
face” of unionization which they claim generates sufficient social gains to make the
entire collective bargaining enterprise worth protecting by statute. Freeman and
Medoff exemplify this approach when they point to “The Collective
Voice/Institutional Response Face” of unionization as the source of the putative
efficiency gains to offset the monopoly wages that unions sometimes extract from
the firm.
As a theoretical matter, a heavy burden of proof lies on those who think that
this second face of unionization sweeps aside all employer opposition. Quite simply,
if unions could provide firms benefits that these firms could not generate for
themselves, key firm executives would be jumping over chairs to embrace the first
union to knock on the door. After all, why would these profit‐making soulless
entities resist unions if they held the only keys to improved labor performance? In
this topsy‐turvy world, a nonunionized firm should fret if its rival obtained a
competitive advantage from being unionized! And it should announce its willingness
to accept unionization in order to restore its competitive position. It never happens;
in all cases the storyline runs in the opposite direction. It is far more likely that a
firm will accede reluctantly to unionization only if the union can credibly promise
that its rivals will labor under the same (dis)advantage in order to minimize the
expected losses. 30
The second face claim thus boils down to an argument of “false
consciousness.” Virtually all employers in the United States are presumed ignorant
of their own business interests when they oppose unions whose innovation could
enhance productivity and profits. Not possible: these managers have worked too
hard, and have too much on the ground knowledge to be dismissed as uninformed
cranks or ideological zealots standing in the path of progress. Their consistent and
intense resistance to unionization should be regarded as well‐nigh conclusive
evidence of their deep conviction that unionization leads to net losses for the firm.
They have every incentive to be right. The labor sympathizers in economics and law
have every incentive to be wrong.
What then could lead learned economists to embrace the opposite
conclusion? One argument urged by Freeman and Medoff is that collective
bargaining is needed to overcome a “public goods problem” associated with firm
production. 31 Their list of these so‐called public goods is impressive: “Safety
conditions, lighting, heating, the speed of the production line, the firm’s formal
grievance procedure, pension plan, and policies on matters such as layoffs, work‐
sharing, cyclical wage adjustments, and promotion.” 32 They conclude that a
competitive market will fail to grapple with these collective issues, all on the implicit
assumption that the only private good that firms supply their workers is the money
in their pay packet. Otherwise the firm will be plagued by “free rider” problems
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among workers that a union backed by a union security provision is able to
overcome.
The initial response to this broad definition of public goods is one of
wonderment. If these so‐called public goods problems were acute, how could any of
the thousands of nonunion firms ever be as efficient as their union rivals? Indeed,
how could they function at all? And yet, somehow, before the arrival of the union,
they seem to solve these issues of employment relations by institutional, contractual
and social means. Why: because there is no public goods problem at all. The classic
public goods problem arises when no individual has the power to exclude, so that
the private investments by each are less than they would be if all could coordinate
their behavior. 33 The standard stylized illustration involves the street lamps on the
public road with abutting 50 homes. The lamps shed light equally on all in amounts
equally desired by all. If parties had to rely on individual voluntary actions to fund
the street light, each individual would sit tight because he or she knows that he
receives only a fraction of the gain—2 percent—that the improvements generate for
all. Thus consider a common case where the total social gain from installing street
lights is 125, and the total social cost of installation is 50. Acting alone no self‐
interested person would invest 50 from which he derived only 2.5 units of private
gain, the same as everyone else. But what if we could get all the individuals to
cooperate by contract under which each agrees to contribute the 1 unit needed to
fund the venture from which each would derive 1.5 in gain. However the voluntary
approach typically won’t work, because high transactions costs of coordinating the
activities of 50 individuals, each of whom has an incentive to hold out, preclude
their consummation. The stated example offers a clear instance of market failure
because some individuals will hold out on the assumption that they would rather
have lights funded by others than pay anything themselves. Since the costs of
coordinating 50 persons—some cooperative, some not—is likely to exceed the
potential 100 units of gain, a solution that every one wants is one that no one can
achieve. Focus state coercion in the form of a special assessment leaves everyone
better off than before, given the identity of their positions.
This coordination problem, however, disappears if the lights are needed as
part of a planned unit development. The project owner puts in the lights at the
appropriate cost and then reaps some additional value from the sale of the
individual units, which is raised to reflect the PUD services that are tied to the unit.
The transaction costs for the improvements are no greater than for those of the
individual units. That one institutional adjustment eliminates the free rider and
collective action problems that called for a system of special assessments. And it
does so in a way that allows for a more accurate judgment on what improvements
are needed and a fairer allocation of costs, given that all potential buyers can value
the entire package before making their decisions. Even those workers who do not
value the common improvements at their allocated costs need not stay away. If the
gains from the purchase of the individual unit exceed the losses from some (or even
all) of the common improvements, it may still make sense to join in. Yet knowing
the situation in advance is likely to reduce the variance of group members, which
makes it easier to handle down the collective action problems that will inevitably
arise in the governance of the PUD.
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These arguments carry over to the workplace without a hitch. Now the
employer stands in the position of the project developer and the workers as
potential unit owners. The employer knows that employees have diverse interests
and seeks to design wage and benefit packages that that meet their individual
demands. There is no need to rely on collective union mechanisms to supply
common goods to workers from heterogeneous backgrounds. Simply stated, the
public goods analysis is wholly inapposite in the context of a firm workplace
because in each and every labor case, the firm, whether large or small, coordinates
the activities within the firm for the benefit of all. No worker will enter into a deal
that leaves him or her worse off than they were before taking into account both the
private benefits of wages, and the firm‐specific public goods relating to working
conditions and the like. The firm is, of course, well aware of the inevitable spillovers
among workers, and will therefore set wages and terms in ways that take into
account both the direct and indirect consequences of a decision.
To see why, take certain elements that must be supplied to all workers in a
unit if they are supplied to any: lighting is such an example. Here the firm has a
solid feedback mechanism. If it considers a lighting pattern that one group of
workers values at 10 and another values at ‐40, it will reject the alternative because
it will have to compensate workers for their net change in position of ‐30. At this
point it thinks of another form of lighting, or it decides that physical separation into
two groups makes sense for these workers. If separation is not feasible, then the
firm may reconfigure its workforce so that its members have greater homogeneity
with respect to these firm‐specific common goods. The same is true with such issues
as injuries on the job, where the wages offered by the firm must offset the potential
losses to the worker, leading once again to the internalization of both costs and
benefits. The firm will therefore worry about the level of safety, lest it be forced to
pay excessive wages. 34
The fundamental point that Freeman and Medoff miss is that the ability of the
firm to internalize these choices incentivizes it toward an efficient solution without
union intervention. There is no coordination problem similar to that with public
lighting. This result, moreover, applies not just to employment, but works with
equal power for such diverse organizations as corporations, partnerships and
condominium associations. Make one person or group the hub around which all
other individuals work, and the public goods problem disappears. At this point the
employer is in a position to integrate resources. None of the particular features of
the employment contract that Freeman and Medoff mention count as public goods.
The union is at best the fifth wheel on the coach. Indeed in most cases it is far worse,
because the divided control that it introduces over these issues impedes the ability
of the employer to make the appropriate tradeoffs across all persons who are in the
firm and who work with it. The union goal to maximize the profits of its members is
inconsistent with the employer’s goal to maximize the value of the firm, which
includes shareholder and nonunion employee interests as well. The only serious
matter to debate is the level of inefficiency that these split power arrangements
introduce. There are no social gains from the internal strife and high transactions
cost introduced by a regime of divided control.
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Equally dubious in this context is the next rationale that Freeman and Medoff
invoke to defend unionization on social welfare grounds. “A second reason why
collective action is necessary is that workers who are tied to a firm are unlikely to
reveal their true preferences to an employer for fear that an employer would fire
them.” The same theme is echoed in Shaiken’s testimony, relying on Freeman and
Medoff: “Without unions, day‐to‐day competitive pressures leave workers with
quitting as the only option to address serious problems, a costly solution for all
concerned.” 35 What?!? The truth is precisely the opposite. Precisely because
quitting is a costly solution, competitive pressures on nonunionized firms will lead
them to adopt, post‐haste, less drastic solutions. Employers have a strong interest in
forestalling senseless levels of turnover and costly training of replacement workers
with a similarly short tenure.
Indeed the description of behavior in nonunion firms defies common
experience. There are thousands of interactions each day, formal and informal, in
which employee preferences are revealed, openly and enthusiastically––and for
good reason. The suggestion box is not a union invention. Employee bonuses for
useful improvements in manufacturing and marketing do not violate some
unwritten employer code. Successful managers are fond of saying that their people
are their most important asset. They make therefore strenuous efforts to hire,
retain and promote able workers. No firm has ever grown by firing more workers
than it hires. Yet the words “recruitment” and “retention” never once enter into the
lexicon of union supporters. Nevertheless, references to these problems in tight
markets are legion. Here is one quotation drawn almost at random: "It is incredibly
difficult to recruit and retain great people," said Judith Itkin, partner in charge of
lawyer resources at Hunton & Williams. 36 From that same article: “Today, with
nearly half of law school graduates women, law firms will have to make a
fundamental shift in their policies regarding partnership in order to remain
competitive,’ [Carol Evans, chief executive officer of Working Mother Media] said.
‘We hope that by recognizing the pioneering firms that have already moved the
needle, a paradigm shift will follow.’” The message has already been heard.
Yes, competition matters, and it flourishes without unions, which impose a
barrier between workers and management that impairs the very communications
that Freeman and Medoff whish to encourage.
I have heard more than one
employer lament quietly that he or she could not consult workers directly about
various renovations to their workplaces, given that these communications count as
unfair labor practices, owing to the union’s status as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the worker. Rather than try to organize a complex three‐ring
circus where each interaction may open up the firm to liability under the current
contract, the preferred strategy is to fly blind, which closes down lines of
communication that good human resource specialists are hired to keep open. Salary
is one component of an attractive compensation package, but only one. Everything
counts. No informed management team supports a culture of fear and intimidation.
The buzzwords are fit, a sense of shared mission, openness and collaboration, as
management gurus repeatedly stress. 37
In this competitive environment, the last thing that an employer wants is an
employee who is reticent about his or her criticisms, insights or demands. Suppose
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that an employer can supply either benefit packages A or B to the worker in the
form of benefit at equal cost to itself. Why would it not want to learn which
individuals or groups prefer package A to B, when it can make everyone happy by
honoring these preferences at no costs to itself? That is why employers commonly
offer workers menus of choices involving such matters as pensions, vacations,
health insurance, housing allowances and the like. The firm precommits itself to a
set of options over which it is indifferent, and then allows each worker separately to
pick that bundle of goods that maximizes his or her welfare. That cannot be done
without the active solicitation of information, which will only be supplied if workers
are confident that it will be used as a basis for future firm action. Workers may
receive some compensation for the suggestions made. But even if they do not, it is
critical that they not think that everything they say is given the “file and forget”
treatment.
Where then lies the claim for union superiority? One common claim is that
productivity gains come from reduced employee turnover in unionized plants,
which is said to lead to lower training costs and higher productivity. 38 Again,
turnover costs could hardly escape management’s attention in a nonunionized plant,
given the employer’s cost of recruiting replacements. Thus the critical question is
how to interpret the turnover figures. Freeman and Medoff claim that the turnover
rate is low because unions give workers a larger voice within the business, and
therefore assume that the monopoly wages they receive, if any, have less to do with
their decision to stay. There is no reason, however, to think that the one reason is
important than the other. It could easily be the case in some situations that workers
hold on to jobs they hate solely because of the monopoly wage. Surely the workers
who came day after day to job bank facilities in the automotive industry were doing
it only for the money.
Stepping back from the particulars, however, the real question about length
job tenure does not concern the motives of workers. Rather it must address any
supposed correlation between length of service and the qualifications and
willingness of individual workers to contribute to firm productivity. There is no
reason to believe that this correlation is uniformly positive. The key question that
any firm has to address is which employees should be retained and which ones
should be let go. These decisions are frequently distorted at both ends by union
agreements. New workers are often subject to short probationary periods, after
which their rights are fully protected under the collective bargaining agreement.
These provisions often force management to terminate workers prematurely
because of the fear that they will not work out once they become permanent
employees. In unregulated firms, workers on the bubble could be extended for an
additional period during which they could hone their skills and improve their
performance. There is little gain to blocking the orderly development of human
capital. But in union context, getting a union wavier on the probation question
raises large institutional issues. Grant it once and it could be requested a second a
third time, until the original agreement is shot through with holes. So the safe
course is one of initial intransigence. Keep strictly to the program lest the entire
edifice crumble.
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The rigidity of collective bargaining agreement also creates immense
difficulties at the opposite end of the work cycle. In many public and private
settings, there is no end of complaints about unproductive workers with long
service who are protected by union seniority agreements. These workers cannot be
fired short of outright theft. Mere incompetence will not justify their removal. In
practice, they can only be bought out, often at considerable cost, deflecting
resources away from more productive employees. More generally, whenever
retention is not a function of the joint decision of the employer and employee,
longer tenure is likely to be correlated with reduced productivity. Put otherwise,
rapid turnover can be highly desirable if it stems from the ability to remove
unproductive workers and leads to promoting able people within the firm, whose
advance might be otherwise stifled.
Aggregate data on turnover, then, cannot decide what a mix a business needs
of fresh blood and seasoned hands. The one point that is certain however is that
union contracts do a poor job of sorting out which relationships, regardless of their
duration, make sense and which do not. So long as there is no lock‐step progression
between length of service and productivity, management control over hiring, firing,
promotion and work rules is essential. Here again the acid test lies not in the
speculations of academic economists or lawyers. It rests in countless illustrations
that unionized firms, burdened with probationary and seniority restrictions, often
cannot compete with nonunionized firms that have greater flexibility in assembling
and deploying their workforce. To give but one example, the upstart trucking
companies that entered the market after the deregulation of surface transportation
in 1980 decimated the ranks of the union competition whose entrenched wage
structure and job rules made those firms unsustainable. 39 Seniority did not stave off
new entrants, and the only established firms that survived had to make the
treacherous transition from a union to a nonunion shop.
A consistent theme thus runs through these writings, which is that unions are
necessary to counteract a management team that is mute and unresponsive. But by
the same token it seems clear that management tasks are so difficult because they
require a delicate balancing act. In this environment, it must be stressed that firing
some workers is a necessary part of the job, for the optimal workplace environment
can never be created by using all carrots and no sticks. That said, able managers do
not make their decisions to dismiss in ignorance of the overall workplace dynamics,
but with full awareness of how these decisions are likely to play out. Often time
some workers must be let go to protect productive workers from their less diligent
colleagues. Employee dismissals are always a big deal even if they expose the
employer to no legal liability whatsoever, as is the case under a contract at will. No
single worker operates in a void. Reputation and morale matter. Other workers
have insecurities and start to look elsewhere if they think that the firing is
unjustified Potential applicants will decide that it is not worth while to work for the
Queen of Hearts if decapitation is the response to revealing one’s true preferences.
In order to forestall these negative effects, dismissal is often accompanied with a
severance package, even if the absence of any legal duty to provide one.
Economists should take heed, but, unfortunately, pro‐union scholars such as
Freeman and Medoff buy into an inaccurate parody of labor relations in unregulated
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firms which makes it all too easy to think that any union presence has to improve
relationships in the workplace. Once recruitment, retention, and promotion are
understood to be the life‐blood of the firm this ostensible benefit of unionization
disappears, for now the prospective worker has to make judgments not only about
the firm but about the union, given that his or her welfare depends on both. To be
sure, some firms do not have enlightened managers. But in a competitive market
those firms pay a real price. Nonwage terms matter, and the firm that does not do
right by its employees will not attract or retain the most productive workers.
Decisions of productive workers to quit pose a huge threat to most firms, and the
effectiveness of the firm response does not depend on unions, but on agile and
sensitive managers.
The only interesting question left therefore is how pro‐union scholars can be
so off base on their views of how ordinary firms work. The most plausible
explanation for their errors rests on their deep confusion between legal doctrine
and a firms’ social practice. The implicit assumption is that so long as a firm has the
power to hire and fire at will, it is sure to use that power in an arbitrary fashion.
Why caprice works to the firm’s advantage is left unstated. But the clear contrast is
to a regulated regime such as that created under the labor statutes in which workers
can only be dismissed for well‐documented cause. That very formulation of the
employment relationship carries with it the patina of institutional reasonableness
that is not found in the dominant common law rule on labor contracts—the contract
at will. 40 These at‐will agreements provide that a worker can be fired for good
reason, bad reason, or no reason at all. On the other side, it is offset by the similar
right of at‐will employees to leave at any time for any reason, good or bad. That
standard appears to enshrine mutual arbitrariness as a preferred social norm. That
impression is strengthened by vivid examples of individual employers that act in an
arbitrary and high‐handed fashion. Ironically, less reference is made about the
employees whose quitting leaves an employer in the lurch.
It is a mistake of systematic proportions, however, to concentrate on isolated
example at the expense of the standard practice. Indeed the major flaw of the
standard critique of the at‐will rule misapprehends how businesses and workers
commonly operate under that rule. The sensible defense of the at‐will regime starts
with the simple proposition that arrangements that endure for long periods of time
in all sorts of divergent labor markets must rest on a sound economic and social
foundation. Otherwise it would be in the interest of all parties to switch voluntarily
to some alternative regime. A little reflection reveals the hidden strengths of the
rule. The first one is simple in stark contrast to a union environment. Contracts at
will are cheap to administer and generate little or no litigation. Of course, workers
can sue for back wages and for personal injuries sustained on the jobs. But they
cannot treat any forward looking decision on dismissal or demotion as a legally
cognizable wrong. Similarly, the employer can sue a worker for the theft or trade
secrets or the willful destruction of property. But no employer can insist that any
worker remain in the company’s employ. In all situations, however, additional
contract provisions can provide that the employment relationship can continue for a
specified term of months or years, and it could stipulate for severance damages in
some fixed amount if these provisions are not honored—or even if they are. In a
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word, the rule is a background or default norm, not an inexorable command. The at‐
will rule helps creates a legal regime with high flexibility and low administrative
costs.
So understood, the at‐will rule does not glorify the right of employers to take
out latent hostilities or irrational ambitions on their hapless employees. Rather it is
better understood as a position that courts should not intervene in hiring and firing
decisions, any more than they intervene in employee decisions to reject job offers or
to quit. It is not possible through the legal process to capture the needed
information to make intelligent judgments case by case, when atmospherics and
context count for so much. Nor is there any reason to do so because the worker is
protected by the quit option. The at‐will rule has complete formal symmetry,
because the options that it affords employees to go else, anywhere and at any time,
offer a strong restraint against employer opportunism. After the workers who quit
may have received an better offer before they leave their current job. Understood
in its rich context, the durability of the contract at will depends on its desirable
incentive effects and the workplace environment it creates for all parties. Union
defenders are wrong to think that the rule offers a license for arbitrary employer
behavior. Market and reputational forces supply strong checks and balances against
abusive employer behavior. Employers that seek to take advantage of workers will
be met by a credible quit threat: why stay if the job promises no net benefit?
Employers that fire arbitrarily will suffer reputational losses in the eyes of their
other employees that will make it more difficult for them to hire and retain new
employees. The firm’s competitive position will erode with the decline in its
performance. The incentives for good behavior exert a powerful hold on the
managers and owners of nonunionized firms.
It is, moreover, perfectly consistent with the contract at‐will for individual
firms, each in its own way, to develop an internal set of social norms that operate as
a de facto “for cause” regime, where it is understood that dismissal will not be
arbitrarily imposed. Indeed, in most small firms, a workplace code emerges from
close interaction that shapes the shared social norms of the workplace. Larger firms
cannot rely exclusively on these forces, but must supplement them with formal
review and grievance procedures that help them to rationalize their personnel
decisions. Without those rules it becomes far more difficult to maintain a sense of
parity among the workers, to clarify expectations on mutual rights and
responsibilities, and, in the current environment, to protect against employment
discrimination lawsuits. Orientation sessions, firm outings and team building
sessions are part of the workplace environment for a reason. A successful business
finds it critical to foster positive relationships in order to create strong morale and
to match workers with tasks that best match their interests and abilities.
Yet the key feature throughout is that this second tier of social norms does
not, by design, create any legal obligations between the parties. Thus it is virtually
standard today for large firms to prepare employer handbooks to provide an
extensive set of protocols for internal use, all of which are prefaced by the explicit
disclaimer in bold type that none of these obligations are judicially enforceable. 41
And smaller firms that dispense with the same level of formality will typically
communicate the same consistent message to their employees.
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This two‐tier regime makes powerful economic and social sense. Freeman
and Medoff wrongly ignore how unionization undermines this two‐tier at‐will
environment by throwing obstacles in the path of employers that seek to create
their own informal governance structure. For example, the ability of employers to
foster these constructive interactions is frustrated by the outdated NLRA
prohibition against company unions found in section 8(a)(2) that blocks the
formation of employer sponsored in‐house operations. One key effect of this
provision is that it casts a pall of uncertainty over any employer that wishes to meet
directly with its workers, even in the absence of a union. These committees
normally do not generate any difficulty when no union organization drive is in
motion. But the moment that becomes a possibility, it is a litigation question
whether these connections involve company dominated labor organizations in
violation of section 8(a)(2), on which there is naturally no clear line. 42 The efforts of
employers to open up lines of communication are thus frustrated by the NLRA,
which is far more concerned with giving the whip hand to a potential union
representative that has commenced an organization campaign.
To be sure, section 8(a)(2) is commonly defended on the ground that the
displacement of company‐sponsored unions is needed to create breathing space for
“authentic” unions. 43 But in practice that provision has profound anticompetitive
effects by hampering efforts of firms to develop internal mechanisms that improve
workplace relationships. It is therefore not uncommon, as noted, for unions to
challenge the activities of various employer‐employee committees as disguised
company unions, especially in the heat of an organizing campaign. The use of the at‐
will contract is always compromised because the NLRA makes it an unfair labor
practice to take any steps “to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization,” 44 including dismissal for organizing activities. The moment the legal
system creates a breach in the overall at‐will environment, it forces firms to
strengthen their formal systems of dispute resolution by making their “for cause”
environment legally binding, chiefly for the defensive purpose of avoiding statutory
liability. In practice, they must offer reasons for the dismissal that negate any
charge of an unfair labor practice. Remove the current threat of a ULP and the
communications that Freeman and Medoff think unlikely will surely flourish.
In sum, the legal and social techniques available to nonunionized firms are
sufficient to deal with all issues of internal management. There are no public goods
or employment relations problem that labor unions solve for employers. It is
therefore no mystery why employers show routine resistance to labor organization.
The current law forces them into relationships from which they can only receive a
smaller slice of a smaller pie. EFCA will only exacerbate what is already a difficult
situation for unionized firms. Many theorists think that the economic costs of
unionization are justified by the democratic institutions it fosters. But that rationale
is not available when direct worker participation in the recognition of a union is cut
off by the check card system, and direct worker ratification or rejection of a
proposed master contract is blocked by mandatory first contract arbitration. Large
number of workers will have no say in the arrangements that will bind them under a
new statute that repudiates the proposition that the union should work for its
members. With card‐check and first‐contract arbitration many workers will have
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no say in the arrangements that guide and organize their lives. These twin
institutions will generate economic and social repercussions that are sure to spread
throughout the system, leading to heightened workplace tensions and reduced job
creation. No rational employer should be pleased with a smaller slice of a still
smaller pie. The strong opposition to unions that many firms display is fully
warranted by the economic facts on the ground.

Third Party Effects: A Constant Share of a Smaller Pie—at Best
The final piece of the EFCA puzzle requires some review of the overall effects
of EFCA on the society at large. These can be conveniently divided into three parts,
the first of which deals with its allocative effects, the second with its distributional
consequences, and the third involving disruption and dislocation.
ALLOCATIVE EFFECTS
The previous two sections have shown that the introduction of the original NLRA in
1935 necessarily shrinks the size of the pie available to employers and employees
by imposing external restrictions that prevent the emergence of dynamic
competitive markets. For these purposes, however, it is best to accept those losses
as a necessary cost of the current social commitment toward unionization. But a
commitment to EFCA does not follow from any endorsement of the status quo.
EFCA is more intrusive in virtually all regards and thus amplifies the adverse effects
of unionization on the employer/employee relationship. These effects cannot be
cabined in to unionized firms that are currently subject to the direct supervision of
the NLRB. Any firm that employs workers also operates in multiple roles in a
myriad of commercial settings, with customers, suppliers, and lenders being the
most prominent. The interactions with these third parties are sometimes subject to
direct regulation under the NLRA. Whenever the labor law prohibits a firm from
subcontracting—or from altering its current production model using current
workers—it not only makes the operation of the regulated firm less efficient than it
would otherwise be, but it also imposes losses on its potential trading partners who
necessarily have fewer options in the market. The social losses from lost
opportunities are not entirely offset by the less efficient relationships adopted in
their place, for strategies of mitigation only reduce, not eliminate, the losses.
Moreover, even the absence of such direct prohibitions, a strong labor regime
will likewise influence the welfare of both suppliers and customers through the
price mechanism. The lower output by the unionized firm implies that it will
purchase fewer complementary goods and services from its suppliers. On the other
side, it will also ship fewer goods or render a smaller level of services to third
persons, which are again sources of social loss. The reduced level of activity can
make lending riskier, and thus can reduce the capital stock available to the firm.
These indirect losses are likely to ripple broadly across society, which makes it
difficult to assert that any particular group of third persons is likely to bear the
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brunt of these losses. But second‐order losses incurred by a larger number of firms,
and their employees, could easily add up to substantial social losses.
The presence of strong unions also has adverse consequences on nonunion
workers by reducing their opportunities for employment and advancement, both in
the unionized firm and in the countless other firms, large and small, that do
proportionately less business in consequence of unionization. In many cases the
jobs lost are entry‐level positions, which reduce opportunities for upward social
mobility to the most vulnerable segments of the population, shutting them out of
chances to join the middle class. In addition, the threat of instant unionization will
retard the formation of the greatest driver of new jobs—small businesses—who are
ill‐equipped to deal with unionization the riskiest stage of their business life. Why
try to form a business if labor negotiations could divert time and energy from
product development and marketing operations? These losses multiply over time,
for first jobs can lead to second jobs with greater prospects, better skills and higher
wages. EFCA will surely intensify these negative effects.
On the other side of the ledger, it is common for union supporters to claim
that the constant threat of unionization induces employers to offer higher wages to
workers, which they claim counts as a positive spillover from union activities to
nonunion members. Thus Harley Shaiken trumpets unions as “the folks that
brought you the middle class,” as if the multiple other sources of productivity from
education to better infrastructure had nothing to do with it. Now the claim is this:
“As union membership slides, however, both unions’ ability to raise wages for their
members and spin‐off benefits for nonunion workers erode, wiping out the middle
class dreams of many Americans.” 45 In his view, unions in effect set the standard of
living for others.
This argument is incorrect on both empirical and theoretical grounds. To
start with the former, it would be useful to find some evidence of systemwide gains
to back up this claim. All of the gross measures of labor productivity, however,
coalesce around a single point: the greater the extent of unionization the lower the
levels of productivity. In the United States, it is hard to test this proposition at the
federal level given the uniform imposition of federal law. But it is possible to draw
statewide comparisons that capture differences in union regulations or union
penetration. To be sure, these tables are often confounded by other variables that
might influence local rates of growth and income: taxation policy is one obvious
factor. But on this question it is likely that states with strong union environments
are likely to have other features that inhibit growth, such as high sales and income
taxes. Notwithstanding the methodological caveats, the gross figures are vivid
enough to call for an explanation by the defenders of unionization.
One key difference in state labor environments are state’s right to work laws,
which limit the influence of unionization. Here the evidence seems clear that states
with these laws do on average better than those who do not. Thus one study by
William T. Wilson of the Mackinac Center for Public Policy found that right‐to‐work
states have lower levels of unionization and higher rates of growth. 46 It was no
surprise that Michigan experienced a growth rate in the market value of its goods
and services of 1.8 percent during the period 1977‐1999, relative to an average
growth rate of 3.4 percent for right to work states, which have, on average, lower
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levels of unionization. The same story is told with respect to growth in employment
rates, where Michigan stood at 1.5 percent for the period between 1970 and 2000,
while right‐to‐work states grew more significantly at 2.9 percent, or close to double
that rate. The magnitude of these differences should not be underestimated because
of the importance of compound interest. Over a twenty year period, differential
growth rates like these translate to about a 32% difference in employment level
between Michigan and right‐to‐work states. Figures like this are always elusive
because they do not control for a wide range of other economic factors that could
influence the overall level of growth, including of course high tax rates, and
emigration of Michigan residents to other states with better economic
environments. That said, I am aware of no data that points in the opposite direction.
Nor am I aware of any theoretical explanation that could reverse the clear
implications from these findings, or those in other studies that have also correlated
a rise in unionization with an increase in unemployment levels, which rests on the
simple proposition that employers will offer fewer jobs when constrained to pay
higher wages. 47
The same basic story is told when attention is turned to levels of union
penetration, regardless of right to work laws. As these rates of unionization become
higher, the overall level of employment growth slows down. 48 Furchtgott‐Roth’s
figures indicate that the 10 most heavily unionized states had lower rates of growth
than the 10 least unionized states. The growth rate of 2.77 for the unionized states
varied between 24.6 and 19.6 percent union penetration. For the bottom ten state s
the same numbers were a growth rate of 5.39 percent for states whose unionization
levels varied between 3.3 and 5.9 percent. In fact, the differences are even more
dramatic than these gross statistics suggest. Two of the three most heavily
unionized states in the United States are Hawaii (number 1) at 24.7 percent, and a
growth rate of 11 percent, and Alaska (number 3) at 22.2 percent with an 8.7
percent growth rate, both thinly populated states. The other eight states are New
York, New Jersey, Washington, Michigan, Illinois, Minnesota, California and
Connecticut. When the growth rates are computed on this group that figure tumbles
to 1 percent exactly, off a far larger population base. There are no similar surprises
in the bottom ten states, all of whom have positive rates, and only one of which,
Mississippi, had a 1 percent growth rate, or the average for the large industrial
states. It does not take much imagination to conclude that the states with the
heaviest union populations had the worst experience. These numbers are hardly
consistent with any story that claims that unions have propelled large numbers of
individuals into the middle class.
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FIGURE 10
U.S UNION DENSITY IN MOST HEAVILY UNIONIZED STATES RANKED 1‐5, 1977‐2007
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FIGURE 11
U.S UNION DENSITY IN MOST HEAVILY UNIONIZED STATES RANKED 6‐10, 1977‐2007
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TABLE 7
UNION DENSITY AND JOB GROWTH FOR SOME STATES
State
Hawaii
New York
Alaska
New Jersey
Washington
Michigan
Illinois
Minnesota
California
Connecticut
Rhode Island
Wisconsin
South Dakota
Mississippi
Utah
Florida
Arkansas
Texas
Georgia
Virginia
North Carolina
South Carolina

Percentage Unionized
24.70%
24.40%
22.20%
20.10%
19.80%
19.60%
16.40%
16.00%
15.70%
15.60%
15.30%
14.90%
5.90%
5.60%
5.40%
5.20%
5.10%
4.90%
4.40%
4.00%
3.30%
3.30%

Job Growth % Increase 2001-2006 49
11.00%
0%
8.70%
1.90%
6.00%
-4.80%
-1.00%
2.70%
3.20%
0%
3.10%
1.60%
5.40%
1.00%
11.20%
9.10%
4.00%
5.70%
4.00%
5.90%
3.20%
4.40%

These results are consistent with the broad outlines of general economic
theory. It is critical of course to identify the supposed source of gains that propel
some workers and their families into the middle class. Consider this common
contention in favor of unionization: “Even modest increases in the share of the
unionized labor force push wages upward, because non‐unionized workplaces must
keep up with unionized ones that collectively bargain for increases.” 50 But why
should nonunion firms follow suit? Let one firm raise the rates to its existing
workers, and the number of workers employed at that firm, ceteris paribus, will
decline. The excess workers are still available to rival firms, who are now able to
offer lower wages because of the increase in the supply of available workers. These
firms know, moreover, that the lower wages will translate into lower prices, which
give them a competitive edge that a union firm is not likely to match, especially if its
work rules inhibit productivity gains by reducing flexibility in operations. Workers,
moreover, will flock to these rival firms for the reasons mentioned above. The
competitive success of nonunionized creates opportunities for expansion that
redounds to their benefit. The basic truth remains. In the long run sustainable wage
increases are tied to higher levels of productivity that union work rules and other
restrictive practices in general thwart.
Nor does the overall analysis change when we focus exclusively on the
unionized firm. All too often, the increased wages of union members come at the
expense of other workers in the unionized firms, which exacerbates income
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differentials, just as Milton Friedman observed long ago. 51 Freeman and Medoff
recognize the force of this claim, but dispute its implications by insisting that unions
create greater parity of wages within firms—without acknowledging the
inefficiencies that this parity can create. 52 In and of itself, these intra‐firm wage
alterations do not have any allocative effects, either positive or negative: whatever
the one side gains is offset by losses on the other side. What matters is the market
structure in which the wage adjustments take place. And wage and benefit
increases will prove sustainable only if they are supported by sufficient increases in
worker productivity. Here, as a first approximation, the social effects of wage
increase should be negative if they result from monopolization of the workplace.
And they are equally unfortunate if they lead employers to offer a monopoly wages
to others in order to stave off union organization.
Even if these wage increases were regarded as an unalloyed social good in
themselves, this defense of unionization still fails. The simplest point in response is
that the threat of unionization is not simply met by raising the wage levels to
present employees. Rather, the inability to stave off unionization once the plant is
up and running generates multiple responses, of which wage increases are only one.
The key insight is that the threat of unionization induces nonunionized firms to
make other socially wasteful decisions solely for defensive reasons. The location
and the design of plants are two decisions that are often altered to deflect the threat
of unionization. Locate plants in antiunion environments and automate them in
ways that reduce the dependency on a unionized force. Or better yet, go overseas
with production that cannot be efficiently undertaken in the United States, costing
jobs that could otherwise be kept at home. These negative impacts would be
avoided if a firm knew that it could remain nonunion no matter where it located.
But under the present law, the risk of unionization is borne by all firms, including
those which have no union workers, which means that the labor statutes impact
negatively the capital value of all firms. It follows therefore that the differential
rates of growth referred to above only tell part of the story. The full story requires
taking into account the downward pressure that unionization imposes on all firms,
unionized or not, which is hard to measure empirically.
In sum, the law in effect imposes a system wide efficiency tax, which
generates a negative externality that the defenders of EFCA do not take into account.
Unions, for example, are vigorous opponents of global outsourcing, which they hope
to defeat by a complex set of taxes and prohibitions, many of which could give an
unintended boost to foreign firms with no American connections. The EFCA makes
it possible for arbitrators to decree that result on a firm‐by‐firm basis (at the very
least) which in turn creates the serious risk that these provisions will rapidly
become the de facto standard for new contracts. The chilling effect of this position
will be hard to isolate in individual cases, for it is not possible to interview the heads
of firms that were never formed, or those that choose to organize off‐shore from the
beginning. But it is highly likely that the aggregate statistics on the formation of
new businesses will reflect the EFCA’s implicit tax on job creation. The key point to
remember is that there is, going forward, no identity of interest between the unions
who profit from EFCA and the workers whose job opportunities are limited by its
passage. A far better strategy for helping worker interest is to opt for a more
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competitive labor environment at home. In the end new job creation will swamp
whatever distributional gains the EFCA promises for some select group of workers.
Increased coercion never leads to increased productivity. EFCA will surely exert an
overall negative effect on the wages and job opportunities of employees.
These negative effects are in fact aggravated by the political consequences of
stronger union influence, which help explain the anemic, indeed nonexistent,
growth rates in places like New York. The simple truth is that unions do not do well
against competition from domestic or foreign firms without statutory protection,
even on the dubious assumption that they somehow provide benefits to workers
that the firms cannot supply for themselves. The rapid rise of unions in the United
States started in the New Deal period. Its success depended not only on the political
willingness to provide unions with key structural protections in the form of
exclusive bargaining rights for all members of the bargaining unit. It depended
heavily on complementary social institutions that fostered monopoly industries,
such as the unified AT&T, which were also insulated from competition. 53 It is, quite
simply, much harder for unions to survive, let alone prosper, in a competitive
business environment. But today’s current competitive environment is not written
in stone. In the eyes of the Supreme Court, our constitutional order does not attach
any priority to competition over state‐protected monopolies. 54 It is possible for the
government to sponsor cartels on Monday and subject them to criminal prosecution
on Tuesday, which is what happened in the regulation of domestic oil production in
the United States in the 1930s. 55 The absence of any priority in favor of competition
over monopoly invites not only the passage of EFCA, but also a retrograde
curtailment in international and domestic free trade policies in order to recreate the
corporatist environment that allowed unions to thrive (and others to suffer) in the
wake of the New Deal initiatives of the 1930s.
Unions of course have to compete in the political environment with a myriad
of business, religious, academic, agricultural and political interests. No one has a
monopoly of influence over the legislative process or the public debate. But for all
the political competition they face, labor unions have done well in gaining
protections against nonunion workers and firms not only under the labor law, but
also through protective tariffs, minimum wage laws, and other statutes, such as the
Davis Bacon act, which requires prevailing (i.e. union) wages to be paid on all public
work projects funded by the federal government. 56 On the domestic front unions
take strong activist positions on land use cases in order to prevent nonunion firms
from entering into areas dominated by union firms. “Your zoning ordinance is the
best weapon you have to stop Wal‐Mart.” 57 Likewise, on the international front,
unions working hand‐in‐hand with their preferred employers will bring
antidumping actions to harass foreign competitors. 58
The magnitude of these union efforts is directly dependent on the financial
base and the political chits that unions collect. It is no accident that union members
are the single largest interest group represented at the Democratic National
Convention, or that unions are conspicuously large contributors to their political
campaigns. 59 The connections do not require code to decipher. When SEIU gave its
resounding endorsement to Obama, Andy Stern made clear the reason why: “‘There
has never been a fight in Illinois or a fight in the nation where our members have
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not asked Barack Obama for assistance and he has not done everything he could to
help us,’ Andy Stern, the union's president, told reporters in announcing the
decision.” 60 And, of course, Barack Obama when in the US Senate was one of the
sponsors of EFCA, and has promised to sign it as president, as is announced on the
SEIU website. 61
DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES
Another element of the picture that needs to be addressed is the
distributional consequences of EFCA. This discussion takes place against a
background of increased differential wealth in the United States. The sources of that
difference are not easy to detect, but surely much of it has to do with the differential
opportunities for education, which are of ever greater value in the information age.
There is nothing that can be done through unionization to alter that distribution of
power, for if the competitive wage falls for persons with little or no education, as it
surely has in the past generation or so, the monopoly power of unionization starts
from a lower base, which makes it unlikely that it could ever offset that decline,
especially since the increased supply of nonunion workers poses at least some
limitation on the power to raise these wages. Likewise, within limits it is always
possible for government, especially at the federal level, to try to work a
redistribution of wealth through taxation which is in general a more efficient way to
handle the task because it does not create a gap between those workers lucky
enough to gain from selective unionization relative to those who do not. 62 The
earned income tax credit, for example, is an explicit tool that is addressed to this
issue, which has more even distributional effects and smaller allocative losses. 63
Yet for these purposes, the question is whether the passage of EFCA could in
and of itself strengthen the position of the middle class. The argument in support of
that claim rests on the view that the original NLRA did this 70 years ago. But there
is no reason to think that this claim is true. The increase in incomes depends on an
overall increase in productivity, which is more likely attributable to innovation that
expands the size of the pie––not union struggles that seek to alter its division.
Indeed, even if EFCA does pass, there is no reason to think that its distributional
effects will work an improvement on the lot of the middle class, given its persistent
downward pressure on overall productivity. Large portions of the current middle
class are not union members now and will not become union members after EFCA.
They will bear the brunt of the statute and find their positions compromised. In
addition, of course, union members and nonunion workers both are enrolled in
pension plans whose value depends on the ability of corporations to continue to
earn the dividends that support the share prices of the stocks—virtually all stocks—
that are in pension portfolios. These capital values will diminish, although no one
can say by how much. Quite simply, union members occupy multiple roles like all
other citizens, and any gains that they might achieve in wages and benefits through
EFCA are likely to be offset first by the increase prices that they have to pay to
obtain goods and services from a unionized Wal‐Mart, and second the loss of jobs
off‐shore. The unionization of one firm does nothing to benefit union members of
other groups. This pessimistic assessment is brutal but true. We cannot regulate
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our nation’s labor markets to increase wealth. The likely consequence of EFCA is
that it will reduce income and employment across the board: the only unknowns
concern the size of the loss, which will depend at least in part on the administrative
regulations and judicial decisions that are needed to fill in EFCA’s very substantial
gaps. No one knows whether the actions of interstitial lawmaking will mitigate or
inflame the errors. No one should support the passage of the statute that holds out
such political risks.
DISRUPTION AND DISLOCATION
The last point worth making is that EFCA necessarily introduces a large
measure of instability that could lead to bitter negotiations and disappointed
expectations all around. Let the arbitral system be weighted in favor of the union
claim, and one of two things will happen. If the arbitration arrangement is carried
forward, it will lead to contraction of the firm business or bankruptcy that itself
becomes a source of tension. If the arbitration system does not carry over, it is
highly likely that the employer will resist the continuation of an employment
relationship that he did not consent to in the first place. Either way, we can
confident that the level of unrest in labor relations will increase, and do so in a time
when the economy is still likely to suffer from a general slowdown. Rahm Emanuel
has said that it is a shame to let a good crisis go to waste. 64 His point was that major
economic reversals can lead to major reforms. But his is a high risk strategy, for the
wrong reform program is likely to generate worse consequences in bad times than
in good ones. No one should play with fire with EFCA whose multiple shortcomings
have been the subject of this book.
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CHAPTER 4
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS

The bulk of this analysis of EFCA is directed at its impact on workers,
employers and the overall economy. The radical transformation that EFCA
promises is sure to raise significant challenges to the constitutionality of its key
provisions on card‐check and interest arbitration. The initial assumption of most
modern scholars is that after the 1937 constitutional revolution, 1 Congress has a
carte‐blanche on the types of programs that it can pass in the economic sphere, so
that any detailed analysis is wholly beside the point. That assumption is no doubt
correct with respect to ordinary legislation. But EFCA is no ordinary statute. It has
such expansive ambitions that the facile presumption of its constitutionality is
unwarranted. Indeed, even under the lax standards of current law, powerful and
focused constitutional challenges raise serious considerations even with the decked
charged against any complaints based on rights of speech or association. Here is a
brief account of the two most vulnerable portions of the current statute, the card
check and the interest arbitration, both separately and in tandem.

The Card Check
The secretive and coercive nature of the card‐check system should be held to
infringe the ordinary rights of political association that are guaranteed to workers,
and perhaps their employers, under the First Amendment. In this regard the words
of Justice Harlan are instructive:
It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the "liberty"
assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
embraces freedom of speech. Of course, it is immaterial whether the beliefs
sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious
or cultural matters, and state action which may have the effect of curtailing
the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny. 2
In this connection, it is critical to remember that the key justification for the
1935 Wagner Act was that its rejection of the common law system of individual
voluntary agreements still left workers rights to full participation in the selection of
unions by secret ballot (after hearing employer speech) and in the ratification of
labor contracts by a vote of all bargaining unit members. The simple logic on this
legal transformation was that these democratic mechanisms offered a sufficient
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quid pro quo for the loss of individual associational rights, given the added power
that workers could obtain with a union as their exclusive bargaining representative.
Both the vote on the union and the contract are gone under the EFCA for the initial
representation‐period, so the question is whether the act offers in the law substitute
protections that justify the abridgement of these associational freedoms for
dissident workers who have no rights of expression at either stage of the process.
The First Amendment issues here are knotty. Under the current law, the
concerns with coercion and free expression lie behind the uniform line of First
Amendment Supreme Court cases that deal with the relationship of individual
workers to the union. For the most part these issues have been relatively narrow in
scope, given the ability of all workers to participate in the selection of the union and
the ratification of its contracts. Thus one common issue is the extent to which union
dues can be used not just to “defray the expenses of the negotiation or
administration of collective agreements, or the expenses entailed in the adjustment
of grievances and disputes,” 3 but also to advance the political agenda of the union,
which may espouse causes to which dissident members of the unions are opposed.
These cases raise conflicts between two strong values. The first is that each
individual worker should be entitled to a range autonomy that does not require him
to support views with which he disappears. Each should be protected by a
constitutional rule that no union election force that worker to support political
expression to which he or she is opposed. Yet on the other side, nonunion members
should not be allowed to free ride off union efforts to create benefits for them. The
perception that each union creates a limited public good is used to justify the ability
of unions to tax nonmembers their contribution to the common plan.
The tension between these two values is a reflection of the current issues in
democratic politics more generally. Individuals may have to live with elected
officials, and they must pay their fair share of taxes in order to support the common
activities of the state, lest they become “free riders” who derive wage and other
material benefits from government activities, to which they make no contribution in
either cash or labor. But their allegiance is limited in light of the First Amendment
guarantees of freedom of speech. In particular dissident citizens do not have to
contribute their money or labor to successful political campaigns of their adversary
in order to entrench the incumbents. Forced participation in the support of the
activities of the polity is thus paired with some degree of insulation from collective
control. The standard first amendment protection for political action balances out
the fears of free riding on the collective against the risk of majority domination.
These same considerations are very much in play in the union context, where
the current legal position allows unions to collect dues to support the business
activities of the union but not its political participation, which is by any account
extensive in the tens of millions of dollars 4 . The line between these business and
political expenditures is not always clear, but the critical 1988 Supreme Court
decision in Communications Workers v. Beck 5 sought to classify the various types of
expenditures. Union conventions, social activities, and publications could be
financed with fees collected from the dues of dissenting workers so long as they did
not directly fund to political activities. But organizing activities outside the
bargaining unit did not so qualify notwithstanding any indirect benefit attributed to
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an increase in union political power, which these dissenting workers could also
oppose on principle.
The central challenge therefore is to determine how this reconciliation
between controlling free riding and preserving individual autonomy carries over to
the new environment created by EFCA’s worker‐free card‐check and compulsory
arbitration provisions. In dealing with this question, it is difficult to know exactly
what standard of review should be given. Within the framework of the current
NLRA, Congress receives considerable deference because of the institutional
safeguards to worker autonomy from political participation. But these rights are
stripped away from dissenting workers who could be forced into a union without
their knowledge or their participation. Perhaps the level of constitutional scrutiny
for this substantial infringement of individual rights of autonomy may be judged on
a lower standard than for the loss of political rights covered under both Street and
Beck. But it would be a mistake to draw any hard line that treats the EFCA as having
only economic but not political significance, given that participation in union
democracy has almost by definition, at least some significant political component.
The peculiar status of labor unions may weigh heavily against applying strict
scrutiny to these prohibitions on the participation in either the selection of the
union or the ratification of the first contract. We know for example that the rules on
freedom of speech in union campaigns give a broader account to the meaning of
coercion in union settings than elsewhere. 6 But they certainly do not eviscerate all
First Amendment considerations in the union context, so that it is appropriate to
rely on judicial review to examine the justifications offered for this loss of the
worker rights that are part economic and part political.
The best view, therefore, seems to impose on the government some standard
of intermediate scrutiny, which requires that they show how the restrictions on
participation in critical bargaining unit activities serves some substantial public end
by means reasonably appropriate to the task. At this point, the only justifications
put forward are partisan, not social, insofar as the expansion of union penetration in
the workplace is the desired end, not any independent measure of worker welfare.
That skeptical account of EFCA is fortified because the statistical and anecdotal
evidence put forward to explain why these restrictions are needed are unsound.
These purported rationales fail on questions of both the desired ends and the means
chosen to achieve them. On the first question, the only legitimate objective is the
control of unfair labor practices by employees, for which—if the case were made
out—the only needed remedy would be the provisions that increase the sanctions
that are imposed on employers who commit ULPs under current law. But so long as
the increased sanctions are available under Section 3, there is no reason to
completely transform the entire structure of labor law through the card‐check
system coupled with compulsory interest arbitration, Worse still, the means here
are far too broad for any supposed end. The evidence presented about widespread
employer abuse is flawed from the collection of the data to the interpretation of the
results, removing the factual predicate of employer irregularities on which the card‐
check system must stand.
It will of course be argued that this result runs against the use of card checks
throughout the legal system. But on this point it is clear that the constitutional
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scrutiny of legislation that allows Congress or state legislatures to bind themselves is
lower than those which are used to determine whether they can impose similar
restrictions on private, nongovernment firms, just as the First Amendment scrutiny
of public employees is less severe than it is of state restrictions on the speech rights
of private employees. 7 Approving the card check system for public employees does
not require the same result for private employees. Indeed the differences are still
starker because of the peculiar imbalances in the card check system that provides
large openings for union coercion. Unions can prevent workers who have signed
their union card from changing their mind. Yet the law refuses to allow antiunion
workers to make binding commitments to oppose union representation. Indeed,
on this view the card check system is unconstitutional even if the provisions for
interest arbitration were struck from the statute. The card check system has no
clear legitimate end, and the means chosen clearly terminate any and all rights of
workers to participation in union affairs, while forcing employers to deal with
unions when they are denied all opportunity to make their case against the union.
So long as worker participation was key to upholding the limitations on common
law rights under the original Wagner Act, this card check program exceeds
constitutional limitations.

Compulsory Interest Arbitration
EFCA’s interest arbitration provisions are even more vulnerable to
constitutional attack. The initial, but limited attack on the statute is that it creates
an impossibly broad delegation of lawmaking authority to the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service (FMCS), which can constitute arbitral panels in whatever
way it sees fit. Historically, the rigid tripartite division of federal power into the
legislative, executive and judicial branches made it difficult to accommodate any
system of delegation by the legislature to either the executive, or at later times, to
independent agencies. As Justice Story wrote, “The general rule of law is, that a
delegated power cannot be delegated." 8 The concerns that animated this doctrine
were several. One was a fear that it would remove key decisions from the system of
political accountability set up under the constitution. A second was that the
delegated party would act in ways that moved the law beyond the position that the
legislature would adopt. There is some authority that allows aggrieved parties to
challenge broad statutory language on the grounds that it permits their excessive
delegation of legislative authority. 9 These concerns, however, have largely been
overmatched by the need to create independent agencies like the NLRB—i.e., whose
members can be removed by the President only with cause—to accommodate the
vast expansion of government activity in the modern period. 10 Without question,
the imperatives of the administrative state have made it exceedingly difficult in
modern times to mount any sustained attack against standards making under the
nondelegation doctrine. 11 But in principle the nondelegation doctrine remains.
Thus the modern cases require at least some articulation of the end to be served so
that it meets the modest test of showing some “intelligible principle,” by which it can
be determined whether or not the agency in question has complied with the sense of
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the statute. 12 But in this case the sketchy nature of the statute offers no clues about
the many particular decisions that have to be addressed on the full range of arbitral
questions. Striking it down on these grounds, moreover, would not end the
initiative, but would require the Congress to do what it should have done already,
which is to articulate some substantive boundaries on what arbitrators can and
cannot do.
Worse in a sense is that the procedures chosen to implement this proposed
statute invite a biased selection of arbitrators who can make decisions that are not
reviewable on their merits by any independent party. It seems self‐evident that
EFCA will only pass with large political majorities from the Democratic side, which
also controls all appointments within the Department of Labor. Perhaps in the
fullness of time the regulations under EFCA will clearly articulate how the arbitral
panels will be selected and organized and thus undercut the serious due process
objections that relate to bias, the opportunity to be heard, vagueness, and the denial
of any judicial review on the merits. But under the current situation, these minimal
standards have not been met. To be sure, this is not a case where persons are
subject to potential discharge or criminal sanctions, so that some flexibility may be
in order. But by the same token, the creation of financial and other obligations
stemming from these arbitrations could dwarf in magnitude the losses from the
traditional types of administrative hearings to which due process protections can
attach. It is also important to stress that the arbitral hearings under EFCA is not a
form of administrative rulemaking for which generally speaking no individual
person gets special rights to be heard, given the broad number of participants in the
overall process. 13 Nor in rulemaking proceedings is it necessary to afford
procedural protections that go above and beyond those which are specified in the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 14 in order to meet the requirements of due
process of law. 15 But compulsory arbitration is a form of adjudication in which the
individual claims to be judged by known rules and administered by neutral judges is
far more insistent. In this case, the standardless rules for adjudication make it
impossible for anyone to know whether a particular decision is right or wrong, let
alone one which will plunge a firm into bankruptcy, a contingency that is nowhere
mentioned in EFCA. EFCA could have avoided the real issues with both the
appearance and likelihood of bias if it had simply provided for the appointment of a
neutral arbitrator who did not answer directly to the head of the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Services, a political appointee. And the absence of any kind of
judicial review in an Article III Court—i.e. those staffed with judges with tenure
during good behavior and protection against salary reduction— 16 removes one of
the key safeguards imposed in those cases in which “nonArticle III” have been held
to be constitutional by the United States Supreme Court. 17 The claims for
expedition remove the possibility that any independent eyes will see whether the
agreement violates principles of fundamental fairness. It has already been held that
the absence of judicial review can offend the norms of due process in cases judicial
review of a jury award was not allow “unless the court can affirmatively say there is
no evidence to support the verdict.” 18 Justice Stevens held that absence of standard
judicial review to challenges of excessive verdicts did not provide sufficient
safeguards against “the danger of arbitrary awards.” 19 The context may differ, but
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the risk is there. Defenders of EFCA could insist that speed is of the essence in these
cases. That contention is odd in that there is no prescribed time for issuing the
arbitral decree. And it is insufficient because it rules out any and all forms of
expedited review which could act as an effective check on arbitral misconduct.
These procedural defects could in principle be cured by some modifications of EFCA.
But as it stands, I know of no statutory or administrative scheme that offers so little
process
Making these due process challenges will raise additional complications
because there will also be a tendency in the courts to defer this challenge on the
ground that it is not ripe until the regulations are adopted, and even then to
postpone the challenge still further to see just how those regulations play out in
practice. But this is one instance in which the penchant for “as applied” review on
the structure of these panels is an open invitation to disaster, as there would be
thousands of cases in various stages of arbitration or settlement before the
regulations are promulgated, vetted through rulemaking process, or applied in an
individual case. The general uneasiness about facial challenges that permeates the
takings area should not apply, however, to procedural claims that deal with bias and
judicial review. It would be appropriate therefore to stay all arbitration proceedings
until someone mounts a facial challenge against the interest arbitration proceedings
that could, and should be handled on expedited judicial review.
The legal issues under the takings clause (and its close cousin, substantive
due process) 20 are often subject to the argument that they should only be
considered once they are ripe for reviews in individual cases. That position is
doubtless correct under current law insofar as it applies to regulatory takings that
only restrict that the right of individuals to use and dispose of property of which
they retain undisturbed possession. 21 The basic rules that govern these regulatory
takings are highly plastic in that they take into account the particulars of the
restrictions and the government justifications for their imposition, under a rational
basis standard that is highly favorable to the government. The question is no longer
whether the government has taken property, say in the form of air rights, but
whether it has interfered with some “investment‐backed expectations of individual
landowners,” 22 which no one can quite define because of the evident circularity in
this formulation. Expectations are supposed to determine the constitutionality of
the law. Yet the law itself sets the relevant expectations, thereby creating the
distinct possibility that an oft‐repeated constitutional violation is insulated from
attack simply because private landowners can anticipate its passage. On this view of
the world, notice of the state’s constitutional wrong is sufficient to deprive a
landowner of his constitutional right 23 . Yet even that flexible test allows for
successful challenges on an as applied basis in at least some cases. 24
The key point here, however, is that however appropriate this framework is
for the evaluation of the NLRA, it is wholly inapposite to the far greater intrusions of
the EFCA, which should be evaluated on the per se takings rules that are used for
physical takings under the current law. 25 Under that rule the size of the intrusion is
only material to the level of damages that is awarded, but not to the existence of the
taking. But why use that standard for physical takings in this case? The answer
tracks the dominant distinction under current law that imposes the lower standards
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of rational basis on any rule that limits the ability of an owner to use its property as
it sees fit, but the higher standard on any action that allows the government to
occupy the land in question, or to authorize its occupation by others. One key case
in this regard is Kaiser Aetna v. United States, which holds that the highest level of
protection is given to the right to exclude. 26 Accordingly, it held that the
government could not condition the access of a marina to public waters on its
owner’s willingness to allow other boats in the harbor to use its waters In contrast,
zoning restrictions that prevent the construction of high‐rises or require the
preservation of open spaces restrictions on use that are governed by a much more
deferential standard of review. Yet even here the review is not completely idle. A
rule that blocks all development needs a strong justification to survive. 27 Lesser
restrictions still require that the owner retain some viable economic use of the
property, albeit it under standards remains opaque to this very day.
This distinction between restrictions on use and government occupation is
embedded in the current law. It can of course be challenged as a matter of general
property theory, which affords the same level of protection to limited interests in
property under the law of easements and restrictive covenants as it does to the
outright ownership of land. But for these purposes, the constitutional deviation
from private law theories of ownership is not to the point. What is critical is that the
distinction between occupation and use maps perfectly into the difference between
the original Wagner Act, as modified by the Taft‐Hartley Act, and the EFCA. The
current law regime limits the right of an employer to walk away from negotiations
with the union, but did not force it to accept any particular contract that it found
unacceptable. The union could not therefore impose on the firm a losing
arrangement that made it impossible for the firm to work with the union. That level
of employer self‐protection is what saves the NLRA from constitutional invalidation.
Hence the parallel to land use restrictions. But the EFCA by imposing a mandatory
first‐contract arbitration scheme forces the employer to accept a deal which is in no
part of its making and in so doing to open its entire business (and trade secrets) to
the union.
There is a vast difference between having to negotiate and being forced to
accept a result that could create a disadvantageous contract, including one that
could lead to bankruptcy. To put a simple analogy, the government violates the
takings clause when it forces a landowner to sell property worth $100 in the open
market to the government’s designated buyer at the $75 price the government fixes.
The forced sale leaves the owner short by $25, which difference the government has
to make up. Otherwise the willingness to pay a dollar to force the sale of the Empire
State Building to a private party insulates the government from paying the full value
to its owner. Likewise it is a taking—here of $25—to demand that an individual
employer hire a worker for $100 per hour when the employer thinks that the labor
is worth on $75. That is just what is happening here on a mass basis, given that
compulsory arbitration offers no protection against the expropriation risk of forcing
employers to pay far more for workers than they would voluntarily do. Stated
otherwise, the difference here is as follows. The state may without compensation
set a minimum wage for workers. But it cannot, without compensation, force the
employer to hire workers at that wage when it does not wish to do so.
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In response to this line of argument, it could be urged that other statutes
force property owners to do business with others on unfavorable terms. Thus rent
control statutes have long been held constitutional. 28 But surely these statutes
would fail on constitutional grounds if the tenant were allowed to live on the
premises for no rent at all. Indeed, as the law in this area has evolved, the current
rent control statutes do not give the government complete freedom in setting the
level of compensation that the landlord receives for its efforts. The modern rule
thus requires at the very least that the landlord be able to cover its costs, including
all costs associated with the original acquisition of the property and its overall
level. 29 That rule does not result in a per se invalidation of the EFCA that applies
under the logic of Loretto, but it does imply that something akin to the rate of return
analysis that is demanded in all rate making cases is considered. 30 Any protection of
this sort, however, is wholly absent here. It is, of course, possible that the Supreme
Court—where this statute will surely end up—might imply what this statute clearly
seems to deny, namely, an implied right of employers to mount judicial challenges
against excessive arbitral awards. Unfortunately, this seems precluded by the last
sentence of new Section 158(h)(3) that states baldly: “The arbitration panel shall
render a decision settling the dispute and such decision shall be binding upon the
parties for a period of 2 years, unless amended during such period by written
consent of the parties.” The term “binding” appears, moreover, not only to preclude
any appeal to an independent judicial tribunal, but also to deny that the arbitrator
must make some initial findings that the firm could stave off bankruptcy or continue
to earn revenues that assure it a reasonable rate of return on invested capital, which
other forms of ratemaking generally require. Indeed, the statutory language
contains no requirement for any written opinion explaining the reasons for the
arbitral award. In short, the precedents that truncate the constitutional protection
for economic liberties do not apply to a statute that denies a regulated firm the
ability either to exit from losing contracts or to obtain judicial review. The logic of
EFCA to force down quick settlements comes at too high a constitutional price.
The want, then, of any form of an exit right short of bankruptcy or liquidation
dooms this statute under current constitutional principles. Think here of the
comparisons to current law. No employer is required to hire a worker at the
stipulated minimum wage, or to supply overtime work. EFCA takes that additional,
and fatal, step. It both stipulates the term of agreement without supplying either the
option to withdraw or some guarantee of a reasonable rate of return after the
arbitral decree is in force. For such draconian actions a higher standard of review
seems appropriate—one that should invalidate the compulsory arbitration
provisions of EFCA under current constitutional law principles.
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CONCLUSION
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?

As this paper makes clear it is very difficult to critique the EFCA without
undertaking a close examination of some of the defects of our current labor law
system. EFCA only exaggerates the flaws of the current system. But what follows
from that critique? In the current political and legal environment, there is no
support for a return to the pre‐Wagner Act days. Rather, the opponents of EFCA are
determined defenders of the status quo, whatever their misgivings about the legal
regime that regulates management‐labor relations under the NLRA. Their position
is that modern firms have learned to adapt to the present union environment and
are able to deal with their workforce under the current law. They do not believe
that all employers are insensitive dolts, who would rather fire a worker than learn
from what he or she has to say. They believe that sound management practices and
forward looking workplace relationships can stave off unionization in any free and
fair election. Their view is that the existence of unfair labor practices is a minor
piece of the overall situation, to which all the provisions of EFCA, including its new
sanctions of ULP, are overkill. They also see this as a two‐sided problem, given the
eagerness of unions to resort to collateral attacks against employers through
litigation and administrative complaints. They treat the decline of unionization in
the private sector as stemming from the increased realization by workers that they
are not on balance and in the long run made better off by unions, whose fortress
mentality cripples workers’ prospects for advancement in today’s global economy.
And most of the time these defenders of the status quo are right. Workers
who sign on to union representation tie their futures to an organization, that need
not represent their interests and which may not be nimble enough to make the
needed adjustments in today’s highly competitive global economy. Unions
themselves acknowledge this point by their own behavior. They do not act as sales
representatives who offer firms goods and services that their customers are only too
happy to buy. Rather, they engage in multiple front wars that involve litigation,
resort to administrative harassment, boycotts, pickets and public denunciation to
achieve their goals. The implicit claim in all this behavior—widely practiced but
rarely acknowledged frankly—is this: you can be less worse off with the union than
your are in the throes of an open‐ended organization campaign. That strategy is no
way to forge good relationships or increase productivity.
Management representatives react to these new aggressive tactics with
predictable hostility. The purpose of this extended essay is to explain what
motivates their behavior, and why the status quo, with all its imperfections, will
outperform any system that adopts card check rules for union recognition and

104
compulsory arbitration for a two‐year first contract, augmented by tougher
penalties for employer ULPs. Legislation often promises grand improvements, only
to be entrenched before its failures become evident. The correct presumption in all
cases is that further legislation, being costly, has to be shown to be a good, or
otherwise it should be treated as harm. EFCA does not come close to passing that
test, which is why there are strong and principled reasons to reason to oppose, and
oppose vigorously, its passage.
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APPENDIX

THE EMPLOYER FREE CHOICE ACT
S. 1041 (H.R. 800)
110th CONGRESS
1st Session
To amend the National Labor Relations Act to establish an efficient system to enable
employees to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to provide for mandatory
injunctions for unfair labor practices during organizing efforts, and for other
purposes.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
March 29, 2007
Mr. KENNEDY (for himself, Mr. DODD, Mr. HARKIN, Ms. MIKULSKI, Mr. BINGAMAN,
Mrs. MURRAY, Mr. REED, Mrs. CLINTON, Mr. OBAMA, Mr. SANDERS, Mr. BROWN,
Mr. BYRD, Mr. INOUYE, Mr. BIDEN, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. BAUCUS, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. KERRY,
Mr. ROCKEFELLER, Mr. REID, Mr. CONRAD, Mr. KOHL, Mr. LIEBERMAN, Mr. AKAKA,
Mrs. FEINSTEIN, Mr. DORGAN, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. FEINGOLD, Mr. WYDEN, Mr.
DURBIN, Mr. JOHNSON, Ms. LANDRIEU, Mr. SCHUMER, Mr. BAYH, Mr. CARPER, Ms.
STABENOW, Ms. CANTWELL, Mr. NELSON of Florida, Mr. LAUTENBERG, Mr.
MENENDEZ, Mr. CARDIN, Mr. WEBB, Mr. CASEY, Mrs. MCCASKILL, Ms. KLOBUCHAR,
Mr. WHITEHOUSE, and Mr. TESTER) introduced the following bill; which was read
twice and referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
A BILL
To amend the National Labor Relations Act to establish an efficient system to enable
employees to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to provide for mandatory
injunctions for unfair labor practices during organizing efforts, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled,
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SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the `Employee Free Choice Act of 2007'.

SEC. 2. STREAMLINING UNION CERTIFICATION.
(a) In General‐ Section 9(c) of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 159(c))
is amended by adding at the end the following:
`(6) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, whenever a petition shall
have been filed by an employee or group of employees or any individual or
labor organization acting in their behalf alleging that a majority of employees
in a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining wish to be
represented by an individual or labor organization for such purposes, the
Board shall investigate the petition. If the Board finds that a majority of the
employees in a unit appropriate for bargaining has signed valid
authorizations designating the individual or labor organization specified in
the petition as their bargaining representative and that no other individual
or labor organization is currently certified or recognized as the exclusive
representative of any of the employees in the unit, the Board shall not direct
an election but shall certify the individual or labor organization as the
representative described in subsection (a).
`(7) The Board shall develop guidelines and procedures for the designation by
employees of a bargaining representative in the manner described in
paragraph (6). Such guidelines and procedures shall include‐‐
`(A) model collective bargaining authorization language that may be used for
purposes of making the designations described in paragraph (6); and
`(B) procedures to be used by the Board to establish the validity of signed
authorizations designating bargaining representatives.'.
(b) Conforming Amendments‐
(1) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD‐ Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 153(b)) is amended, in the second sentence‐‐
(A) by striking `and to' and inserting `to'; and
(B) by striking `and certify the results thereof,' and inserting `, and to issue
certifications as provided for in that section,'.
(2) UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES‐ Section 8(b) of the National Labor Relations Act
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(29 U.S.C. 158(b)) is amended‐‐
(A) in paragraph (7)(B) by striking `, or' and inserting `or a petition has been
filed under section 9(c)(6), or'; and
(B) in paragraph (7)(C) by striking `when such a petition has been filed' and
inserting `when such a petition other than a petition under
section 9(c)(6) has been filed'.

SEC. 3. FACILITATING INITIAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS.
Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 158) is amended by adding
at the end the following:
`(h) Whenever collective bargaining is for the purpose of establishing an initial
agreement following certification or recognition, the provisions of subsection
(d) shall be modified as follows:
`(1) Not later than 10 days after receiving a written request for collective
bargaining from an individual or labor organization that has been
newly organized or certified as a representative as defined in section
9(a), or within such further period as the parties agree upon, the
parties shall meet and commence to bargain collectively and shall
make every reasonable effort to conclude and sign a collective
bargaining agreement.
`(2) If after the expiration of the 90‐day period beginning on the date on which
bargaining is commenced, or such additional period as the parties
may agree upon, the parties have failed to reach an agreement, either
party may notify the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service of the
existence of a dispute and request mediation. Whenever such a
request is received, it shall be the duty of the Service promptly to put
itself in communication with the parties and to use its best efforts, by
mediation and conciliation, to bring them to agreement.
`(3) If after the expiration of the 30‐day period beginning on the date on which
the request for mediation is made under paragraph (2), or such
additional period as the parties may agree upon, the Service is not
able to bring the parties to agreement by conciliation, the Service shall
refer the dispute to an arbitration board established in accordance
with such regulations as may be prescribed by the Service. The
arbitration panel shall render a decision settling the dispute and such
decision shall be binding upon the parties for a period of 2 years,
unless amended during such period by written consent of the parties.'.
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SEC. 4. STRENGTHENING ENFORCEMENT.
(a) Injunctions Against Unfair Labor Practices During Organizing Drives‐
(1) IN GENERAL‐ Section 10(l) of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C.
160(l)) is amended‐‐
(A) in the second sentence, by striking `If, after such' and inserting the following:
`(2) If, after such'; and
(B) by striking the first sentence and inserting the following:
`(1) Whenever it is charged‐‐
`(A) that any employer‐‐
`(i) discharged or otherwise discriminated against an employee in violation of
subsection (a)(3) of section 8;
`(ii) threatened to discharge or to otherwise discriminate against an employee in
violation of subsection (a)(1) of section 8; or
`(iii) engaged in any other unfair labor practice within the meaning of subsection
(a)(1) that significantly interferes with, restrains, or coerces
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7;
while employees of that employer were seeking representation by a labor
organization or during the period after a labor organization was
recognized as a representative defined in section 9(a) until the first
collective bargaining contract is entered into between the employer
and the representative; or
`(B) that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning
of subparagraph (A), (B) or (C) of section 8(b)(4), section 8(e), or
section 8(b)(7);
the preliminary investigation of such charge shall be made forthwith and given
priority over all other cases except cases of like character in the office where
it is filed or to which it is referred.'.
(2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT‐ Section 10(m) of the National Labor Relations
Act (29 U.S.C. 160(m)) is amended by inserting `under circumstances
not subject to section 10(l)' after `section 8'.
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(b) Remedies for Violations‐
(1) BACKPAY‐ Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C.
160(c)) is amended by striking `And provided further,' and inserting
`Provided further, That if the Board finds that an employer has
discriminated against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) of
section 8 while employees of the employer were seeking
representation by a labor organization, or during the period after a
labor organization was recognized as a representative defined in
subsection (a) of section 9 until the first collective bargaining contract
was entered into between the employer and the representative, the
Board in such order shall award the employee back pay and, in
addition, 2 times that amount as liquidated damages: Provided
further,'.
(2) CIVIL PENALTIES‐ Section 12 of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C.
162) is amended‐‐
(A) by striking `Any' and inserting `(a) Any'; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
`(b) Any employer who willfully or repeatedly commits any unfair labor practice
within the meaning of subsections (a)(1) or (a)(3) of section 8 while
employees of the employer are seeking representation by a labor
organization or during the period after a labor organization has been
recognized as a representative defined in subsection (a) of section 9 until the
first collective bargaining contract is entered into between the employer and
the representative shall, in addition to any make‐whole remedy ordered, be
subject to a civil penalty of not to exceed $20,000 for each violation. In
determining the amount of any penalty under this section, the Board shall
consider the gravity of the unfair labor practice and the impact of the unfair
labor practice on the charging party, on other persons seeking to exercise
rights guaranteed by this Act, or on the public interest.'.
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13
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